[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] Xen Security Advisory 167 (CVE-2016-1570) - PV superpage functionality missing sanity checks
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Xen Security Advisory CVE-2016-1570 / XSA-167 version 4 PV superpage functionality missing sanity checks UPDATES IN VERSION 4 ==================== Public release. ISSUE DESCRIPTION ================= The PV superpage functionality lacks certain validity checks on data being passed to the hypervisor by guests. This is the case for the page identifier (MFN) passed to MMUEXT_MARK_SUPER and MMUEXT_UNMARK_SUPER sub-ops of the HYPERVISOR_mmuext_op hypercall as well as for various forms of page table updates. IMPACT ====== Use of the feature, which is disabled by default, may have unknown effects, ranging from information leaks through Denial of Service to privilege escalation. VULNERABLE SYSTEMS ================== Only systems which enable the PV superpage feature are affected. That is, only systems with an `allowsuperpage' setting on the hypervisor command line. Note that in Xen 4.0.x and 3.4.x the option is named `allowhugepage'. Xen versions 3.4.0, 3.4.1, and from 4.1 onwards are affected. Only x86 systems are affected. Only PV guests can exploit the vulnerability. MITIGATION ========== Running only HVM guests will avoid this issue. Not enabling PV superpage support (by omitting the `allowsuperpage' or `allowhugepage' hypervisor command line options) will avoid exposing the issue. CREDITS ======= This issue was discovered by Qinghao Tang of 360 Marvel Team. RESOLUTION ========== Applying the appropriate attached patch resolves this issue. xsa167.patch xen-unstable xsa167-4.6.patch Xen 4.6.x, 4.5.x xsa167-4.4.patch Xen 4.4.x, 4.3.x $ sha256sum xsa167* a71f709eef59425cb2113fa48d3b44048c6bf41063200fee1c847f6e0ed45a09 xsa167.patch 194c1ce89292f4cbb9980baa703095bcbeb5849abf46d193e07a98a0d8301f78 xsa167-4.4.patch 2bd786cccfd13c6732d6db8afc9e18058465efcb1bc93f894c359e3a820d5403 xsa167-4.6.patch $ DEPLOYMENT DURING EMBARGO ========================= Deployment of the patches and/or mitigations described above (or others which are substantially similar) is permitted during the embargo, even on public-facing systems with untrusted guest users and administrators. However deployment of the SUPERPAGE DISABLEMENT MITIGATION is NOT permitted (except where all the affected systems and VMs are administered and used only by organisations which are members of the Xen Project Security Issues Predisclosure List). Specifically, deployment on public cloud systems is NOT permitted. This is because disabling PV superpage support is visible to guests, so such deployment could lead to the rediscovery of the vulnerability. Deployment of the mitigation is permitted only AFTER the embargo ends. Also: Distribution of updated software is prohibited (except to other members of the predisclosure list). Predisclosure list members who wish to deploy significantly different patches and/or mitigations, please contact the Xen Project Security Team. (Note: this during-embargo deployment notice is retained in post-embargo publicly released Xen Project advisories, even though it is then no longer applicable. This is to enable the community to have oversight of the Xen Project Security Team's decisionmaking.) For more information about permissible uses of embargoed information, consult the Xen Project community's agreed Security Policy: http://www.xenproject.org/security-policy.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJWn3jEAAoJEIP+FMlX6CvZTOsH/2ReFJ0Yhp5da69XKvFEJR/s 0yEFxjvqiSyBPsWjyiaAdOp/1A2sltEeDDnMy7xEoXHmon0p6IV0IR4L+fMCLjl2 1ZI4tKpkn3zUE+IOjfu/GJ53f87XWSq/u9Ri7yZQdxFpgd3AXcLegGm8i4L/58iY vdwAAuczACztEN/NbWFedlGUEd5PKqKwb4wOg1uhLIMwzvjxgtejVAyZD83HgP6i LeWMO7EfeU8ND38Otiw9lNlKD/Ia7vpRG+BXuADLx18hbR1TU9AJ0RO1zb9JnAAj snYdgB6s1wzRD4/HOc+s1uaIttPPODs0IhZunylI7UVhdWKp5Qkszw/QUcmufnk= =5acB -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Attachment:
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xsa167-4.6.patch _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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