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Re: [Xen-devel] xenstored crashes with SIGSEGV



Hello Ian,

On 15.12.2014 14:17, Ian Campbell wrote:
> On Fri, 2014-12-12 at 17:58 +0000, Ian Campbell wrote:
>>  On Fri, 2014-12-12 at 18:20 +0100, Philipp Hahn wrote:
>>> On 12.12.2014 17:56, Ian Campbell wrote:
>>>> On Fri, 2014-12-12 at 17:45 +0100, Philipp Hahn wrote:
>>>>> On 12.12.2014 17:32, Ian Campbell wrote:
>>>>>> On Fri, 2014-12-12 at 17:14 +0100, Philipp Hahn wrote:
...
>>> The 1st and 2nd trace look like this: ptr in frame #2 looks very bogus.
>>>
>>> (gdb) bt full
>>> #0  talloc_chunk_from_ptr (ptr=0xff00000000) at talloc.c:116
>>>         tc = <value optimized out>
>>> #1  0x0000000000407edf in talloc_free (ptr=0xff00000000) at talloc.c:551
>>>         tc = <value optimized out>
>>> #2  0x000000000040a348 in tdb_open_ex (name=0x1941fb0
>>> "/var/lib/xenstored/tdb.0x1935bb0",

I just noticed something strange:

> #3  0x000000000040a684 in tdb_open (name=0xff00000000 <Address
> 0xff00000000 out of bounds>, hash_size=0,
>     tdb_flags=4254928, open_flags=-1, mode=3119127560) at tdb.c:1773
> #4  0x000000000040a70b in tdb_copy (tdb=0x192e540, outfile=0x1941fb0
> "/var/lib/xenstored/tdb.0x1935bb0")

Why does gdb-7.0.1 print "name=0xff000000" here for frame 3, but for
frame 2 and 4 the pointers are correct again?
Verifying the values with an explicit "print" shows them as correct.

>> I've timed out for tonight will try and have another look next week.
> 
> I've had another dig, and have instrumented all of the error paths from
> this function and I can't see any way for an invalid pointer to be
> produced, let alone freed. I've been running under valgrind which should
> have caught any uninitialised memory type errors.

Thank you for testing that.

>>>     hash_size=<value optimized out>, tdb_flags=0, open_flags=<value
>>> optimized out>, mode=<value optimized out>,
>>>     log_fn=0x4093b0 <null_log_fn>, hash_fn=<value optimized out>) at
>>> tdb.c:1958
> 
> Please can you confirm what is at line 1958 of your copy of tdb.c. I
> think it will be tdb->locked, but I'd like to be sure.

Yes, that's the line:
# sed -ne 1958p tdb.c
        SAFE_FREE(tdb->locked);

> You are running a 64-bit dom0, correct?

yes: x86_64

> I've only just noticed that
> 0xff00000000 is >32bits. My testing so far was 32-bit, I don't think it
> should matter wrt use of uninitialised data etc.
> 
> I can't help feeling that 0xff00000000 must be some sort of magic
> sentinel value to someone. I can't figure out what though.

0xff is too much for bit flip errors. and also two crashes on different
machines in the same location very much rules out any HW error for me.

My 2nd idea was that someone decremented 0 one too many, but then that
would have to be an 8 bit value - reading the code I didn't see anything
like that.

> Have you observed the xenstored processes growing especially large
> before this happens? I'm wondering if there might be a leak somewhere
> which after a time is resulting a 

I have no monitoring of the memory usage for the crashed systems, but
the core files look reasonable sane.
Looking at the test-system running
/usr/share/pyshared/xen/xend/xenstore/tests/stress_xs.py the memory
usage stays constant since last Friday.

> I'm about to send out a patch which plumbs tdb's logging into
> xenstored's logging, in the hopes that next time you see this it might
> say something as it dies.

Thank you for the patch: I'll try to incorporate it and will continue
trying to reproduce the crash.


One more thing we noticed: /var/lib/xenstored/ contained the tdb file
and to bit-identical copies after the crash, so I would read that as two
transactions being in progress at the time of the crash. Might be that
this is important.
But /usr/share/pyshared/xen/xend/xenstore/tests/stress_xs.py seems to
create more transaction in parallel and my test system so far has
survived this since Friday.

Sincerely
Philipp Hahn

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