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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] Security policy ambiguities - XSA-108 process post-mortem
Lars Kurth writes ("Re: [Xen-devel] Security policy ambiguities - XSA-108
process post-mortem"):
> On 10 Nov 2014, at 18:01, Ian Jackson <ijackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
...
> > The Security Team will impose deployment restrictions only insofar
> > as it is necessary to prevent the exposure of technicalities (for
> > example, differences in behaviour) which present a significant risk
> > of rediscovery of the vulnerability. Such situations are expected
> > to be rare.
>
> +1
>
> However, I find the text somewhat confusing. "may deploy fixed
> versions during the embargo, only with permission from the
> Security Team" contradicts the other statements, that deploying
> fixes is OK, unless stated in the advisory text.
I will clarify my proposed wording on this point.
> In any case, it is not quite clear what the protocol to get permission
> is. Or whether, the protocol is "deployment is OK" unless stated
> otherwise.
>
> So I think, in the final policy text this should be written from the
> viewpoint of a pre-disclosure member, not the viewpoint of the
> Security Team.
>
> Or is the intention that permission is sought via
> xen-security-issues-discuss@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx?
No, the permission will be stated in the advisory. I have reworded
this in my copy of my draft text to make this clearer.
Thanks,
Ian.
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