[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] (v2) Design proposal for RMRR fix
>>> On 08.01.15 at 16:15, <George.Dunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Thu, Jan 8, 2015 at 1:00 PM, Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>> On 08.01.15 at 13:54, <George.Dunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> On Thu, Jan 8, 2015 at 12:49 PM, George Dunlap >>> <George.Dunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>> If RMRRs almost always happen up above 2G, for example, then a simple >>>> solution that wouldn't require too much work would be to make sure >>>> that the PCI MMIO hole we specify to libxc and to qemu-upstream is big >>>> enough to include all RMRRs. That would satisfy the libxc and qemu >>>> requirements. >>>> >>>> If we then store specific RMRRs we want included in xenstore, >>>> hvmloader can put them in the e820 map, and that would satisfy the >>>> hvmloader requirement. >>> >>> An alternate thing to do here would be to "properly" fix the >>> qemu-upstream problem, by making a way for hvmloader to communicate >>> changes in the gpfn layout to qemu. >>> >>> Then hvmloader could do the work of moving memory under RMRRs to >>> higher memory; and libxc wouldn't need to be involved at all. >> >> I don't think avoiding libxc involvement is possible: Once a certain >> range of memory has been determined to need reserving (e.g. >> due to a statically assigned device), attempts to populate the >> respective GFNs with RAM would (ought to) fail. > > Is it the case that marking a range as an RMRR in Xen basically only > involves adding a 1-1 mapping in the p2m / IOMMU? > > So is it the case that the main reason the "empty RMRR gpfn range in > hvmloader" solution wouldn't work is that for statically-assigned > devices, the devices are assigned to the guest before it boots (and > thus before hvmloader gets to run)? > > We could imagine not actually mapping the RMRRs on domain creation, > but allowing hvmloader to move the gpfns around and then ask Xen to do > the 1-1 mapping. That might be an option, but would be safe/secure only as long as nothing gets mapped in these regions before, which again would require libxc changes. Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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