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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v1 1/4] xsm/libxl/xen_version: Add XSM for some of the xen_version commands.
On Thu, 2015-10-08 at 22:56 -0400, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> The XENVER_[compile_info|changeset|commandline] are now
> guarded by an XSM check.
I can guess, but please explain/justify why this is the case for these
here.
> The rest: XENVER_[version|extraversion|capabilities|
> parameters|get_features|page_size|guest_handle] behave
> as before (no XSM check).
and correspondingly why these ones to not warrant such a change.
> As such we also modify the toolstack such that if we fail
> to get any data instead of printing (null) we just print "".
Perhaps the hypervisor should instead return "<denied>" or some suitable
string indicating why (<denied-xsm>)?
> @@ -720,4 +720,28 @@ static XSM_INLINE int xsm_pmu_op (XSM_DEFAULT_ARG
> struct domain *d, unsigned int
> }
> }
>
> +#include <public/version.h>
> +static XSM_INLINE int xsm_version_op (XSM_DEFAULT_ARG uint32_t op)
> +{
> + XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_PRIV);
> + switch ( op )
> + {
> + case XENVER_compile_info:
> + case XENVER_changeset:
> + case XENVER_commandline:
> + return xsm_default_action(XSM_PRIV, current->domain, NULL);
> + case XENVER_version:
> + case XENVER_extraversion:
> + case XENVER_capabilities:
> + case XENVER_platform_parameters:
> + case XENVER_get_features:
> + case XENVER_pagesize:
> + case XENVER_guest_handle:
> + /* The should _NEVER_ get here, but just in case. */
BUG_ON?
IMHO such a comment should have a "because ..." in it.
Actually, thinking about it, instead of splitting access control between
do_xen_version and here it would be more normal to have this function DTRT
and for it to be called unconditionally.
Ian.
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