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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3] x86: allow 64-bit PV guest kernels to suppress user mode exposure of M2P
Hi,
At 15:31 +0100 on 24 Apr (1429889471), Jan Beulich wrote:
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
> @@ -1435,6 +1435,14 @@ void sh_install_xen_entries_in_l4(struct
> shadow_l4e_from_mfn(page_to_mfn(d->arch.perdomain_l3_pg),
> __PAGE_HYPERVISOR);
>
> + if ( !shadow_mode_refcounts(d) && !is_pv_32on64_domain(d) &&
I think the right check here is !shadow_mode_external(d), i.e. that
this l4e is a mapping of the M2P and not some guest-controlled mapping.
> + !VM_ASSIST(d, m2p_strict) )
> + {
> + /* zap_ro_mpt(mfn_x(sl4mfn)); */
> + sl4e[shadow_l4_table_offset(RO_MPT_VIRT_START)] = shadow_l4e_empty();
> + zap_ro_mpt(mfn_x(gl4mfn));
Here and below -- shouldn't the existing PV paths be taking care of
zapping/filling the guest pagetable before we get here? It doesn't
seem right for shadow pagetable code to be making this kind of change
- especially in a mapping that's not actually "shadowed" per se.
Cheers,
Tim.
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