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On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 10:52 PM, Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

Hello Tamas,

On 24/09/2014 18:13, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:

On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 6:51 PM, Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx
<mailto:julien.grall@linaro.org>> wrote:
>
> > + && hypercall_preempt_check() )
> > + {
> > + rc = progress;
> > + goto out;
>
> Jumping directly to the label "out" will skip flushing the TLB for the
> domain. While it wasn't critical until now, partial redo during
> insertion/allocation or hypercall preemption only for relinquish, the
> guest may use the wrong permission because the TLB hasn't been flushed.
>
> At the same time, it looks like you never request to flush for the
> MEMACCESS operation (see *flush = true). Does memaccess does a TLB flush
> somewhere else?
>
>
> Yes, at the end of p2m_set_mem_access once all PTEs are updated
> successfully. I guess we could flush the TLB as we are progressing as
> well, it wouldn't hurt.

We should flush the TLB as we are progressing because the guest may
technically continue to run...

Hm, I think the guest is always paused while mem_access is being set via
memop but sure, it can't hurt.

I didn't find any domain pause call neither in the hypervisor nor in xen-access.

Unless the pause is done by the hypervisor via the same hypercall, it's safer to flush the TLB if it's necessary.

Ack, and you are right, I don't know why I thought it was paused.

This case made me also think about another possible issue. Permission
are checked in raw_copy_{from,to}_guest_helper during virtual address
translation to a physical address.

As you modified the attribute in the P2M, the copy may failed because of
the lake of permission.

I'm not entire sure what you mean. Can you elaborate?

Xen has a bunch of functions raw_copy_{from,to}_guest helpers which copy data from/to the guest.

Since XSA-98, Xen checks that the guest has effectively the right to read/write (depending of the helpers) a specific mapping before copying the data.

Ah yes I remember seeing that, it's passed through get_page_from_gva and uses the MMU to do the translation directly.

If the guest page doesn't have the good right, the helper will fail and therefore so do the hypercall.

When memaccess is used, a RAM page may have its permission lower down.
When the helpers are called, the code to check memory access during permission violation will never be called... and the guest will receive an hypercall failure.

This is not the right behavior, the hypercall should only fail if the permissions are effectively wrong after check mem access has been called.

Ack, I guess the straight forward solution here would be to forward the read/write event to the mem_access listener in the inline gvirt_to_maddr function. For mem_access however I should really include both the gvaddr and gpaddr values, which means the translation would happen twice, once with gva_to_ipa (that uses the MMU without the flag-based permission checks to translate), forward to mem_access, then do the check with the flag-based permission check again if mem_access is clear. Would that be an acceptable approach in your opinion?

Tamas

Regards,

--
Julien Grall

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH for-4.5 v8 15/19] xen/arm: Data abort exception (R/W) mem_events.