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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [v8][PATCH 02/17] introduce XEN_DOMCTL_set_rdm
On Mon, Dec 01, 2014 at 05:24:20PM +0800, Tiejun Chen wrote:
> This should be based on a new parameter globally, 'pci_rdmforce'.
>
> pci_rdmforce = 1 => Of course this should be 0 by default.
>
> '1' means we should force check to reserve all ranges. If failed
> VM wouldn't be created successfully. This also can give user a
> chance to work well with later hotplug, even if not a device
> assignment while creating VM.
>
> But we can override that by one specific pci device:
>
> pci = ['AA:BB.CC,rdmforce=0/1]
>
> But this 'rdmforce' should be 1 by default since obviously any
> passthrough device always need to do this. Actually no one really
> want to set as '0' so it may be unnecessary but I'd like to leave
> this as a potential approach.
>
> So this domctl provides an approach to control how to populate
> reserved device memory by tools.
>
> Note we always post a message to user about this once we owns
> RMRR.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@xxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> docs/man/xl.cfg.pod.5 | 6 +++++
> docs/misc/vtd.txt | 15 ++++++++++++
> tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h | 6 +++++
> tools/libxc/xc_domain.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++
> tools/libxl/libxl_create.c | 3 +++
> tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c | 47
> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h | 4 ++++
> tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl | 2 ++
> tools/libxl/libxlu_pci.c | 2 ++
> tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c | 10 ++++++++
In the past we had split the hypervisor and the
toolstack patches in two. So that one could focus
on the hypervisor ones first, and then in another
patch on the toolstack.
But perhaps this was intended to be in one patch?
> xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.c | 8 +++++++
> xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/domain.h | 4 ++++
I don't see ARM here? Should there be an ARM variant of this? If not
should the toolstack ones only run under x86?
> xen/include/public/domctl.h | 21 +++++++++++++++++
> xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c | 1 +
> 15 files changed, 196 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/docs/man/xl.cfg.pod.5 b/docs/man/xl.cfg.pod.5
> index 622ea53..9adc41e 100644
> --- a/docs/man/xl.cfg.pod.5
> +++ b/docs/man/xl.cfg.pod.5
> @@ -645,6 +645,12 @@ dom0 without confirmation. Please use with care.
> D0-D3hot power management states for the PCI device. False (0) by
> default.
>
> +=item B<rdmforce=BOOLEAN>
> +
> +(HVM/x86 only) Specifies that the VM would force to check and try to
s/force/forced/
> +reserve all reserved device memory, like RMRR, associated to the PCI
> +device. False (0) by default.
Not sure I understand. How would the VM be forced to do this? Or is
it that the hvmloader would force to do this? And if it fails (as you
say 'try') ? What then?
> +
> =back
>
> =back
> diff --git a/docs/misc/vtd.txt b/docs/misc/vtd.txt
> index 9af0e99..23544d5 100644
> --- a/docs/misc/vtd.txt
> +++ b/docs/misc/vtd.txt
> @@ -111,6 +111,21 @@ in the config file:
> To override for a specific device:
> pci = [ '01:00.0,msitranslate=0', '03:00.0' ]
>
> +RDM, 'reserved device memory', for PCI Device Passthrough
> +---------------------------------------------------------
> +
> +The BIOS controls some devices in terms of some reginos of memory used for
Could you elaborate what 'some devices' are? Network cards? GPUs? What
are the most commons ones.
s/reginos/regions/
And by regions you mean BAR regions?
> +these devices. This kind of region should be reserved before creating a VM
> +to make sure they are not occupied by RAM/MMIO to conflict, and also we can
You said 'This' but here you are using the plural ' are'. IF you want it plural
it needs to be 'These regions'
> +create necessary IOMMU table successfully.
> +
> +To enable this globally, add "pci_rdmforce" in the config file:
> +
> + pci_rdmforce = 1 (default is 0)
The guest config file? Or /etc/xen/xl.conf ?
> +
> +Or just enable for a specific device:
> + pci = [ '01:00.0,rdmforce=1', '03:00.0' ]
> +
>
> Caveat on Conventional PCI Device Passthrough
> ---------------------------------------------
> diff --git a/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h b/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
> index 0ad8b8d..84012fe 100644
> --- a/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
> +++ b/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
> @@ -2038,6 +2038,12 @@ int xc_assign_device(xc_interface *xch,
> uint32_t domid,
> uint32_t machine_bdf);
>
> +int xc_domain_device_setrdm(xc_interface *xch,
> + uint32_t domid,
> + uint32_t num_pcidevs,
> + uint32_t pci_rdmforce,
> + struct xen_guest_pcidev_info *pcidevs);
> +
> int xc_get_device_group(xc_interface *xch,
> uint32_t domid,
> uint32_t machine_bdf,
> diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c b/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c
> index b864872..7fd43e9 100644
> --- a/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c
> +++ b/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c
> @@ -1633,6 +1633,34 @@ int xc_assign_device(
> return do_domctl(xch, &domctl);
> }
>
> +int xc_domain_device_setrdm(xc_interface *xch,
> + uint32_t domid,
> + uint32_t num_pcidevs,
> + uint32_t pci_rdmforce,
> + struct xen_guest_pcidev_info *pcidevs)
> +{
> + int ret;
> + DECLARE_DOMCTL;
> + DECLARE_HYPERCALL_BOUNCE(pcidevs,
> + num_pcidevs*sizeof(xen_guest_pcidev_info_t),
> + XC_HYPERCALL_BUFFER_BOUNCE_IN);
> +
> + if ( xc_hypercall_bounce_pre(xch, pcidevs) )
> + return -1;
> +
> + domctl.cmd = XEN_DOMCTL_set_rdm;
> + domctl.domain = (domid_t)domid;
> + domctl.u.set_rdm.flags = pci_rdmforce;
> + domctl.u.set_rdm.num_pcidevs = num_pcidevs;
> + set_xen_guest_handle(domctl.u.set_rdm.pcidevs, pcidevs);
> +
> + ret = do_domctl(xch, &domctl);
> +
> + xc_hypercall_bounce_post(xch, pcidevs);
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> int xc_get_device_group(
> xc_interface *xch,
> uint32_t domid,
> diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_create.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_create.c
> index 1198225..c615686 100644
> --- a/tools/libxl/libxl_create.c
> +++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_create.c
> @@ -862,6 +862,9 @@ static void initiate_domain_create(libxl__egc *egc,
> ret = libxl__domain_build_info_setdefault(gc, &d_config->b_info);
> if (ret) goto error_out;
>
> + ret = libxl__domain_device_setrdm(gc, d_config, domid);
> + if (ret) goto error_out;
> +
> if (!sched_params_valid(gc, domid, &d_config->b_info.sched_params)) {
> LOG(ERROR, "Invalid scheduling parameters\n");
> ret = ERROR_INVAL;
> diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c
> index 3e191c3..e50587d 100644
> --- a/tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c
> +++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c
> @@ -90,6 +90,53 @@ const char *libxl__domain_device_model(libxl__gc *gc,
> return dm;
> }
>
> +int libxl__domain_device_setrdm(libxl__gc *gc,
> + libxl_domain_config *d_config,
> + uint32_t dm_domid)
> +{
> + int i, ret;
> + libxl_ctx *ctx = libxl__gc_owner(gc);
> + struct xen_guest_pcidev_info *pcidevs = NULL;
> + uint32_t rdmforce = 0;
> +
> + if ( d_config->num_pcidevs )
> + {
> + pcidevs =
> malloc(d_config->num_pcidevs*sizeof(xen_guest_pcidev_info_t));
> + if ( pcidevs )
> + {
> + for (i = 0; i < d_config->num_pcidevs; i++)
> + {
> + pcidevs[i].devfn = PCI_DEVFN(d_config->pcidevs[i].dev,
> + d_config->pcidevs[i].func);
> + pcidevs[i].bus = d_config->pcidevs[i].bus;
> + pcidevs[i].seg = d_config->pcidevs[i].domain;
> + pcidevs[i].flags = d_config->pcidevs[i].rdmforce &
> + PCI_DEV_RDM_CHECK;
> + }
> + }
> + else
> + {
> + LIBXL__LOG(CTX, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR,
> + "Can't allocate for pcidevs.");
> + return -1;
> + }
> + }
> + rdmforce = libxl_defbool_val(d_config->b_info.rdmforce) ? 1 : 0;
> +
> + /* Nothing to do. */
> + if ( !rdmforce && !d_config->num_pcidevs )
> + return 0;
> +
> + ret = xc_domain_device_setrdm(ctx->xch, dm_domid,
> + (uint32_t)d_config->num_pcidevs,
> + rdmforce,
> + pcidevs);
> + if ( d_config->num_pcidevs )
> + free(pcidevs);
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> const libxl_vnc_info *libxl__dm_vnc(const libxl_domain_config *guest_config)
> {
> const libxl_vnc_info *vnc = NULL;
> diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h b/tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h
> index a38f695..be397a6 100644
> --- a/tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h
> +++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h
> @@ -1477,6 +1477,10 @@ _hidden int libxl__need_xenpv_qemu(libxl__gc *gc,
> int nr_disks, libxl_device_disk *disks,
> int nr_channels, libxl_device_channel *channels);
>
> +_hidden int libxl__domain_device_setrdm(libxl__gc *gc,
> + libxl_domain_config *info,
> + uint32_t domid);
> +
> /*
> * This function will cause the whole libxl process to hang
> * if the device model does not respond. It is deprecated.
> diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl b/tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl
> index f7fc695..0076a32 100644
> --- a/tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl
> +++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl
> @@ -398,6 +398,7 @@ libxl_domain_build_info = Struct("domain_build_info",[
> ("kernel", string),
> ("cmdline", string),
> ("ramdisk", string),
> + ("rdmforce", libxl_defbool),
> ("u", KeyedUnion(None, libxl_domain_type, "type",
> [("hvm", Struct(None, [("firmware", string),
> ("bios", libxl_bios_type),
> @@ -518,6 +519,7 @@ libxl_device_pci = Struct("device_pci", [
> ("power_mgmt", bool),
> ("permissive", bool),
> ("seize", bool),
> + ("rdmforce", bool),
> ])
>
> libxl_device_vtpm = Struct("device_vtpm", [
> diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxlu_pci.c b/tools/libxl/libxlu_pci.c
> index 26fb143..989eac8 100644
> --- a/tools/libxl/libxlu_pci.c
> +++ b/tools/libxl/libxlu_pci.c
> @@ -143,6 +143,8 @@ int xlu_pci_parse_bdf(XLU_Config *cfg, libxl_device_pci
> *pcidev, const char *str
> pcidev->permissive = atoi(tok);
> }else if ( !strcmp(optkey, "seize") ) {
> pcidev->seize = atoi(tok);
> + }else if ( !strcmp(optkey, "rdmforce") ) {
> + pcidev->rdmforce = atoi(tok);
> }else{
> XLU__PCI_ERR(cfg, "Unknown PCI BDF option: %s", optkey);
> }
> diff --git a/tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c b/tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c
> index 0e754e7..9c23733 100644
> --- a/tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c
> +++ b/tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c
> @@ -919,6 +919,7 @@ static void parse_config_data(const char *config_source,
> int pci_msitranslate = 0;
> int pci_permissive = 0;
> int pci_seize = 0;
> + int pci_rdmforce = 0;
> int i, e;
>
> libxl_domain_create_info *c_info = &d_config->c_info;
> @@ -1699,6 +1700,9 @@ skip_vfb:
> if (!xlu_cfg_get_long (config, "pci_seize", &l, 0))
> pci_seize = l;
>
> + if (!xlu_cfg_get_long (config, "pci_rdmforce", &l, 0))
> + pci_rdmforce = l;
> +
> /* To be reworked (automatically enabled) once the auto ballooning
> * after guest starts is done (with PCI devices passed in). */
> if (c_info->type == LIBXL_DOMAIN_TYPE_PV) {
> @@ -1719,6 +1723,7 @@ skip_vfb:
> pcidev->power_mgmt = pci_power_mgmt;
> pcidev->permissive = pci_permissive;
> pcidev->seize = pci_seize;
> + pcidev->rdmforce = pci_rdmforce;
> if (!xlu_pci_parse_bdf(config, pcidev, buf))
> d_config->num_pcidevs++;
> }
> @@ -1726,6 +1731,11 @@ skip_vfb:
> libxl_defbool_set(&b_info->u.pv.e820_host, true);
> }
>
> + if ((c_info->type == LIBXL_DOMAIN_TYPE_HVM) && pci_rdmforce)
> + libxl_defbool_set(&b_info->rdmforce, true);
> + else
> + libxl_defbool_set(&b_info->rdmforce, false);
> +
> switch (xlu_cfg_get_list(config, "cpuid", &cpuids, 0, 1)) {
> case 0:
> {
> diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
> index 78c6977..ae924ad 100644
> --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
> +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
> @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
> #include <xen/tasklet.h>
> #include <xsm/xsm.h>
> #include <asm/msi.h>
> +#include <xen/stdbool.h>
>
> struct pci_seg {
> struct list_head alldevs_list;
> @@ -1553,6 +1554,44 @@ int iommu_do_pci_domctl(
> }
> break;
>
> + case XEN_DOMCTL_set_rdm:
> + {
> + struct xen_domctl_set_rdm *xdsr = &domctl->u.set_rdm;
> + struct xen_guest_pcidev_info *pcidevs = NULL;
> + struct domain *d = rcu_lock_domain_by_any_id(domctl->domain);
> +
> + if ( d == NULL )
> + return -ESRCH;
> +
What if this is called on an PV domain?
You are also missing the XSM checks.
What if this is called multiple times. Is it OK to over-ride
the 'pci_force' or should it stick once?
> + d->arch.hvm_domain.pci_force =
> + xdsr->flags & PCI_DEV_RDM_CHECK ? true : false;
Won't we crash here if this is called for PV guests?
> + d->arch.hvm_domain.num_pcidevs = xdsr->num_pcidevs;
What if the 'num_pcidevs' has some bogus value. You need to check for that.
> + d->arch.hvm_domain.pcidevs = NULL;
Please first free it. It might be that the toolstack
is doing this a couple of times. You don't want to leak memory.
> +
> + if ( xdsr->num_pcidevs )
> + {
> + pcidevs = xmalloc_array(xen_guest_pcidev_info_t,
> + xdsr->num_pcidevs);
> + if ( pcidevs == NULL )
> + {
> + rcu_unlock_domain(d);
> + return -ENOMEM;
But you already have set 'num_pcidevs' to some value. This copying/check
should be done before you modify 'd->arch.hvm_domain'...
> + }
> +
> + if ( copy_from_guest(pcidevs, xdsr->pcidevs,
> + xdsr->num_pcidevs*sizeof(*pcidevs)) )
> + {
> + xfree(pcidevs);
> + rcu_unlock_domain(d);
Ditto. You need to do these checks before you modify 'd->arch.hvm_domain'.
> + return -EFAULT;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + d->arch.hvm_domain.pcidevs = pcidevs;
> + rcu_unlock_domain(d);
> + }
> + break;
> +
> case XEN_DOMCTL_assign_device:
> if ( unlikely(d->is_dying) )
> {
> diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.c
> b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.c
> index 1152c3a..5e41e7a 100644
> --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.c
> +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.c
> @@ -674,6 +674,14 @@ acpi_parse_one_rmrr(struct acpi_dmar_header *header)
> " RMRR region: base_addr %"PRIx64
> " end_address %"PRIx64"\n",
> rmrru->base_address, rmrru->end_address);
> + /*
> + * TODO: we may provide a precise paramter just to reserve
s/paramter/parameter/
> + * RMRR range specific to one device.
> + */
> + dprintk(XENLOG_WARNING VTDPREFIX,
> + "So please set pci_rdmforce to reserve these ranges"
> + " if you need such a device in hotplug case.\n");
'Please set rdmforce to reserve ranges %lx->%lx if you plan to hotplug this
device.'
But then this is going to be a bit verbose, so perhaps:
'Ranges %lx-%lx need rdmforce to properly work.' ?
> +
> acpi_register_rmrr_unit(rmrru);
> }
> }
> diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/domain.h
> b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/domain.h
> index 2757c7f..38530e5 100644
> --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/domain.h
> +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/domain.h
> @@ -90,6 +90,10 @@ struct hvm_domain {
> /* Cached CF8 for guest PCI config cycles */
> uint32_t pci_cf8;
>
Maybe a comment explaining its purpose?
> + bool_t pci_force;
> + uint32_t num_pcidevs;
> + struct xen_guest_pcidev_info *pcidevs;
> +
You are also missing freeing of this in the hypervisor when the guest
is destroyed. Please fix that.
> struct pl_time pl_time;
>
> struct hvm_io_handler *io_handler;
> diff --git a/xen/include/public/domctl.h b/xen/include/public/domctl.h
> index 57e2ed7..ba8970d 100644
> --- a/xen/include/public/domctl.h
> +++ b/xen/include/public/domctl.h
> @@ -508,6 +508,25 @@ struct xen_domctl_get_device_group {
> typedef struct xen_domctl_get_device_group xen_domctl_get_device_group_t;
> DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_domctl_get_device_group_t);
>
> +/* Currently just one bit to indicate force to check Reserved Device Memory.
> */
Not sure I understand. Did you mean:
'Check Reserved Device Memory'.
What happens if you do not have this flag? What are the semantics
of this hypercall - as in what will it mean.
> +#define PCI_DEV_RDM_CHECK 0x1
> +struct xen_guest_pcidev_info {
> + uint16_t seg;
> + uint8_t bus;
> + uint8_t devfn;
> + uint32_t flags;
> +};
> +typedef struct xen_guest_pcidev_info xen_guest_pcidev_info_t;
> +DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_guest_pcidev_info_t);
> +/* Control whether/how we check and reserve device memory. */
> +struct xen_domctl_set_rdm {
> + uint32_t flags;
What is this 'flags' purpose compared to the 'pcidevs.flags'? Please
explain.
> + uint32_t num_pcidevs;
> + XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_64(xen_guest_pcidev_info_t) pcidevs;
> +};
> +typedef struct xen_domctl_set_rdm xen_domctl_set_rdm_t;
> +DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_domctl_set_rdm_t);
> +
> /* Pass-through interrupts: bind real irq -> hvm devfn. */
> /* XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq */
> /* XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq */
> @@ -1070,6 +1089,7 @@ struct xen_domctl {
> #define XEN_DOMCTL_setvnumainfo 74
> #define XEN_DOMCTL_psr_cmt_op 75
> #define XEN_DOMCTL_arm_configure_domain 76
> +#define XEN_DOMCTL_set_rdm 77
> #define XEN_DOMCTL_gdbsx_guestmemio 1000
> #define XEN_DOMCTL_gdbsx_pausevcpu 1001
> #define XEN_DOMCTL_gdbsx_unpausevcpu 1002
> @@ -1135,6 +1155,7 @@ struct xen_domctl {
> struct xen_domctl_gdbsx_domstatus gdbsx_domstatus;
> struct xen_domctl_vnuma vnuma;
> struct xen_domctl_psr_cmt_op psr_cmt_op;
> + struct xen_domctl_set_rdm set_rdm;
> uint8_t pad[128];
> } u;
> };
> diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
> index d48463f..5a760e2 100644
> --- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
> +++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
> @@ -592,6 +592,7 @@ static int flask_domctl(struct domain *d, int cmd)
> case XEN_DOMCTL_test_assign_device:
> case XEN_DOMCTL_assign_device:
> case XEN_DOMCTL_deassign_device:
> + case XEN_DOMCTL_set_rdm:
There is more to XSM than just this file..
Please compile with XSM enabled.
> #endif
> return 0;
Also how does this work with 32-bit dom0s? Is there a need to use the
compat layer?
>
> --
> 1.9.1
>
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