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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [xen-unstable baseline-only test] 38238: tolerable FAIL
This run is configured for baseline tests only. flight 38238 xen-unstable real [real] http://osstest.xs.citrite.net/~osstest/testlogs/logs/38238/ Failures :-/ but no regressions. Regressions which are regarded as allowable (not blocking): test-amd64-amd64-pygrub 20 guest-start/debian.repeat fail blocked in 38227 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-stubdom-debianhvm-amd64-xsm 9 debian-hvm-install fail like 38227 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 17 guest-stop fail like 38227 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 9 windows-install fail like 38227 Tests which did not succeed, but are not blocking: test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-qcow2 9 debian-di-install fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-vhd 9 debian-di-install fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-raw 9 debian-di-install fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-xsm 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-xsm 14 guest-saverestore fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt 14 guest-saverestore fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-rumpuserxen-amd64 15 rumpuserxen-demo-xenstorels/xenstorels.repeat fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-pvh-intel 11 guest-start fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-pvh-amd 11 guest-start fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-midway 13 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-midway 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2 13 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl 13 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-xsm 13 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-xsm 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu 13 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-xsm 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-xsm 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm 10 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm 10 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-vhd 11 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-rtds 13 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-rtds 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 17 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 17 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 17 guest-stop fail never pass version targeted for testing: xen e294a0c3af9f4443dc692b180fb1771b1cb075e8 baseline version: xen b261366f10eb150458d28aa728d399d0a781997e Last test of basis 38227 2015-10-30 08:20:16 Z 3 days Testing same since 38238 2015-11-02 05:50:17 Z 0 days 1 attempts ------------------------------------------------------------ People who touched revisions under test: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@xxxxxxxxxx> Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx> Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx> jobs: build-amd64-xsm pass build-armhf-xsm pass build-i386-xsm pass build-amd64 pass build-armhf pass build-i386 pass build-amd64-libvirt pass build-armhf-libvirt pass build-i386-libvirt pass build-amd64-oldkern pass build-i386-oldkern pass build-amd64-prev pass build-i386-prev pass build-amd64-pvops pass build-armhf-pvops pass build-i386-pvops pass build-amd64-rumpuserxen pass build-i386-rumpuserxen pass test-amd64-amd64-xl pass test-armhf-armhf-xl pass test-amd64-i386-xl pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-stubdom-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-stubdom-debianhvm-amd64-xsm fail test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-xsm pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-xsm fail test-amd64-i386-libvirt-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-xsm pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-xl-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-pvh-amd fail test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-amd pass test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-amd pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64 pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64 pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64 pass test-amd64-i386-freebsd10-amd64 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64 pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64 pass test-amd64-amd64-rumpuserxen-amd64 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-credit2 pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2 pass test-amd64-i386-freebsd10-i386 pass test-amd64-i386-rumpuserxen-i386 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-pvh-intel fail test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-intel pass test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-intel pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt fail test-amd64-i386-libvirt pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-midway pass test-amd64-amd64-migrupgrade pass test-amd64-i386-migrupgrade pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-multivcpu pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu pass test-amd64-amd64-pair pass test-amd64-i386-pair pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-pair pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-pair pass test-amd64-amd64-amd64-pvgrub pass test-amd64-amd64-i386-pvgrub pass test-amd64-amd64-pygrub fail test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-qcow2 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qcow2 pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-raw fail test-amd64-i386-xl-raw pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-rtds pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-rtds pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3-vcpus1 pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3-vcpus1 pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-vhd pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-vhd fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 pass ------------------------------------------------------------ sg-report-flight on osstest.xs.citrite.net logs: /home/osstest/logs images: /home/osstest/images Logs, config files, etc. are available at http://osstest.xs.citrite.net/~osstest/testlogs/logs Test harness code can be found at http://xenbits.xensource.com/gitweb?p=osstest.git;a=summary Push not applicable. ------------------------------------------------------------ commit e294a0c3af9f4443dc692b180fb1771b1cb075e8 Author: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Date: Wed Oct 21 16:18:30 2015 +0100 libxl: adjust PoD target by memory fudge, too PoD guests need to balloon at least as far as required by PoD, or risk crashing. Currently they don't necessarily know what the right value is, because our memory accounting is (at the very least) confusing. Apply the memory limit fudge factor to the in-hypervisor PoD memory target, too. This will increase the size of the guest's PoD cache by the fudge factor LIBXL_MAXMEM_CONSTANT (currently 1Mby). This ensures that even with a slightly-off balloon driver, the guest will be stable even under memory pressure. There are two call sites of xc_domain_set_pod_target that need fixing: The one in libxl_set_memory_target is straightforward. The one in xc_hvm_build_x86.c:setup_guest is more awkward. Simply setting the PoD target differently does not work because the various amounts of memory during domain construction no longer match up. Instead, we adjust the guest memory target in xenstore (but only for PoD guests). This introduces a 1Mby discrepancy between the balloon target of a PoD guest at boot, and the target set by an apparently-equivalent `xl mem-set' (or similar) later. This approach is low-risk for a security fix but we need to fix this up properly in xen.git#staging and probably also in stable trees. This is XSA-153. Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> (cherry picked from commit 56fb5fd62320eb40a7517206f9706aa9188d6f7b) commit 95e7415843b94c346e5ba8682665f508f220e04b Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 29 13:37:19 2015 +0100 x86: rate-limit logging in do_xen{oprof,pmu}_op() Some of the sub-ops are acessible to all guests, and hence should be rate-limited. In the xenoprof case, just like for XSA-146, include them only in debug builds. Since the vPMU code is rather new, allow them to be always present, but downgrade them to (rate limited) guest messages. This is CVE-2015-7971 / XSA-152. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx> commit 6e97c4b37386c2d09e09e9b5d5d232e37728b960 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 29 13:36:52 2015 +0100 xenoprof: free domain's vcpu array This was overlooked in fb442e2171 ("x86_64: allow more vCPU-s per guest"). This is CVE-2015-7969 / XSA-151. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx> commit 101ce53266866144e724ed593173bc4098b300b9 Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 29 13:36:25 2015 +0100 x86/PoD: Eager sweep for zeroed pages Based on the contents of a guests physical address space, p2m_pod_emergency_sweep() could degrade into a linear memcmp() from 0 to max_gfn, which runs non-preemptibly. As p2m_pod_emergency_sweep() runs behind the scenes in a number of contexts, making it preemptible is not feasible. Instead, a different approach is taken. Recently-populated pages are eagerly checked for reclaimation, which amortises the p2m_pod_emergency_sweep() operation across each p2m_pod_demand_populate() operation. Note that in the case that a 2M superpage can't be reclaimed as a superpage, it is shattered if 4K pages of zeros can be reclaimed. This is unfortunate but matches the previous behaviour, and is required to avoid regressions (domain crash from PoD exhaustion) with VMs configured close to the limit. This is CVE-2015-7970 / XSA-150. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> commit d46896ebbb23f3a9fef2eb6066ae614fd1acfd96 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 29 13:35:40 2015 +0100 free domain's vcpu array This was overlooked in fb442e2171 ("x86_64: allow more vCPU-s per guest"). This is CVE-2015-7969 / XSA-149. Reported-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx> commit fe360c90ea13f309ef78810f1a2b92f2ae3b30b8 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 29 13:35:07 2015 +0100 x86: guard against undue super page PTE creation When optional super page support got added (commit bd1cd81d64 "x86: PV support for hugepages"), two adjustments were missed: mod_l2_entry() needs to consider the PSE and RW bits when deciding whether to use the fast path, and the PSE bit must not be removed from L2_DISALLOW_MASK unconditionally. This is CVE-2015-7835 / XSA-148. Reported-by: "æ ¾å°?è?ª(好é£?)" <shangcong.lsc@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx> commit 1ef01396fdff88b1c3331a09ca5c69619b90f4ea Author: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 29 13:34:17 2015 +0100 arm: handle races between relinquish_memory and free_domheap_pages Primarily this means XENMEM_decrease_reservation from a toolstack domain. Unlike x86 we have no requirement right now to queue such pages onto a separate list, if we hit this race then the other code has already fully accepted responsibility for freeing this page and therefore there is no more for relinquish_memory to do. This is CVE-2015-7814 / XSA-147. Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> commit 1c0e59ff15764e7b0c59282365974f5b8924ce83 Author: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 29 13:33:38 2015 +0100 arm: rate-limit logging from unimplemented PHYSDEVOP and HVMOP. These are guest accessible and should therefore be rate-limited. Moreover, include them only in debug builds. This is CVE-2015-7813 / XSA-146. Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> commit 29bcf64ce8bc0b1b7aacd00c8668f255c4f0686c Author: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 29 13:31:10 2015 +0100 arm: Support hypercall_create_continuation for multicall Multicall for ARM has been supported since commit f0dbdc6 "xen: arm: fully implement multicall interface.". Although, if an hypercall in multicall requires preemption, it will crash the host: (XEN) Xen BUG at domain.c:347 (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.7-unstable arm64 debug=y Tainted: C ]---- [...] (XEN) Xen call trace: (XEN) [<00000000002420cc>] hypercall_create_continuation+0x64/0x380 (PC) (XEN) [<0000000000217274>] do_memory_op+0x1b00/0x2334 (LR) (XEN) [<0000000000250d2c>] do_multicall_call+0x114/0x124 (XEN) [<0000000000217ff0>] do_multicall+0x17c/0x23c (XEN) [<000000000024f97c>] do_trap_hypercall+0x90/0x12c (XEN) [<0000000000251ca8>] do_trap_hypervisor+0xd2c/0x1ba4 (XEN) [<00000000002582cc>] guest_sync+0x88/0xb8 (XEN) (XEN) (XEN) **************************************** (XEN) Panic on CPU 5: (XEN) Xen BUG at domain.c:347 (XEN) **************************************** (XEN) (XEN) Manual reset required ('noreboot' specified) Looking to the code, the support of multicall looks valid to me, as we only need to fill call.args[...]. So drop the BUG(); This is CVE-2015-7812 / XSA-145. Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx> commit 79fbab823fde327c6b766529c1b06b509457dc92 Author: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 29 12:24:13 2015 +0100 sched-rt: avoid to shadow the variable "svc" in rt_dom_cntl The variable "svc" is declared twice within rt_dom_cntl. However, the top declaration could be re-used avoiding re-declaring another time the variable. Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@xxxxxxxxxx> commit 568ff32927ecc68765973ad5b590b48e045dee4a Author: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 29 12:23:53 2015 +0100 credit2: avoid to shadow the variable "cur" in runq_tickle The variable "cur" is declared twice within "cur". However the top declaration could be re-used avoiding re-declaring another time the variable. Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> commit 4c09af65a9afeabd381b132a21dd8eaeee7e8437 Author: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 29 12:23:34 2015 +0100 common/memory: avoid to shadow the variable "d" in do_memory_op The variable "d" is declared multiple times within do_memory_op. The subsequent declaration are not useful because the top one is never used. So drop them. Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> commit 5a722f89d30093cf5e1d2bc536fd73d6f9e5513f Author: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 29 12:20:38 2015 +0100 grant_table: avoid to shadow "frame" in __gnttab_map_grant_ref The variable "frame" is declared twice within the function __gntab_map_grant_ref. This makes the code quite confusing to read. The second definition is not useful as the first one is never used until then. So drop it. Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> commit f6f08decb5f24ac299ab2ce23e2164ed8b13ca50 Author: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 29 12:19:23 2015 +0100 common/domain: avoid to shadow the variable "d" in do_vcpu_op The variable "d" is defined twice. However, the second one is not necessary as the vCPU as already been deduced from the first "d". Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> (qemu changes not included) _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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