[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] Xen Security Advisory 155 (CVE-2015-8550) - paravirtualized drivers incautious about shared memory
On Mon, Jan 04, 2016 at 02:06:32PM +0100, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote: > On Tue, Dec 22, 2015 at 10:06:25AM -0500, Eric Shelton wrote: > > The XSA mentions that "PV frontend patches will be developed and > > released (publicly) after the embargo date." Has anything been done > > towards this that should also be incorporated into MiniOS? On a > > system utilizing a "driver domain," where a backend is running on a > > domain that is considered unprivileged and untrusted (such as the > > example described in http://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Driver_Domain), > > it seems XSA-155-style double fetch vulnerabilities in the frontends > > are also a potential security concern, and should be eliminated. > > However, perhaps that does not include pcifront, since pciback would > > always be running in dom0. > > And BTW the same applies to Linux frontends, for which also I haven't seen > any public development. In attachment my email to > xen-security-issues-discuss list (sent during embargo), with patches > attached there. I haven't got any response. Could you post it using git-send-email please? I took a quick glance at them but didn't get a chance to do an indepth look. _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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