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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 1/3] xsm/xen_version: Add XSM for the xen_version hypercall.
On 06/11/15 14:36, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote: All of XENVER_* have now an XSM check. The subops for XENVER_[compile_info|changeset|commandline| extraversion] are now priviliged operations. To not break guests we still return an string - but it is just '<denied>'. The rest: XENVER_[version|capabilities| parameters|get_features|page_size|guest_handle] behave as before - allowed by default for all guests. This is with the XSM default policy and with the dummy ones. Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx> Comments below, inline. [...] Minor tweak: if you don't want to add the new to the block a few lines above, the one-line permission syntax without braces (as seen below) looks better. [...] Since this call produces denials in the default policy, it should be marked as XSM_OTHER. I think that both version_priv and version_use belong in the same access vector (xen2) rather than placing version_use in domain2. -- Daniel De Graaf National Security Agency _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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