[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] Critique of the Xen Security Process
On Mon, 2015-11-09 at 15:48 -0600, Doug Goldstein wrote: >Â > I'll echo this sentiment as well. Most distro packagers will dislike > this and need to work around some of this behavior in their respective > distros. This is something we have been working upstream to address as well. As it stands I believe everything which the tools might download can be redirected to instead an existing component (via one of the --with-system- foo configuration options) or disabled (via a --disable-foo configure option). So I think now the current state is that there aren't "workarounds" but rather "supported ways to disable". The big outstanding issue is the stubdom build, the distro I care about most (Debian) simply doesn't build these (for reasons above and beyond the downloading). > Project Raisin is aiming to help with this Indeed, and it might also allow us to make some of the above options the default in the future. Maybe in the meantime perhaps a ./configure --ensure-offline or --disable- downloads which: * either disables stubdoms automatically or checks you've passed -- disable-stubdom as well * either disables all the other things which might be cloned or requires the corresponding --with-system-foo=, or has a guess at a default system version * sets FETCHER to /bin/false would be useful? (essentially as a guard against new options being required to turn stuff off). > but it doesn't seem > to have a lot of community effort behind it and it too attempts to > install dependencies on my machine and wants to be run with sudo. I believe it has a mode where it simply checks for dependencies and tells you what is required and thereby avoids the need for sudo, but I'm not sure. Ian. _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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