[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v5 4/4] x86/ioreq server: Reset outstanding p2m_ioreq_server entries when an ioreq server unmaps.
>>> On 09.08.16 at 11:25, <yu.c.zhang@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On 8/9/2016 4:13 PM, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>>> On 09.08.16 at 09:39, <yu.c.zhang@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> On 8/9/2016 12:29 AM, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>>>>> On 12.07.16 at 11:02, <yu.c.zhang@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>> @@ -5512,6 +5513,12 @@ static int hvmop_set_mem_type( >>>>> if ( rc ) >>>>> goto out; >>>>> >>>>> + if ( t == p2m_ram_rw && memtype[a.hvmmem_type] == >>>>> p2m_ioreq_server ) >>>>> + p2m->ioreq.entry_count++; >>>>> + >>>>> + if ( t == p2m_ioreq_server && memtype[a.hvmmem_type] == >>>>> p2m_ram_rw ) >>>>> + p2m->ioreq.entry_count--; >>>>> + >>>> These (and others below) happen, afaict, outside of any lock, which >>>> can't be right. >>> How about we make this entry_count as atomic_t and use atomic_inc/dec >>> instead? >> That's certainly one of the options, but beware of overflow. > > Oh, thanks for your remind, Jan. I just found that atomic_t is defined > as "typedef struct { int counter; } atomic_t;" > which do have overflow issues if entry_count is supposed to be a uint32 > or uint64. > > Now I have another thought: the entry_count is referenced in 3 > different scenarios: > 1> the hvmop handlers - hvmop_set_mem_type() and > hvmop_map_mem_type_to_ioreq_server(), > which are triggered by device model, and will not be concurrent. And > hvmop_set_mem_type() will > permit the mem type change only when an ioreq server has already been > mapped to this type. You shouldn't rely on a well behaved dm, and that's already leaving aside the question whether there couldn't even be well behaved use cases of parallel invocations of this op. > 2> the misconfiguration handlers - resolve_misconfig() or do_recalc(), > which are triggered by HVM's > vm exit, yet this will only happen after the ioreq server has already > been unmapped. This means the > accesses to the entry_count will not be concurrent with the above hvmop > handlers. This case may be fine, but not for (just) the named reason: Multiple misconfig invocations can happen at the same time, but presumably your addition is inside the p2m-locked region (you'd have to double check that). > 3> routine hap_enable_log_dirty() - this can be triggered by tool stack > at any time, but only by read > access to this entry_count, so a read_atomic() would work. A read access may be fine, but only if the value can't get incremented in a racy way. Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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