[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [BUG] Emulation issues
On 30/07/15 11:24, Andrew Cooper wrote: > On 30/07/15 11:16, Roger Pau Monnà wrote: >> El 30/07/15 a les 12.12, Paul Durrant ha escrit: >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: Roger Pau Monnà [mailto:roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx] >>>> Sent: 29 July 2015 14:54 >>>> To: Paul Durrant; xen-devel; Andrew Cooper >>>> Subject: Re: [BUG] Emulation issues >>>> I've applied your patch and the one from Andrew, so my current diff is: >>>> >>>> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c >>>> index 30acb78..1bc3cc9 100644 >>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c >>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c >>>> @@ -145,6 +145,8 @@ static int hvmemul_do_io( >>>> return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE; >>>> goto finish_access; >>>> default: >>>> + gprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "weird emulation state %u\n", >>>> + vio->io_req.state); >>>> return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE; >>>> } >>>> >>>> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c >>>> index ec1d797..38d6d99 100644 >>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c >>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c >>>> @@ -2747,6 +2747,7 @@ int hvm_send_ioreq(struct hvm_ioreq_server *s, >>>> ioreq_t *proto_p, >>>> } >>>> } >>>> >>>> + gprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "unable to contact device model\n"); >>>> return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE; >>>> } >>>> >>>> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/io.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/io.c >>>> index d3b9cae..12d50c2 100644 >>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/io.c >>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/io.c >>>> @@ -163,7 +163,9 @@ int handle_pio(uint16_t port, unsigned int size, int >>>> dir) >>>> break; >>>> default: >>>> gdprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "Weird HVM ioemulation status %d.\n", rc); >>>> - domain_crash(curr->domain); >>>> + show_execution_state(&curr->arch.user_regs); >>>> + dump_execution_state(); >>>> + domain_crash_synchronous(); >>>> break; >>>> } >>>> >>>> And got the following panic while doing a `xl shutdown -w -a` of 20 HVM >>>> guests: >>>> >>>> (XEN) irq.c:386: Dom19 callback via changed to Direct Vector 0x93 >>>> (XEN) irq.c:276: Dom19 PCI link 0 changed 5 -> 0 >>>> (XEN) irq.c:276: Dom19 PCI link 1 changed 10 -> 0 >>>> (XEN) irq.c:276: Dom19 PCI link 2 changed 11 -> 0 >>>> (XEN) irq.c:276: Dom19 PCI link 3 changed 5 -> 0 >>>> (XEN) d10v0 weird emulation state 1 >>>> (XEN) io.c:165:d10v0 Weird HVM ioemulation status 1. >>>> (XEN) Assertion 'diff < STACK_SIZE' failed at traps.c:91 >>>> (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.6-unstable x86_64 debug=y Tainted: C ]---- >>>> (XEN) CPU: 0 >>>> (XEN) RIP: e008:[<ffff82d080234b83>] show_registers+0x60/0x32f >>>> (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000010212 CONTEXT: hypervisor (d10v0) >>>> (XEN) rax: 000000001348fc88 rbx: ffff8300cc668290 rcx: 0000000000000000 >>>> (XEN) rdx: ffff8300dfaf0000 rsi: ffff8300cc668358 rdi: ffff8300dfaf7bb8 >>>> (XEN) rbp: ffff8300dfaf7bd8 rsp: ffff8300dfaf7a98 r8: ffff83019d270000 >>>> (XEN) r9: 0000000000000004 r10: 0000000000000004 r11: 0000000000000001 >>>> (XEN) r12: ffff8300cc668000 r13: 0000000000000000 r14: ffff82c00026c000 >>>> (XEN) r15: ffff830198bf9000 cr0: 000000008005003b cr4: 00000000000026e0 >>>> (XEN) cr3: 00000000cc77b000 cr2: ffff880002762df8 >>>> (XEN) ds: 0000 es: 0000 fs: 0000 gs: 0000 ss: e010 cs: e008 >>>> (XEN) Xen stack trace from rsp=ffff8300dfaf7a98: >>>> (XEN) ffff8300dfaf7ac8 ffff82d080144b11 0000000000000046 >>>> ffff8300dfaf7ac8 >>>> (XEN) 0000000000000046 0000000000000092 ffff8300dfaf7ae0 >>>> ffff82d08012cfd3 >>>> (XEN) ffff82d0802a1bc0 ffff8300dfaf7af8 0000000000000046 >>>> 0000000000002001 >>>> (XEN) 0000000000002001 fffff80002089e28 0000000000000001 >>>> fffffe00003829c0 >>>> (XEN) 000000000000b004 0000000000000000 0000000000000014 >>>> 0000000000000002 >>>> (XEN) 000000000000b004 0000000000002001 000000000000b005 >>>> 000000000000b004 >>>> (XEN) 0000000000002001 000000000000b004 >>>> 0000beef0000beef<G><0>d15v0 weird emulation state 1 >>>> (XEN) ffffffff8036fa45<G><0>io.c:165:d15v0 Weird HVM ioemulation status >>>> 1. >>>> (XEN) >>>> (XEN) Assertion 'diff < STACK_SIZE' failed at traps.c:91 >>>> (XEN) 000000bf0000beef----[ Xen-4.6-unstable x86_64 debug=y Tainted: >>>> C ]---- >>>> (XEN) 0000000000000046CPU: 6 >>>> (XEN) fffffe00003829c0RIP: e008:[<ffff82d080234b83>] 000000000000beef >>>> show_registers+0x60/0x32f >>>> (XEN) >>>> (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000010212 0000000000000000CONTEXT: hypervisor >>>> 0000000000000000 (d15v0) 0000000000000000 >>>> (XEN) rax: 0000000121dd3c88 rbx: ffff83007b4c4290 rcx: 0000000000000000 >>>> (XEN) 0000000000000000rdx: ffff83019d290000 rsi: ffff83007b4c4358 rdi: >>>> ffff83019d297bb8 >>>> (XEN) >>>> (XEN) rbp: ffff83019d297bd8 rsp: ffff83019d297a98 r8: >>>> ffff83019d270000 >>>> (XEN) ffff8300cc668290r9: 0000000000000001 r10: 0000000000000001 r11: >>>> 0000000000000001 >>>> (XEN) ffff8300cc668000r12: ffff83007b4c4000 r13: 0000000000000000 r14: >>>> ffff82c000299000 >>>> (XEN) 0000000000000000r15: ffff830198bf9000 cr0: 000000008005003b cr4: >>>> 00000000000026e0 >>>> (XEN) ffff82c00026c000cr3: 000000007b5d7000 cr2: ffff8800026b14d8 >>>> (XEN) >>>> (XEN) ds: 002b es: 002b fs: 0000 gs: 0000 ss: e010 cs: e008 >>>> (XEN) ffff8300dfaf7bf8Xen stack trace from rsp=ffff83019d297a98: >>>> (XEN) ffff82d08018dd4d ffff82d0802685bf 0000000000000001 >>>> ffff830198bf9000 0000000000000002 00007cfe62d68527 >>>> (XEN) ffff82d08023b132 ffff8300dfaf7c38 >>>> (XEN) ffff82d0801caff0 ffff830198bf9000 ffff8300dfaf7c38 >>>> ffff82d0802685bf >>>> 0000000000002001 ffff83019d297b70 >>>> (XEN) 0000000000000200 ffff8300cc7da000 >>>> (XEN) ffff83019d29ecc0 ffff83019d297b98 ffff8300cc668000 >>>> 0000000000000000 ffff8300cc7da250 0000000000000001 >>>> (XEN) 0000000000002001 ffff8300dfaf7db8 >>>> (XEN) ffff82d0801c5934 0000000000002001 8000000000000000 >>>> fffff80002089e28 ffff8300cc7da000 0000000000000001 >>>> (XEN) fffffe00003829c0 ffff8300dfaf0000 >>>> (XEN) ffff8300cc7da250 000000000000b004 ffff8300dfaf7cf8 >>>> 0000000000000000 00000000000cc277 0000000000000014 >>>> (XEN) 0000000000000002 0000000000000000 >>>> (XEN) 0000000000000001 000000000000b004 00000000000feff0 >>>> 0000000000002001 ffff8300ccfec820 000000000000b005 >>>> (XEN) 000000000000b004 ffff8300dfaf7d08 >>>> (XEN) ffff82d0801f2009 0000000000002001 ffffffffffffffff >>>> 000000000000b004 >>>> ffffffffffffffff 0000beef0000beef >>>> (XEN) ffffffff8036fa45 00000000000001f0 >>>> (XEN) 000000004003b000 000000bf0000beef ffff8300cc7da000 >>>> 0000000000000046 0000000000000000 fffffe00003829c0 >>>> (XEN) 000000000000beef ffff8300ccfec820 >>>> (XEN) 00000000000cc278 0000000000000000 ffff8300ccfec820 >>>> 0000000000000000 ffff8300cc7da000 0000000000000000 >>>> (XEN) 0000000000000000 ffff8300dfaf7da8 >>>> (XEN) ffff82d080122c5a ffff83007b4c4290 ffff8300dfaf7db8 >>>> ffff83007b4c4000 ffff8300dfaf7d28 0000000000000000 >>>> (XEN) ffff82c000299000Xen call trace: >>>> (XEN) >>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d080234b83>] show_registers+0x60/0x32f >>>> (XEN) ffff83019d297bf8 [<ffff82d08018dd4d>] >>>> show_execution_state+0x11/0x20 >>>> (XEN) ffff82d08018dd4d [<ffff82d0801caff0>] handle_pio+0x129/0x158 >>>> (XEN) 0000000000000001 [<ffff82d0801c5934>] >>>> hvm_do_resume+0x258/0x33e >>>> (XEN) 0000000000000002 [<ffff82d0801e3166>] >>>> vmx_do_resume+0x12b/0x142 >>> Ok, so this is a handle_pio() that's being called to pick up the results of >>> an I/O that was sent to an external emulator. Did you manage to apply my >>> patch too? I'd really like to know what part of the emulation handling is >>> actually returning X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE. >> Yes, I've applied both patches at the same time and this is the output I >> got. You can see my diff above the trace. Do you want me to apply only >> your patch? > This patch is in my queue for 4.7, and should prevent the interleaving > of the messages. Ahem! take two, without a missing unlock path. ~Andrew diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c index 58ba4ea..5a808d4 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c @@ -417,18 +417,37 @@ void show_stack_overflow(unsigned int cpu, const struct cpu_user_regs *regs) void show_execution_state(const struct cpu_user_regs *regs) { + /* + * Avoid interleaving the concurrent results from two cpus, but fault + * handlers need to take priority. + */ + static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock); + + spin_lock_recursive(&lock); + show_registers(regs); show_stack(regs); + + spin_unlock_recursive(&lock); } void vcpu_show_execution_state(struct vcpu *v) { + /* + * Avoid interleaving the concurrent results from two cpus, but fault + * handlers need to take priority. + */ + static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock); + + spin_lock_recursive(&lock); + printk("*** Dumping Dom%d vcpu#%d state: ***\n", v->domain->domain_id, v->vcpu_id); if ( v == current ) { show_execution_state(guest_cpu_user_regs()); + spin_unlock_recursive(&lock); return; } @@ -439,6 +458,8 @@ void vcpu_show_execution_state(struct vcpu *v) show_guest_stack(v, &v->arch.user_regs); vcpu_unpause(v); + + spin_unlock_recursive(&lock); } static const char *trapstr(unsigned int trapnr) _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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