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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH for-4.5 v8 06/19] xen: Relocate mem_event_op domctl and access_op memop into common.


  • To: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>, Tamas K Lengyel <tklengyel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 17:19:32 +0300
  • Cc: ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx, tim@xxxxxxx, julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx, ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxx, andres@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
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On 09/23/2014 05:07 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 23.09.14 at 16:00, <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> On 09/23/2014 04:32 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>>> On 23.09.14 at 15:14, <tklengyel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>> --- a/xen/common/mem_event.c
>>>> +++ b/xen/common/mem_event.c
>>>> @@ -623,12 +623,9 @@ int mem_event_domctl(struct domain *d, 
>>>> xen_domctl_mem_event_op_t *mec,
>>>>                                      HVM_PARAM_ACCESS_RING_PFN,
>>>>                                      mem_access_notification);
>>>>  
>>>> -            if ( mec->op != XEN_DOMCTL_MEM_EVENT_OP_ACCESS_ENABLE &&
>>>> -                 rc == 0 && hvm_funcs.enable_msr_exit_interception )
>>>> -            {
>>>> -                d->arch.hvm_domain.introspection_enabled = 1;
>>>> -                hvm_funcs.enable_msr_exit_interception(d);
>>>> -            }
>>>> +            if ( !rc && mec->op != XEN_DOMCTL_MEM_EVENT_OP_ACCESS_ENABLE )
>>>> +                p2m_enable_msr_exit_interception(d);
>>>
>>> The name is clearly not suitable for an abstraction - there's certainly
>>> not going to be MSRs on each and every CPU architecture. Maybe
>>> consult with Razvan on an agreeable more suitable name.
>>
>> P2m_set_up_introspection() perhaps? With the MSR HVM code where
>> applicable, nothing (or something else) where not? Would this be too
>> generic?
> 
> I'd be fine with that name provided the != above gets converted
> to a == XEN_DOMCTL_MEM_EVENT_OP_ACCESS_ENABLE_INTROSPECTION.

No problem here (should Tamas choose to go in that direction).


Regards,
Razvan Cojocaru

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