|
[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [xen-unstable-smoke test] 101887: regressions - FAIL
flight 101887 xen-unstable-smoke real [real] http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/101887/ Regressions :-( Tests which did not succeed and are blocking, including tests which could not be run: test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-i386 9 debian-hvm-install fail REGR. vs. 101834 build-armhf 5 xen-build fail REGR. vs. 101834 Tests which did not succeed, but are not blocking: test-armhf-armhf-xl 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-libvirt 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass version targeted for testing: xen 6723676c2651a40855e37861315569892fa2b923 baseline version: xen 496673a2ada93c201fbe1cc83146c8bd8e79169d Last test of basis 101834 2016-10-31 22:10:29 Z 2 days Failing since 101884 2016-11-03 12:02:50 Z 0 days 2 attempts Testing same since 101887 2016-11-03 14:03:07 Z 0 days 1 attempts ------------------------------------------------------------ People who touched revisions under test: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@xxxxxxxxxx> George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx> Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> jobs: build-amd64 pass build-armhf fail build-amd64-libvirt pass test-armhf-armhf-xl blocked test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-i386 fail test-amd64-amd64-libvirt pass ------------------------------------------------------------ sg-report-flight on osstest.test-lab.xenproject.org logs: /home/logs/logs images: /home/logs/images Logs, config files, etc. are available at http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs Explanation of these reports, and of osstest in general, is at http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=osstest.git;a=blob;f=README.email;hb=master http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=osstest.git;a=blob;f=README;hb=master Test harness code can be found at http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb?p=osstest.git;a=summary Not pushing. ------------------------------------------------------------ commit 6723676c2651a40855e37861315569892fa2b923 Author: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Nov 3 13:19:03 2016 +0100 docs: document ACPI usage in PVHv2 guests It is possible for PVHv2 guests to get the hardware description from ACPI tables, add this to the documentation also. Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> commit 33b79dd04445b3ce289aa821eed8d812157478d6 Author: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Nov 3 12:29:21 2016 +0100 docs: fixup PVHv2 documentation regarding AP startup On PVHv2 guests the local APIC can also be used to start APs if present. Amend the documentation in order to reflect this. Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> commit 12bc22f79117dfae5e59382cdda6b8b6b70a7554 Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Wed Nov 2 14:43:48 2016 +0000 x86/emul: Reject LGDT/LIDT attempts with non-canonical base addresses No sane OS would deliberately try this, but make Xen's emulation match real hardware by delivering #GP(0), rather than suffering a VMEntry failure. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx> Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> commit ff53c65311a32e54dba51f2b8112632e9dd2af3b Author: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Wed Nov 2 14:10:37 2016 +0000 libxl: disallow enabling PoD and ALTP2M at the same time That combination would cause Xen to crash. Note that although this is a security issue, is not XSA-worthy because ALTP2M is experimental. Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> commit 3c79495579adddee535c2b7f8c332e4517764a0e Author: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Wed Nov 2 16:05:03 2016 +0100 features: declare the Credit2 scheduler as Supported Credit2 is available in tree as an "Experimental" scheduler since a few years. Recently, effort started for making it production ready and, eventually, the new Xen's default scheduler. As a consequence of that, it has undergone a great deal of development, testing and benchmarking. In fact, Credit2's much more modern (wrt Credit1) design and cleaner code makes it a lot easier to understand what the scheduler is doing, fix scheduling issues that may come up, and implement new and more advanced features, in future. In some more details: - key features that were missing (pinning and context switching rate-limiting) have now been implemented, and more (soft affinity, caps and reservations) are about to come. The gap wrt Credit1 is therefore closing. In particular, with pinning and rate-limiting available, the scheduler can be considered usable. - Credit2 is tested by OSSTest since long time. Furthermore, as a part of recent efforts, stress tests and benchmarks have been run and shown no bugs or stability issues. - A number of different benchmarks have been run, most of them comparing Credit2 with Credit1. Some of the results were posted on xen-devel, some others have been illustrated during a talk at 2016 edition of Xen-Project Developer Summit. In general, performance look promising --if not better than Credit1 already, in some of the cases. It therefore appears that we are ready to mark the Credit2 scheduler as a 'Supported' feature, and ask users to look at it and try it, if they think it suits their needs. Of course, declaring something 'Supported' has security implications. So here it is how the situation looks like from a security standpoint: 1) Is guest->host privilege escalation possible? The only interfaces exposed to unprivileged guests are the SCHEDOP hypercalls, and timers. None of those hypercalls contain any pointers, and they don't look to contain any privilege escalation path. Also, they're not specific to Credit2, as they're "used" by all schedulers (ingluding the current default, Credit1), so anything about these interfaces would be a security concern already. 2) Is guest user->guest kernel escalation possible? The guest kernel is not really relying on anything from the scheduler to protect itself or any data in any way. 3) Is there any information leakage? The only information which the scheduler exposes to unprivileged guests is the timing information. This may be able to be used for side-channel attacks to probabilistically infer things about other vcpus running on the same system; but this has not traditionally been considered within the security boundary. And, again, this is possible with all schedulers. The control domain can issue DOMCTL_SCHEDOP and SYSCTL_SCHEDOP hypercalls, but the involved data structures are handled in a way that does not leak information (which would be leaked "only" to Dom0 anyway). 4) Can a Denial-of-Service be triggered? This is a risk, with schedulers, and one that's hard to foresee. For instance, it _did_ happen on Credit1, in the past (a vcpu could "game the system" by sleeping at particular times to gain BOOST priority and monopolize 95% of the cpu). In that case, it was possible because of the probabilistic nature of accounting in Credit1 (which was then fixed). Well, Credit2: - already do accurate, rather than probabilistic, accounting; - does not have any BOOST or, in general, any way for a vcpu to become 'more important' than the others: they're all subjected to the same crediting algorithm. Also note that, the accounting and the crediting algorithm are a lot simpler than in Credit1, and hence a lot easier to understand, debug and audit. Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> commit fecf584294c6b00d95de0ecdb5e02269d8d9b4c9 Author: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Mon Oct 31 17:03:04 2016 +0000 Config.mk: fix comment for debug option Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx> Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> commit 31d41d7bc87d0d2a24ac965b37793faa40d23dcb Author: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Mon Oct 31 17:42:25 2016 +0000 build: make debug option affect tools only The debug option in Config.mk affects hypervisor, tools and stubdom by appending different flags to CFLAGS. Mini-os under extra is not affected because it already has its own build system when it is separated from xen.git. It is undesirable because now hypervisor build is affected by both Kconfig and debug. Disentangle the semantics of debug by pushing relevant options to individual sub-systems. For hypervisor, the flags previously added by debug option is now controlled by CONFIG_DEBUG. For tools, flags are moved from config/*.mk into tools/Rules.mk. For stubdom, because it unilaterally sets debug=y before including top-level Config.mk, we only need to move the debug build set of flags into stubdom Makefile. Specifically there are some considerations on what flags are picked: 1. we don't need -fno-optimize-sibling-calls anymore because gcc doc indicates that it is not enabled for -O1, which we already set in the debug build. 2. for tools we use -O0 -g3 in Rules.mk because they already take precedence over the flags set in config/*.mk. 3. for hypervisor we don't add -fno-omit-frame-pointer to debug build because that's controlled by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. This patch doesn't intend to tune those flags, but to provide identical set of effective flags as before. The debug option in Config.mk will only affect tools components after this patch is applied. Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> commit e1d1c68ea8a3354ba7474f15303d0a9086ba3287 Author: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Mon Oct 31 17:01:12 2016 +0000 xen: disable debug build Xen debug build is controlled by Kconfig. Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx> Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> (qemu changes not included) _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
|
 |
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |