[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH V14 3/7] xen/arm: Allow hypervisor access to mem_access protected pages
On Thu, 2015-03-26 at 23:05 +0100, Tamas K Lengyel wrote: > @@ -1209,6 +1306,10 @@ struct page_info *get_page_from_gva(struct domain *d, > vaddr_t va, > > err: > spin_unlock(&p2m->lock); > + > + if ( !page && p2m->mem_access_enabled ) > + page = p2m_mem_access_check_and_get_page(va, flags); Is this safe/correct to do without continuing to hold the p2m lock? It seems like the result of gva_to_ipa in the new function perhaps ought to be? Not sure about the p2m_get_mem_access (or does it have its own lock? Should it?) The case I'm thinking about is something else (grant ops etc) changing the p2m between the first check in get_page_from_gva and this one. Worst case would be spurious results from a race, which perhaps are tolerable? The rest of it looked good to me. Ian. _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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