[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3] x86: allow 64-bit PV guest kernels to suppress user mode exposure of M2P
Hi, At 15:31 +0100 on 24 Apr (1429889471), Jan Beulich wrote: > --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c > @@ -1435,6 +1435,14 @@ void sh_install_xen_entries_in_l4(struct > shadow_l4e_from_mfn(page_to_mfn(d->arch.perdomain_l3_pg), > __PAGE_HYPERVISOR); > > + if ( !shadow_mode_refcounts(d) && !is_pv_32on64_domain(d) && I think the right check here is !shadow_mode_external(d), i.e. that this l4e is a mapping of the M2P and not some guest-controlled mapping. > + !VM_ASSIST(d, m2p_strict) ) > + { > + /* zap_ro_mpt(mfn_x(sl4mfn)); */ > + sl4e[shadow_l4_table_offset(RO_MPT_VIRT_START)] = shadow_l4e_empty(); > + zap_ro_mpt(mfn_x(gl4mfn)); Here and below -- shouldn't the existing PV paths be taking care of zapping/filling the guest pagetable before we get here? It doesn't seem right for shadow pagetable code to be making this kind of change - especially in a mapping that's not actually "shadowed" per se. Cheers, Tim. _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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