Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 08/10] x86/hvm: pkeys, add pkeys support for do_page_fault

[Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>]

On 16/11/15 10:31, Huaitong Han wrote:
> This patch adds pkeys support for do_page_fault.
>
> the protection keys architecture define a new status bit in the PFEC. PFEC.PK
> (bit 5) is set to 1 if an only if protection keys block the access.
>
> Protection keys block an access and induce a page fault if and only if
> 1.Protection keys are enabled (CR4.PKE=1 and EFER.LMA=1), and
> 2.The page has a valid translation (page is present with no reserved bit
>   violations), and
> 3.The access is not an instruction fetch, and
> 4.The access is to a user page, and
> 5.At least one of the following restrictions apply:
>     --The access is a data read or data write and AD=1
>     --The access is a data write and WD=1 and either CR0.WP=1 or (CR0.WP=0 and
>     it is a user access)
>
> Signed-off-by: Huaitong Han <huaitong.han@xxxxxxxxx>
>
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
> index 9f5a6c6..73abb3b 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
> @@ -1287,7 +1287,7 @@ enum pf_type {
>      spurious_fault
>  };
>  
> -static enum pf_type __page_fault_type(
> +static enum pf_type __page_fault_type(struct vcpu *vcpu,
>      unsigned long addr, const struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
>  {
>      unsigned long mfn, cr3 = read_cr3();
> @@ -1295,7 +1295,7 @@ static enum pf_type __page_fault_type(
>      l3_pgentry_t l3e, *l3t;
>      l2_pgentry_t l2e, *l2t;
>      l1_pgentry_t l1e, *l1t;
> -    unsigned int required_flags, disallowed_flags, page_user;
> +    unsigned int required_flags, disallowed_flags, page_user, pte_pkeys;
>      unsigned int error_code = regs->error_code;
>  
>      /*hvm_wp_enabled
>
> @@ -1340,6 +1340,7 @@ static enum pf_type __page_fault_type(
>      if ( ((l3e_get_flags(l3e) & required_flags) != required_flags) ||
>           (l3e_get_flags(l3e) & disallowed_flags) )
>          return real_fault;
> +    pte_pkeys = l3e_get_pkeys(l3e);
>      page_user &= l3e_get_flags(l3e);
>      if ( l3e_get_flags(l3e) & _PAGE_PSE )
>          goto leaf;
> @@ -1351,6 +1352,7 @@ static enum pf_type __page_fault_type(
>      if ( ((l2e_get_flags(l2e) & required_flags) != required_flags) ||
>           (l2e_get_flags(l2e) & disallowed_flags) )
>          return real_fault;
> +    pte_pkeys = l2e_get_pkeys(l2e);
>      page_user &= l2e_get_flags(l2e);
>      if ( l2e_get_flags(l2e) & _PAGE_PSE )
>          goto leaf;
> @@ -1362,12 +1364,22 @@ static enum pf_type __page_fault_type(
>      if ( ((l1e_get_flags(l1e) & required_flags) != required_flags) ||
>           (l1e_get_flags(l1e) & disallowed_flags) )
>          return real_fault;
> +    pte_pkeys = l1e_get_pkeys(l1e);
>      page_user &= l1e_get_flags(l1e);
>  
>  leaf:
>      if ( page_user )
>      {
>          unsigned long cr4 = read_cr4();
> +        unsigned int ff, wf, uf, rsvdf, pkuf;
> +        unsigned int pkru_ad, pkru_wd;
> +
> +        uf = error_code & PFEC_user_mode;
> +        wf = error_code & PFEC_write_access;
> +        rsvdf = error_code & PFEC_reserved_bit;
> +        ff = error_code & PFEC_insn_fetch;
> +        pkuf = error_code & PFEC_protection_key;

These should be bool_t's rather than unsigned int, but I don't really
see the point of breaking them all out.

> +
>          /*
>           * Supervisor Mode Execution Prevention (SMEP):
>           * Disallow supervisor execution from user-accessible mappings
> @@ -1386,15 +1398,35 @@ leaf:
>           *   - CPL=3 or X86_EFLAGS_AC is clear
>           *   - Page fault in kernel mode
>           */
> -        if ( (cr4 & X86_CR4_SMAP) && !(error_code & PFEC_user_mode) &&
> +        if ( (cr4 & X86_CR4_SMAP) && !uf &&
>               (((regs->cs & 3) == 3) || !(regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_AC)) )
>              return smap_fault;
> +         /*
> +         * PKU:  additional mechanism by which the paging controls
> +         * access to user-mode addresses based on the value in the
> +         * PKRU register. A fault is considered as a PKU violation if all
> +         * of the following conditions are ture:
> +         * 1.CR4_PKE=1.
> +         * 2.EFER_LMA=1.
> +         * 3.page is present with no reserved bit violations.
> +         * 4.the access is not an instruction fetch.
> +         * 5.the access is to a user page.
> +         * 6.PKRU.AD=1
> +         *       or The access is a data write and PKRU.WD=1
> +         *           and either CR0.WP=1 or it is a user access.
> +         */
> +         pkru_ad = READ_PKRU_AD(pte_pkeys);
> +         pkru_wd = READ_PKRU_AD(pte_pkeys);
> +         if ( pkuf && (cr4 & X86_CR4_PKE) && hvm_long_mode_enabled(vcpu) &&
> +             !rsvdf && !ff && (pkru_ad ||
> +             (pkru_wd && wf && (hvm_wp_enabled(vcpu) || uf))))
> +             return real_fault;

This has clearly never been tested on a non-Skylake processor.  The
rdpkru instruction must be after the CR4_PKE check, or it will kill Xen
with a #UD fault.

The hvm_long_mode_enabled() and hvm_wp_enabled() are not valid without a
has_hvm_container() check.  However, you on a PV-only codepath so can
guarantee that the vcpu is not an hvm one (All HVM pagefaults are
handled via paging_fault()).  You can also guarantee that CR0.WP is 1,
and don't actually need to pass a vcpu pointer into here at at all.

>      }
>  
>      return spurious_fault;
>  }
>  
> -static enum pf_type spurious_page_fault(
> +static enum pf_type spurious_page_fault(struct vcpu *vcpu,
>      unsigned long addr, const struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
>  {
>      unsigned long flags;
> @@ -1405,7 +1437,7 @@ static enum pf_type spurious_page_fault(
>       * page tables from becoming invalid under our feet during the walk.
>       */
>      local_irq_save(flags);
> -    pf_type = __page_fault_type(addr, regs);
> +    pf_type = __page_fault_type(vcpu, addr, regs);
>      local_irq_restore(flags);
>  
>      return pf_type;
> @@ -1479,6 +1511,7 @@ static int fixup_page_fault(unsigned long addr, struct 
> cpu_user_regs *regs)
>   *  Bit 2: User mode (=1) ; Supervisor mode (=0)
>   *  Bit 3: Reserved bit violation
>   *  Bit 4: Instruction fetch
> + *  Bit 5: Protection-key violations
>   */
>  void do_page_fault(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
>  {
> @@ -1500,7 +1533,7 @@ void do_page_fault(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
>  
>      if ( unlikely(!guest_mode(regs)) )
>      {
> -        pf_type = spurious_page_fault(addr, regs);
> +        pf_type = spurious_page_fault(current, addr, regs);
>          if ( (pf_type == smep_fault) || (pf_type == smap_fault) )
>          {
>              console_start_sync();
> @@ -1533,7 +1566,7 @@ void do_page_fault(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
>  
>      if ( unlikely(current->domain->arch.suppress_spurious_page_faults) )
>      {
> -        pf_type = spurious_page_fault(addr, regs);
> +        pf_type = spurious_page_fault(current, addr, regs);
>          if ( (pf_type == smep_fault) || (pf_type == smap_fault))
>          {
>              printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "%pv fatal SM%cP violation\n",
> diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h
> index 427eb84..e8090fb 100644
> --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h
> +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h
> @@ -135,13 +135,14 @@
>  #define TF_kernel_mode         (1<<_TF_kernel_mode)
>  
>  /* #PF error code values. */
> -#define PFEC_page_present   (1U<<0)
> -#define PFEC_write_access   (1U<<1)
> -#define PFEC_user_mode      (1U<<2)
> -#define PFEC_reserved_bit   (1U<<3)
> -#define PFEC_insn_fetch     (1U<<4)
> -#define PFEC_page_paged     (1U<<5)
> -#define PFEC_page_shared    (1U<<6)
> +#define PFEC_page_present       (1U<<0)
> +#define PFEC_write_access       (1U<<1)
> +#define PFEC_user_mode          (1U<<2)
> +#define PFEC_reserved_bit       (1U<<3)
> +#define PFEC_insn_fetch         (1U<<4)
> +#define PFEC_protection_key     (1U<<5)
> +#define PFEC_page_paged         (1U<<6)
> +#define PFEC_page_shared        (1U<<7)

Again, this needs a rebase, and you will find that PFEC_prot_key is
already included.

~Andrew

_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel