[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH RFC/WIPv2 1/6] Introduce XENMEM_transfer operation



On 24/09/14 16:13, Vitaly Kuznetsov wrote:
> Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> writes:
>
>> On 24/09/14 15:20, Vitaly Kuznetsov wrote:
>>> New operation reassigns pages from one domain to the other mapping them
>>> at exactly the same GFNs in the destination domain. Pages mapped more
>>> than once (e.g. granted pages) are being copied.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>> ---
>>>  xen/common/memory.c         | 178 
>>> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>>  xen/include/public/memory.h |  32 +++++++-
>>>  2 files changed, 209 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/xen/common/memory.c b/xen/common/memory.c
>>> index 2e3225d..653e117 100644
>>> --- a/xen/common/memory.c
>>> +++ b/xen/common/memory.c
>>> @@ -578,6 +578,180 @@ static long 
>>> memory_exchange(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_memory_exchange_t) arg)
>>>      return rc;
>>>  }
>>>  
>>> +static long memory_transfer(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_memory_transfer_t) 
>>> arg)
>>> +{
>>> +    long rc = 0;
>>> +    struct xen_memory_transfer trans;
>>> +    struct domain *source_d, *dest_d;
>>> +    unsigned long mfn, gmfn, last_gmfn;
>>> +    p2m_type_t p2mt;
>>> +    struct page_info *page, *new_page;
>>> +    char *sp, *dp;
>>> +    int copying;
>>> +
>>> +    if ( copy_from_guest(&trans, arg, 1) )
>>> +        return -EFAULT;
>>> +
>>> +    source_d = rcu_lock_domain_by_any_id(trans.source_domid);
>>> +    if ( source_d == NULL )
>>> +    {
>>> +        rc = -ESRCH;
>>> +        goto fail_early;
>>> +    }
>>> +
>>> +    if ( source_d->is_dying )
>>> +    {
>>> +        rc = -EINVAL;
>>> +        rcu_unlock_domain(source_d);
>>> +        goto fail_early;
>>> +    }
>>> +
>>> +    dest_d = rcu_lock_domain_by_any_id(trans.dest_domid);
>>> +    if ( dest_d == NULL )
>>> +    {
>>> +        rc = -ESRCH;
>>> +        rcu_unlock_domain(source_d);
>>> +        goto fail_early;
>>> +    }
>>> +
>>> +    if ( dest_d->is_dying )
>>> +    {
>>> +        rc = -EINVAL;
>>> +        goto fail;
>>> +    }
>>> +
>>> +    last_gmfn = trans.gmfn_start + trans.gmfn_count;
>>> +    for ( gmfn = trans.gmfn_start; gmfn < last_gmfn; gmfn++ )
>>> +    {
>>> +        page = get_page_from_gfn(source_d, gmfn, &p2mt, 0);
>>> +        if ( !page )
>>> +        {
>>> +            continue;
>>> +        }
>>> +
>>> +        mfn = page_to_mfn(page);
>>> +        if ( !mfn_valid(mfn) )
>>> +        {
>>> +            put_page(page);
>>> +            continue;
>>> +        }
>>> +
>>> +        copying = 0;
>>> +
>>> +        if ( is_xen_heap_mfn(mfn) )
>>> +        {
>>> +            put_page(page);
>>> +            continue;
>>> +        }
>>> +
>>> +        /* Page table always worth copying */
>>> +        if ( (page->u.inuse.type_info & PGT_l4_page_table) ||
>>> +             (page->u.inuse.type_info & PGT_l3_page_table) ||
>>> +             (page->u.inuse.type_info & PGT_l2_page_table) ||
>>> +             (page->u.inuse.type_info & PGT_l1_page_table) )
>>> +            copying = 1;
>> How can copying pagetables like this ever work?  You will end up with an
>> L4 belonging to the new domain pointing to L3's owned by the old domain.
>>
>> Even if you change the ownership of the pages pointed to by the L1's, as
>> soon as the old domain is torn down, the new domains pagetables will be
>> freed heap pages.
> Yes, I'm aware it is broken and that's actually why I sent this RFC - in
> my PATCH 0/6 letter the main question was: what's the best approach here
> with regards to PV? If we want to avoid copying and updating this pages
> we can do it while killing the original domain (so instead of this
> _transfer op we'll have special 'domain kill' op).

Ah - I had not taken that meaning from your 0/6.

Xen has no knowledge whatsoever of a PV domains p2m table (other than
holding a reference to it for toolstack/domain use).  This knowledge
lives exclusively in the toolstack and guest.

As a result, I would say that a hypercall like this cannot possibly be
made to work for PV guests without some PV architectural changes in Xen.

~Andrew


_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel


 


Rackspace

Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our
servers 24x7x365 and backed by RackSpace's Fanatical Support®.