[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 1/6] libelf: rewrite symtab/strtab loading for Dom0

El 21/01/16 a les 18.29, Ian Jackson ha escrit:
> Roger Pau Monne writes ("[PATCH v4 1/6] libelf: rewrite symtab/strtab loading 
> for Dom0"):
>> Current implementation of elf_load_bsdsyms is broken when loading inside of
>> a HVM guest, because it assumes elf_memcpy_safe is able to write into guest
>> memory space, which it is not.
>> Take the oportunity to do some cleanup and properly document how
>> elf_{parse/load}_bsdsyms works. The new implementation uses elf_load_image
>> when dealing with data that needs to be copied to the guest memory space.
>> Also reduce the number of section headers copied to the minimum necessary.
> ...
>>  #define elf_hdr_elm(_elf, _hdr, _elm, _val)     \
>>  do {                                            \
>>      if ( elf_64bit(_elf) )                      \
>> -        elf_store_field(_elf, _hdr, e64._elm, _val);  \
>> +        (_hdr).e64._elm = _val;                 \
> This seems to bypass the safe store mechanism which was introduced to
> fix XSA-55.

This macro is only used to store fields inside of a structure that's
allocated on the stack, and it doesn't involve any kind of pointer
magic/arithmetic. The way it was used previously in this function indeed
required the use of the _safe mechanism in order to prevent writing into
arbitrary memory places, because we were actually modifying guest memory

I could restore the previous behaviour, but that would mean adding some
handlers in order to access the structure. Since this is only used for
Dom0, which already makes use of the elf_memcpy_unchecked function as
called by elf_store_val which is in turn called from elf_store_field, so
it's not like we were protected previously anyway.


Xen-devel mailing list



Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our
servers 24x7x365 and backed by RackSpace's Fanatical Support®.