Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH V13 3/7] xen/arm: Allow hypervisor access to mem_access protected pages

[Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx>]

On Thu, 2015-03-12 at 17:02 +0100, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
> 
> 
> On Thu, Mar 12, 2015 at 4:56 PM, Ian Campbell
> <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>         On Thu, 2015-03-12 at 16:44 +0100, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
>         >
>         >
>         > On Thu, Mar 12, 2015 at 4:40 PM, Julien Grall
>         > <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>         >         Hi Ian,
>         >
>         >         On 12/03/15 15:27, Ian Campbell wrote:
>         >         >> Currently, check_type_get_page emulate only the
>         check for
>         >         2). So you may
>         >         >> end up to allow Xen writing in read-only mapping
>         (from the
>         >         Stage 1 POV).
>         >         >> This was XSA-98.
>         >         >
>         >         > XSA-98 was purely about stage-2 permissions (e.g.
>         read-only
>         >         grants). The
>         >         > fact that the resulting patch also checks stage-1
>         >         permissions is not a
>         >         > security property AFAICT.
>         >
>         >         XSA-98 was for both... Without checking stage-1
>         permission a
>         >         userspace
>         >         which can issue an hypercall may be able to write
>         into
>         >         read-only kernel
>         >         space. Whoops.
>         >
>         >
>         > Userspace is able to issue hypercall?
>         
>         
>         Via ioctls on /proc/xen/privcmd, yes. It's how the toolstack
>         talks to
>         Xen...
> 
> 
> Well, that is not the userspace issuing the hypercall, its a kernel
> module issuing the hypercall on behalf of a process ;)

But the vaddrs etc in there are userspace controlled and the kernel does
not validate them.

Ian.



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