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[Xen-devel] [PATCH] vm_event: Rename MEM_ACCESS_EMULATE and MEM_ACCESS_EMULATE_NOWRITE


  • To: xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • From: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 16:54:27 +0300
  • Cc: keir@xxxxxxx, Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx, jbeulich@xxxxxxxx, tlengyel@xxxxxxxxxxx
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  • Delivery-date: Tue, 07 Jul 2015 13:54:50 +0000
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  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xen.org>

By naming, placing and bit shift convention, it could be taken as
implied that MEM_ACCESS_EMULATE and MEM_ACCESS_EMULATE_NOWRITE are
mem_access event specific flags (instead of being generally
applicable as vm_event flags). This patch renames them to
VM_EVENT_FLAG_EMULATE and VM_EVENT_FLAG_EMULATE_NOWRITE
respectively, and uses bit shifts following the rest of the
VM_EVENT_FLAG_ constants.

Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
 xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c         |    4 ++--
 xen/include/public/vm_event.h |   26 +++++++++++++-------------
 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
index 6b39733..4c49369 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
@@ -1418,7 +1418,7 @@ void p2m_mem_access_emulate_check(struct vcpu *v,
                                   const vm_event_response_t *rsp)
 {
     /* Mark vcpu for skipping one instruction upon rescheduling. */
-    if ( rsp->flags & MEM_ACCESS_EMULATE )
+    if ( rsp->flags & VM_EVENT_FLAG_EMULATE )
     {
         xenmem_access_t access;
         bool_t violation = 1;
@@ -1553,7 +1553,7 @@ bool_t p2m_mem_access_check(paddr_t gpa, unsigned long 
gla,
     if ( v->arch.vm_event.emulate_flags )
     {
         hvm_mem_access_emulate_one((v->arch.vm_event.emulate_flags &
-                                    MEM_ACCESS_EMULATE_NOWRITE) != 0,
+                                    VM_EVENT_FLAG_EMULATE_NOWRITE) != 0,
                                    TRAP_invalid_op, HVM_DELIVER_NO_ERROR_CODE);
 
         v->arch.vm_event.emulate_flags = 0;
diff --git a/xen/include/public/vm_event.h b/xen/include/public/vm_event.h
index 577e971..aa22052 100644
--- a/xen/include/public/vm_event.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/vm_event.h
@@ -47,6 +47,19 @@
 #define VM_EVENT_FLAG_VCPU_PAUSED     (1 << 0)
 /* Flags to aid debugging mem_event */
 #define VM_EVENT_FLAG_FOREIGN         (1 << 1)
+/*
+ * The following flags can be set in response to a mem_access event.
+ *
+ * Emulate the fault-causing instruction (if set in the event response flags).
+ * This will allow the guest to continue execution without lifting the page
+ * access restrictions.
+ */
+#define VM_EVENT_FLAG_EMULATE         (1 << 2)
+/*
+ * Same as MEM_ACCESS_EMULATE, but with write operations or operations
+ * potentially having side effects (like memory mapped or port I/O) disabled.
+ */
+#define VM_EVENT_FLAG_EMULATE_NOWRITE (1 << 3)
 
 /*
  * Reasons for the vm event request
@@ -136,19 +149,6 @@ struct vm_event_regs_x86 {
 #define MEM_ACCESS_GLA_VALID            (1 << 3)
 #define MEM_ACCESS_FAULT_WITH_GLA       (1 << 4)
 #define MEM_ACCESS_FAULT_IN_GPT         (1 << 5)
-/*
- * The following flags can be set in the response.
- *
- * Emulate the fault-causing instruction (if set in the event response flags).
- * This will allow the guest to continue execution without lifting the page
- * access restrictions.
- */
-#define MEM_ACCESS_EMULATE              (1 << 6)
-/*
- * Same as MEM_ACCESS_EMULATE, but with write operations or operations
- * potentially having side effects (like memory mapped or port I/O) disabled.
- */
-#define MEM_ACCESS_EMULATE_NOWRITE      (1 << 7)
 
 struct vm_event_mem_access {
     uint64_t gfn;
-- 
1.7.9.5


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