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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4] Sanity check xsave area when migrating or restoring from older Xen verions
On 21/10/14 19:40, Don Koch wrote:
> Xen 4.3 and older transferred a maximum sized xsave area (as if all
> the available XCR0 bits were set); the new version only transfers
> based on the actual XCR0 bits. This may result in a smaller area if
> the last sections were missing (e.g., the LWP area from an AMD
> machine). If the size doesn't match the XCR0 derived size, the part of
> the xsave area between the XCR0 specified and transferred size is
> checked for zero data. If any part of the overflow area is non-zero,
> we return with an error.
>
> Signed-off-by: Don Koch <dkoch@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> Changes in V4:
> - Removed check of size base on xfeature_mask.
> - Unsign some ints.
> - Change %d to %u for unsigned ints.
> - Move printk to only print if non-zero data found.
>
> Changes in V3:
> - use h->data for zero check
> - remove max size check (use size that was sent)
> - fix error message (drop first byte value)
> - fix "for" issues
>
> Changes in V2:
> - Add check for size.
> - Add check for non-zero data in unused part of block.
>
> xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++------------
> 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> index f0e1edc..c2780d2 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> @@ -1971,6 +1971,7 @@ static int hvm_load_cpu_xsave_states(struct domain *d,
> hvm_domain_context_t *h)
> struct vcpu *v;
> struct hvm_hw_cpu_xsave *ctxt;
> struct hvm_save_descriptor *desc;
> + unsigned int i, overflow_start;
>
> /* Which vcpu is this? */
> vcpuid = hvm_load_instance(h);
> @@ -2011,15 +2012,8 @@ static int hvm_load_cpu_xsave_states(struct domain *d,
> hvm_domain_context_t *h)
> save_area) + XSTATE_AREA_MIN_SIZE);
> return -EINVAL;
> }
> - size = HVM_CPU_XSAVE_SIZE(xfeature_mask);
> - if ( desc->length > size )
> - {
> - printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING
> - "HVM%d.%d restore mismatch: xsave length %u > %u\n",
> - d->domain_id, vcpuid, desc->length, size);
> - return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> - }
> h->cur += sizeof (*desc);
> + overflow_start = h->cur;
>
> ctxt = (struct hvm_hw_cpu_xsave *)&h->data[h->cur];
> h->cur += desc->length;
> @@ -2038,10 +2032,20 @@ static int hvm_load_cpu_xsave_states(struct domain
> *d, hvm_domain_context_t *h)
> size = HVM_CPU_XSAVE_SIZE(ctxt->xcr0_accum);
> if ( desc->length > size )
> {
> - printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING
> - "HVM%d.%d restore mismatch: xsave length %u > %u\n",
> - d->domain_id, vcpuid, desc->length, size);
> - return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> + /* Make sure missing bytes are all zero. */
Please make a reference to the bug in this comment, so the reasons for
the strange check is a little more obvious given a glance at the code.
Perhaps
/*
* Xen-4.3 and older used to send longer-than-needed xsave regions.
Permit loading the record if the extra data is all zero
*/
(suitably wrapped, given its natural indentation)
> + for ( i = size; i < desc->length; i++ )
> + {
> + if ( h->data[overflow_start + i] )
> + {
> + printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING
> + "HVM%u.%u restore mismatch: xsave length %u > %u\n",
> + d->domain_id, vcpuid, desc->length, size);
> + printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING
> + "HVM%u.%u restore mismatch: xsave has non-zero data
> starting at %#x\n",
> + d->domain_id, vcpuid, i);
This should be one message. Also note that, while a lot of code gets it
wrong, domain_id is signed while vcpuid is unsigned.
Perhaps
"HVM%d.%u restore: xsave length %#x > %#x with non-zero data at %#x\n"
It is quite unhelpful to report 3 related numbers, two in one base with
one in a different base. I feel hex is more useful here, when comparing
the offsets against the manuals.
~Andrew
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> + }
> + }
> }
> /* Checking finished */
>
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