[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86/hvm: Fix use-after-free introduced by c/s 428607a
On 2/1/2016 7:56 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote: c/s 428607a "x86: shrink 'struct domain', was already PAGE_SIZE" introduced a use-after-free error during domain destruction, because of the order in which timers are torn down. (XEN) Xen call trace: (XEN) [<ffff82d08013344e>] spinlock.c#check_lock+0x1e/0x40 (XEN) [<ffff82d08013349b>] _spin_lock+0x11/0x52 (XEN) [<ffff82d0801e8076>] vpt.c#pt_lock+0x24/0x40 (XEN) [<ffff82d0801e88f4>] destroy_periodic_time+0x18/0x81 (XEN) [<ffff82d0801e1089>] rtc_deinit+0x53/0x78 (XEN) [<ffff82d0801d1e5a>] hvm_domain_destroy+0x52/0x69 (XEN) [<ffff82d08016a758>] arch_domain_destroy+0x1a/0x98 (XEN) [<ffff82d080107cd5>] domain.c#complete_domain_destroy+0x6f/0x182 (XEN) [<ffff82d080126a19>] rcupdate.c#rcu_process_callbacks+0x144/0x1a6 (XEN) [<ffff82d080132c52>] softirq.c#__do_softirq+0x82/0x8d (XEN) [<ffff82d080132caa>] do_softirq+0x13/0x15 (XEN) [<ffff82d080248ae1>] entry.o#process_softirqs+0x21/0x30 (XEN) (XEN) (XEN) **************************************** (XEN) Panic on CPU 3: (XEN) GENERAL PROTECTION FAULT (XEN) [error_code=0000] (XEN) **************************************** Defer the freeing of d->arch.hvm_domain.pl_time until all timers have been destroyed. For safety, NULL out the pointers after freeing them, in an attempt to make mistakes more obvious in the future. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> --- CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx> CC: Corneliu ZUZU <czuzu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c index f24400d..38c65b3 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c @@ -1674,8 +1674,10 @@ void hvm_domain_relinquish_resources(struct domain *d) void hvm_domain_destroy(struct domain *d) { xfree(d->arch.hvm_domain.io_handler); + d->arch.hvm_domain.io_handler = NULL; + xfree(d->arch.hvm_domain.params); - xfree(d->arch.hvm_domain.pl_time); + d->arch.hvm_domain.params = NULL;hvm_destroy_cacheattr_region_list(d); @@ -1686,6 +1688,9 @@ void hvm_domain_destroy(struct domain *d)rtc_deinit(d); stdvga_deinit(d); vioapic_deinit(d); + + xfree(d->arch.hvm_domain.pl_time); + d->arch.hvm_domain.pl_time = NULL; }static int hvm_save_tsc_adjust(struct domain *d, hvm_domain_context_t *h) Ups, really sorry, ashamed to say I've done the mistake of not actually testing this on a machine (working on ARM here). Won't happen again, if I'm to send another patch I'll be sure to actually setup an X86 Dom0 & at least do some basic tests. Regarding the "set to NULL after free" practice, wouldn't it be wise to define an xfreeandnull(void**) macro and use the "unsafe" xfree only when it makes sense to (proly most of the time it won't)? Corneliu. _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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