[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [PULL 11/11] xen/pt: unknown PCI config space fields should be read-only
From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> ... by default. Add a per-device "permissive" mode similar to pciback's to allow restoring previous behavior (and hence break security again, i.e. should be used only for trusted guests). This is part of XSA-131. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@xxxxxxxxxx>) --- hw/xen/xen_pt.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- hw/xen/xen_pt.h | 2 ++ hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c | 4 ++++ 3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt.c b/hw/xen/xen_pt.c index 8923582..9afcda8 100644 --- a/hw/xen/xen_pt.c +++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt.c @@ -239,6 +239,7 @@ static void xen_pt_pci_write_config(PCIDevice *d, uint32_t addr, XenPTReg *reg_entry = NULL; uint32_t find_addr = addr; XenPTRegInfo *reg = NULL; + bool wp_flag = false; if (xen_pt_pci_config_access_check(d, addr, len)) { return; @@ -278,6 +279,10 @@ static void xen_pt_pci_write_config(PCIDevice *d, uint32_t addr, /* pass directly to the real device for passthrough type register group */ if (reg_grp_entry == NULL) { + if (!s->permissive) { + wb_mask = 0; + wp_flag = true; + } goto out; } @@ -298,12 +303,15 @@ static void xen_pt_pci_write_config(PCIDevice *d, uint32_t addr, uint32_t real_offset = reg_grp_entry->base_offset + reg->offset; uint32_t valid_mask = 0xFFFFFFFF >> ((4 - emul_len) << 3); uint8_t *ptr_val = NULL; + uint32_t wp_mask = reg->emu_mask | reg->ro_mask; valid_mask <<= (find_addr - real_offset) << 3; ptr_val = (uint8_t *)&val + (real_offset & 3); - if (reg->emu_mask == (0xFFFFFFFF >> ((4 - reg->size) << 3))) { - wb_mask &= ~((reg->emu_mask - >> ((find_addr - real_offset) << 3)) + if (!s->permissive) { + wp_mask |= reg->res_mask; + } + if (wp_mask == (0xFFFFFFFF >> ((4 - reg->size) << 3))) { + wb_mask &= ~((wp_mask >> ((find_addr - real_offset) << 3)) << ((len - emul_len) << 3)); } @@ -347,6 +355,16 @@ static void xen_pt_pci_write_config(PCIDevice *d, uint32_t addr, } else { /* nothing to do with passthrough type register, * continue to find next byte */ + if (!s->permissive) { + wb_mask &= ~(0xff << ((len - emul_len) << 3)); + /* Unused BARs will make it here, but we don't want to issue + * warnings for writes to them (bogus writes get dealt with + * above). + */ + if (index < 0) { + wp_flag = true; + } + } emul_len--; find_addr++; } @@ -358,6 +376,13 @@ static void xen_pt_pci_write_config(PCIDevice *d, uint32_t addr, memory_region_transaction_commit(); out: + if (wp_flag && !s->permissive_warned) { + s->permissive_warned = true; + xen_pt_log(d, "Write-back to unknown field 0x%02x (partially) inhibited (0x%0*x)\n", + addr, len * 2, wb_mask); + xen_pt_log(d, "If the device doesn't work, try enabling permissive mode\n"); + xen_pt_log(d, "(unsafe) and if it helps report the problem to xen-devel\n"); + } for (index = 0; wb_mask; index += len) { /* unknown regs are passed through */ while (!(wb_mask & 0xff)) { @@ -824,6 +849,7 @@ static void xen_pt_unregister_device(PCIDevice *d) static Property xen_pci_passthrough_properties[] = { DEFINE_PROP_PCI_HOST_DEVADDR("hostaddr", XenPCIPassthroughState, hostaddr), + DEFINE_PROP_BOOL("permissive", XenPCIPassthroughState, permissive, false), DEFINE_PROP_END_OF_LIST(), }; diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt.h b/hw/xen/xen_pt.h index f9795eb..4bba559 100644 --- a/hw/xen/xen_pt.h +++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt.h @@ -197,6 +197,8 @@ struct XenPCIPassthroughState { PCIHostDeviceAddress hostaddr; bool is_virtfn; + bool permissive; + bool permissive_warned; XenHostPCIDevice real_device; XenPTRegion bases[PCI_NUM_REGIONS]; /* Access regions */ QLIST_HEAD(, XenPTRegGroup) reg_grps; diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c index 19f926b..f3cf069 100644 --- a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c +++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c @@ -101,6 +101,10 @@ static uint32_t get_throughable_mask(const XenPCIPassthroughState *s, { uint32_t throughable_mask = ~(reg->emu_mask | reg->ro_mask); + if (!s->permissive) { + throughable_mask &= ~reg->res_mask; + } + return throughable_mask & valid_mask; } -- 1.7.10.4 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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