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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86/monitor: minor left-shift undefined behavior checks


  • To: Corneliu ZUZU <czuzu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • From: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Thu, 18 Feb 2016 16:03:44 +0200
  • Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxx>, Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
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  • Delivery-date: Thu, 18 Feb 2016 14:03:08 +0000
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  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xen.org>

On 02/18/2016 12:53 PM, Corneliu ZUZU wrote:
> This minor patch adds a range-check to avoid left-shift caused undefined
> behavior. Also replaces '1 <<' w/ '1U <<' @ x86 monitor.h in an effort to 
> avoid
> a future potential '1 << 31' that would cause a similar issue.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Corneliu ZUZU <czuzu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>  xen/arch/x86/monitor.c        | 13 +++++++++----
>  xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h | 10 +++++-----
>  2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c b/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c
> index a507edb..b4bd008 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c
> @@ -32,10 +32,15 @@ int arch_monitor_domctl_event(struct domain *d,
>      {
>      case XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_WRITE_CTRLREG:
>      {
> -        unsigned int ctrlreg_bitmask =
> -            monitor_ctrlreg_bitmask(mop->u.mov_to_cr.index);
> -        bool_t old_status =
> -            !!(ad->monitor.write_ctrlreg_enabled & ctrlreg_bitmask);
> +        unsigned int ctrlreg_bitmask;
> +        bool_t old_status;
> +
> +        /* sanity check: avoid left-shift undefined behavior */
> +        if ( unlikely(mop->u.mov_to_cr.index > 31) )
> +            return -EINVAL;
> +
> +        ctrlreg_bitmask = monitor_ctrlreg_bitmask(mop->u.mov_to_cr.index);
> +        old_status = !!(ad->monitor.write_ctrlreg_enabled & ctrlreg_bitmask);
>  
>          if ( unlikely(old_status == requested_status) )
>              return -EEXIST;
> diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h
> index c789f71..f1bf4bd 100644
> --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h
> +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h
> @@ -40,14 +40,14 @@ static inline uint32_t 
> arch_monitor_get_capabilities(struct domain *d)
>      if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) || !cpu_has_vmx )
>          return capabilities;
>  
> -    capabilities = (1 << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_WRITE_CTRLREG) |
> -                   (1 << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_MOV_TO_MSR) |
> -                   (1 << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_SOFTWARE_BREAKPOINT) |
> -                   (1 << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_GUEST_REQUEST);
> +    capabilities = (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_WRITE_CTRLREG) |
> +                   (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_MOV_TO_MSR) |
> +                   (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_SOFTWARE_BREAKPOINT) |
> +                   (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_GUEST_REQUEST);
>  
>      /* Since we know this is on VMX, we can just call the hvm func */
>      if ( hvm_is_singlestep_supported() )
> -        capabilities |= (1 << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_SINGLESTEP);
> +        capabilities |= (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_SINGLESTEP);
>  
>      return capabilities;
>  }

Acked-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>



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