[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 06/15] x86/emul: Rework emulator event injection
At 17:19 +0000 on 24 Nov (1480007992), Andrew Cooper wrote: > On 24/11/16 17:08, Jan Beulich wrote: > >>>> On 24.11.16 at 18:00, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > >> On 24/11/16 14:53, Jan Beulich wrote: > >>>>>> On 23.11.16 at 16:38, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > >>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c > >>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c > >>>> @@ -5377,7 +5377,7 @@ int ptwr_do_page_fault(struct vcpu *v, unsigned > >>>> long addr, > >>>> page_unlock(page); > >>>> put_page(page); > >>>> > >>>> - if ( rc == X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE ) > >>>> + if ( rc == X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE || ptwr_ctxt.ctxt.event_pending ) > >>>> goto bail; > >>>> > >>>> perfc_incr(ptwr_emulations); > >>>> @@ -5501,7 +5501,8 @@ int mmio_ro_do_page_fault(struct vcpu *v, unsigned > >>>> long addr, > >>>> else > >>>> rc = x86_emulate(&ctxt, &mmio_ro_emulate_ops); > >>>> > >>>> - return rc != X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE ? EXCRET_fault_fixed : 0; > >>>> + return ((rc != X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE && !ctxt.event_pending) > >>>> + ? EXCRET_fault_fixed : 0); > >>>> } > >>> Wouldn't these two better be adjusted to check for OKAY and RETRY, > >>> the more that iirc we had settled on it not (yet) being guaranteed to > >>> see event_pending set whenever getting back EXCEPTION? > >> In this patch, the key point I am guarding against is that, without the > >> ->inject_*() hooks, some actions which previously took a fail_if() path > >> now succeed and latch an event. > >> > >> From that point of view, it doesn't matter how the event became pending, > >> but the fact that one is means that it was a codepath which would > >> previously have returned UNHANDLEABLE. > >> > >> > >> Later patches, which stop raising faults behind the back of emulator, > >> are the ones where new consideration is needed towards the handling of > >> EXCEPTION/event_pending. Following Tim's feedback, I have more work to > >> do in patch 9, as propagate_page_fault() raises #PF behind the back of > >> the emulator for PV guests. > >> > >> In other words, I think this patch wants to stay like this, and a later > >> one change to be better accommodating. > > Okay. > > > >>>> @@ -3433,7 +3433,7 @@ static int sh_page_fault(struct vcpu *v, > >>>> shadow_continue_emulation(&emul_ctxt, regs); > >>>> v->arch.paging.last_write_was_pt = 0; > >>>> r = x86_emulate(&emul_ctxt.ctxt, emul_ops); > >>>> - if ( r == X86EMUL_OKAY ) > >>>> + if ( r == X86EMUL_OKAY && !emul_ctxt.ctxt.event_pending ) > >>> Aiui you need this for the swint case. > >> Why? software interrupts were never previously tolerated in shadow > >> emulation. > > Then why would you expect OKAY together with event_pending set? > > I'm not saying swint handling needs to succeed here, but I can't see > > anything else to cause that particular state to occur. > > Before this patch, a VM playing race conditions with the emulator could > cause this case to emulate 0xcc, which would fail because of the lack of > ->inject_sw_interrupt() hook, and return X86_UNHANDLEABLE. > > The changes in this patch now mean that the same case would properly > latch #BP, returning OKAY because its a trap not an exception. > > By not explicitly failing the OKAY case with an event pending, we are > suddenly opening up rather more functionality than previously existed. > > > > >>> But wouldn't you then need to add similar checks in OKAY paths elsewhere? > >> I don't see why I would. Does my explanation above resolve your concern? > > I'm afraid not: On the same basis as above, code not expecting to > > handle swint may now see OKAY together with event_pending set, > > and would need to indicate failure to their callers just like you do in > > sh_page_fault(). > > That is my intent with the current code. I have double checked it, and > it still looks correct. So is that not the case I was worried about, where the emulator updates register state but we then drop the expected event on the floor? Tim. _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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