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Re: [Xen-devel] Device model operation hypercall (DMOP, re qemu depriv)
- To: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx>
- From: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 3 Aug 2016 17:10:48 +0100
- Cc: StefanoStabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>, Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>, George Dunlap <George.Dunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx>, David Vrabel <david.vrabel@xxxxxxxxxx>, Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>, Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@xxxxxxxxxx>, xen-devel <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Delivery-date: Wed, 03 Aug 2016 16:11:06 +0000
- List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xen.org>
George Dunlap writes ("Re: Device model operation hypercall (DMOP, re qemu
depriv)"):
> So before qemu devpriv can be usable, *all* the HVMCTL operations would
> need to be audited, and those that were deemed insecure would need to be
> either fixed or removed.
Even worse, the bad HVMCTLs would be retrospectively turned into
security-bugs-in-old-hypervisors. I don't think this is tenable.
Ian.
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