[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4] xen/pvh: use a custom IO bitmap for PVH hardware domains
On 30/04/15 11:42, Roger Pau Monne wrote: Since a PVH hardware domain has access to the physical hardware create a custom more permissive IO bitmap. The permissions set on the bitmap are populated based on the contents of the ioports rangeset. Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monnà <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@xxxxxxx> Cc: Aravind Gopalakrishnan <Aravind.Gopalakrishnan@xxxxxxx> Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@xxxxxxxxx> Cc: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@xxxxxxxxx> Cc: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx> --- Changes since v3: - Add the RTC IO ports to the list of blocked ports. - Remove admin_io_okay since it's just a wrapper around ioports_access_permitted. Changes since v2: - Add 0xcf8-0xcfb to the range of blocked (trapped) IO ports. - Use rangeset_report_ranges in order to iterate over the range of not trapped IO ports. - Allocate the Dom0 PVH IO bitmap with _xmalloc_array, which allows setting the alignment to PAGE_SIZE. - Tested with Linux PV/PVH using 3.18 and FreeBSD PVH HEAD. Changes since v1: - Dynamically allocate PVH Dom0 IO bitmap if needed. - Drop cast from construct_vmcs when writing the IO bitmap. - Create a new function that sets up the bitmap before launching Dom0. This is needed because ns16550_endboot is called after construct_dom0. --- xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++- xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.c | 3 ++- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c | 5 +++-- xen/arch/x86/setup.c | 2 ++ xen/arch/x86/traps.c | 27 ++++----------------------- xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/domain.h | 2 ++ xen/include/asm-x86/setup.h | 1 + 8 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c index 378e650..5f27074 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c @@ -1546,8 +1546,10 @@ int __init construct_dom0( /* ACPI PM Timer. */ if ( pmtmr_ioport ) rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, pmtmr_ioport, pmtmr_ioport + 3); - /* PCI configuration space (NB. 0xcf8 has special treatment). */ - rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, 0xcfc, 0xcff); + /* PCI configuration space */ + rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, 0xcf8, 0xcff); + /* RTC */ + rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, 0x70, 0x71); /* Command-line I/O ranges. */ process_dom0_ioports_disable(d);@@ -1635,6 +1637,29 @@ out:return rc; }+static int __init io_bitmap_cb(unsigned long s, unsigned long e, void *ctx)+{ + struct domain *d = ctx; + unsigned long i; + + for ( i = s; i <= e; i++ ) + __clear_bit(i, d->arch.hvm_domain.io_bitmap); + + return 0; +} + +void __init setup_io_bitmap(struct domain *d) +{ + int rc; + + if ( is_pvh_domain(d) ) + { + rc = rangeset_report_ranges(d->arch.ioport_caps, 0, 0x10000, + io_bitmap_cb, d); + BUG_ON(rc); + } +} + /* * Local variables: * mode: C diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c index bfde380..c842ae0 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c @@ -78,9 +78,10 @@ integer_param("hvm_debug", opt_hvm_debug_level);struct hvm_function_table hvm_funcs __read_mostly; +#define HVM_IOBITMAP_SIZE (3*PAGE_SIZE/BYTES_PER_LONG)/* I/O permission bitmap is globally shared by all HVM guests. */ unsigned long __attribute__ ((__section__ (".bss.page_aligned"))) - hvm_io_bitmap[3*PAGE_SIZE/BYTES_PER_LONG]; + hvm_io_bitmap[HVM_IOBITMAP_SIZE];/* Xen command-line option to enable HAP */static bool_t __initdata opt_hap_enabled = 1; @@ -1484,6 +1485,22 @@ int hvm_domain_initialise(struct domain *d) goto fail1; d->arch.hvm_domain.io_handler->num_slot = 0;+ /* Set the default IO Bitmap */+ if ( is_hardware_domain(d) ) + { + d->arch.hvm_domain.io_bitmap = _xmalloc_array(BYTES_PER_LONG, PAGE_SIZE, + HVM_IOBITMAP_SIZE); + if ( d->arch.hvm_domain.io_bitmap == NULL ) + { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto fail1; + } + memset(d->arch.hvm_domain.io_bitmap, ~0, + HVM_IOBITMAP_SIZE * BYTES_PER_LONG); + } + else + d->arch.hvm_domain.io_bitmap = hvm_io_bitmap; + if ( is_pvh_domain(d) ) { register_portio_handler(d, 0, 0x10003, handle_pvh_io); @@ -1519,6 +1536,8 @@ int hvm_domain_initialise(struct domain *d) stdvga_deinit(d); vioapic_deinit(d); fail1: + if ( is_hardware_domain(d) ) + xfree(d->arch.hvm_domain.io_bitmap); xfree(d->arch.hvm_domain.io_handler); xfree(d->arch.hvm_domain.params); fail0: diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.c index 21292bb..227a187 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.c @@ -118,7 +118,8 @@ static int construct_vmcb(struct vcpu *v) svm_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_AMD64_LWP_CBADDR);vmcb->_msrpm_base_pa = (u64)virt_to_maddr(arch_svm->msrpm);- vmcb->_iopm_base_pa = (u64)virt_to_maddr(hvm_io_bitmap); + vmcb->_iopm_base_pa = + (u64)virt_to_maddr(v->domain->arch.hvm_domain.io_bitmap);/* Virtualise EFLAGS.IF and LAPIC TPR (CR8). */vmcb->_vintr.fields.intr_masking = 1; diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c index 63007a9..bd37f0e 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c @@ -986,8 +986,9 @@ static int construct_vmcs(struct vcpu *v) }/* I/O access bitmap. */- __vmwrite(IO_BITMAP_A, virt_to_maddr((char *)hvm_io_bitmap + 0)); - __vmwrite(IO_BITMAP_B, virt_to_maddr((char *)hvm_io_bitmap + PAGE_SIZE)); + __vmwrite(IO_BITMAP_A, virt_to_maddr(d->arch.hvm_domain.io_bitmap)); + __vmwrite(IO_BITMAP_B, virt_to_maddr(d->arch.hvm_domain.io_bitmap + + PAGE_SIZE / BYTES_PER_LONG));if ( cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery ){ diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c index 2b9787a..339343f 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c @@ -1446,6 +1446,8 @@ void __init noreturn __start_xen(unsigned long mbi_p)dmi_end_boot(); + setup_io_bitmap(dom0);+ system_state = SYS_STATE_active;domain_unpause_by_systemcontroller(dom0);diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c index 22cdfc4..8d2bbb2 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c @@ -1753,25 +1753,6 @@ static int guest_io_okay( return 0; }-/* Has the administrator granted sufficient permission for this I/O access? */-static int admin_io_okay( - unsigned int port, unsigned int bytes, - struct vcpu *v, struct cpu_user_regs *regs) -{ - /* - * Port 0xcf8 (CONFIG_ADDRESS) is only visible for DWORD accesses. - * We never permit direct access to that register. - */ - if ( (port == 0xcf8) && (bytes == 4) ) - return 0; - - /* We also never permit direct access to the RTC/CMOS registers. */ - if ( ((port & ~1) == RTC_PORT(0)) ) - return 0; - - return ioports_access_permitted(v->domain, port, port + bytes - 1); -} - static int pci_cfg_ok(struct domain *d, int write, int size) { uint32_t machine_bdf; @@ -1813,7 +1794,7 @@ uint32_t guest_io_read( uint32_t data = 0; unsigned int shift = 0;- if ( admin_io_okay(port, bytes, v, regs) )+ if ( ioports_access_permitted(v->domain, port, port + bytes - 1) ) { switch ( bytes ) { @@ -1877,7 +1858,7 @@ void guest_io_write( unsigned int port, unsigned int bytes, uint32_t data, struct vcpu *v, struct cpu_user_regs *regs) { - if ( admin_io_okay(port, bytes, v, regs) ) + if ( ioports_access_permitted(v->domain, port, port + bytes - 1) ) { switch ( bytes ) { case 1: @@ -2228,7 +2209,7 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct cpu_user_regs *regs) exec_in: if ( !guest_io_okay(port, op_bytes, v, regs) ) goto fail; - if ( admin_io_okay(port, op_bytes, v, regs) ) + if ( ioports_access_permitted(v->domain, port, port + op_bytes - 1) ) { mark_regs_dirty(regs); io_emul(regs); @@ -2258,7 +2239,7 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct cpu_user_regs *regs) exec_out: if ( !guest_io_okay(port, op_bytes, v, regs) ) goto fail; - if ( admin_io_okay(port, op_bytes, v, regs) ) + if ( ioports_access_permitted(v->domain, port, port + op_bytes - 1) ) { mark_regs_dirty(regs); io_emul(regs); diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/domain.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/domain.h index 0702bf5..d002954 100644 --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/domain.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/domain.h @@ -143,6 +143,8 @@ struct hvm_domain { */ uint64_t sync_tsc;+ unsigned long *io_bitmap;+ union { struct vmx_domain vmx; struct svm_domain svm; diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/setup.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/setup.h index 08bc23a..381d9f8 100644 --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/setup.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/setup.h @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ int construct_dom0( module_t *initrd, void *(*bootstrap_map)(const module_t *), char *cmdline); +void setup_io_bitmap(struct domain *d);unsigned long initial_images_nrpages(nodeid_t node);void discard_initial_images(void); _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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