[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH][XSA-126] xen: limit guest control of PCI command register
On Wed, Jun 10, 2015 at 08:08:37AM +0100, Jan Beulich wrote: > >>> On 08.06.15 at 11:30, <mst@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > What happens if you disable SERR# in the command register > > of 83:00.1? > > We've just been told that with SERR not enabled in any of the > sibling endpoints the NMI still occurs. Not really surprising with > us now assuming that it's the root port that generates the SERR > in response to the UR coming back from an endpoint. But otoh > in conflict with what we see in the ITP log (where SERR clearly > is enabled on the endpoints, and the information we got says > that it _is_ disabled, not that they had to do anything to disable > it). > > > 2. Has a driver initialized this endpoint? What if you don't > > load a driver before sending the transaction resulting in the UR? > > They now tried at least without loading a driver in Dom0, which > didn't make a difference. Did you mean to also not load any driver > in the guest? Otoh I can't really see what difference this makes, > as the cleanup after the guest inside the hypervisor doesn't > really depend much on whether it actively used any of the MSI-X > entries. > > Jan I don't really know. The idea would be that device is not designed for memory to be disabled when it's active, and starts behaving in broken ways. -- MST _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |