Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/3] x86/xen: Introduce a global flag to fix the MSI mask bug

[Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx>]

On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 04:44:44PM +0000, David Vrabel wrote:
> On 27/10/14 19:45, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> > On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 11:09:42AM +0000, David Vrabel wrote:
> >> On 27/10/14 02:44, Yijing Wang wrote:
> >>> Commit 0e4ccb1505a9 ("PCI: Add x86_msi.msi_mask_irq() and 
> >>> msix_mask_irq()")
> >>> fixed MSI mask bug which may cause kernel crash. But the commit
> >>> made MSI code complex. Introduce a new global flag "pci_msi_ignore_mask"
> >>> to ignore MSI/MSI-X to fix this issue, it's a cleaner solution.
> >>> And the commit 0e4ccb1505a9 will be reverted in the later patch.
> >>
> >> Reviewed-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@xxxxxxxxxx>
> >>
> >> In the sense that it keeps the odd Xen behaviour.  But...
> >>
> >> Konrad, why was this fixed like this in the first place?  IMO, it would
> > 
> > As 0e4ccb1505a9 explains:
> >     PCI: Add x86_msi.msi_mask_irq() and msix_mask_irq()
> >     
> >     Certain platforms do not allow writes in the MSI-X BARs to setup or tear
> >     down vector values.  To combat against the generic code trying to write 
> > to
> >     that and either silently being ignored or crashing due to the pagetables
> >     being marked R/O this patch introduces a platform override.
> >     
> >     Note that we keep two separate, non-weak, functions 
> > default_mask_msi_irqs()
> >     and default_mask_msix_irqs() for the behavior of the 
> > arch_mask_msi_irqs()
> >     and arch_mask_msix_irqs(), as the default behavior is needed by x86 PCI
> >     code.
> >     
> >     For Xen, which does not allow the guest to write to MSI-X tables - as 
> > the
> >     hypervisor is solely responsible for setting the vector values - we
> >     implement two nops.
> 
> My question specifically was: could this be fixed by allowing writes to
> set/clear the mask bit?  If so, why was this not done and could we do

No.
> this now?
> 
> David

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