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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH V6 4/5] xen, libxc: Request page fault injection via libxc
>>> On 09.09.14 at 12:28, <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Changes since V5:
> - Now synchronizing access to the trap injection data.
> - Only enforcing the CR3 match for cr3 != ~0.
> - Updated the xen-access.c test.
Leaving aside the question of whether this is the right mechanism,
still a couple of comments:
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> @@ -420,6 +420,31 @@ static bool_t hvm_wait_for_io(struct hvm_ioreq_vcpu *sv,
> ioreq_t *p)
> return 1;
> }
>
> +static bool_t hvm_can_inject_domain_pf(struct vcpu *v)
> +{
> + const struct domain *d = v->domain;
> + struct segment_register seg;
> + uint64_t mask;
> +
> + hvm_get_segment_register(v, x86_seg_ss, &seg);
> +
> + if ( seg.attr.fields.dpl != 3 ) /* Guest is not in user mode */
> + return 0;
> +
> + if ( hvm_long_mode_enabled(v) )
> + mask = PADDR_MASK & PAGE_MASK; /* Bits 51:12. */
> + else if ( hvm_pae_enabled(v) )
> + mask = 0x00000000ffffffe0; /* Bits 31:5. */
> + else
> + mask = (uint32_t)PAGE_MASK; /* Bits 31:12. */
> +
> + if ( (v->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[3] & mask) !=
> + (d->arch.hvm_domain.inject_trap.cr3 & mask) )
If you take off the masking here ...
> @@ -450,12 +475,30 @@ void hvm_do_resume(struct vcpu *v)
> }
> }
>
> + spin_lock(&d->arch.hvm_domain.inject_trap_lock);
> +
> /* Inject pending hw/sw trap */
> - if ( v->arch.hvm_vcpu.inject_trap.vector != -1 )
> + if ( v->arch.hvm_vcpu.inject_trap.vector != -1 )
> {
> hvm_inject_trap(&v->arch.hvm_vcpu.inject_trap);
> v->arch.hvm_vcpu.inject_trap.vector = -1;
> }
> + /*
> + * Inject per-domain pending hw/sw trap (this will most likely
> + * be a page fault injected by memory introspection code).
> + */
> + else if ( d->arch.hvm_domain.inject_trap.vector != -1 )
> + {
> + if ( d->arch.hvm_domain.inject_trap.vector != TRAP_page_fault ||
> + d->arch.hvm_domain.inject_trap.cr3 == ~0 ||
... you can avoid this check (which is suspicious anyway due to the
hard coded number - it'd be better if that value got a manifest
constant assigned in the public header).
> @@ -1473,9 +1516,11 @@ int hvm_domain_initialise(struct domain *d)
> printk(XENLOG_G_INFO "PVH guest must have HAP on\n");
> return -EINVAL;
> }
> -
> }
>
> + d->arch.hvm_domain.inject_trap.vector = -1;
> + spin_lock_init(&d->arch.hvm_domain.inject_trap_lock);
> +
> spin_lock_init(&d->arch.hvm_domain.ioreq_server.lock);
> INIT_LIST_HEAD(&d->arch.hvm_domain.ioreq_server.list);
> spin_lock_init(&d->arch.hvm_domain.irq_lock);
> @@ -6086,20 +6131,58 @@ long do_hvm_op(unsigned long op,
> XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg)
> goto param_fail8;
>
> rc = -ENOENT;
> - if ( tr.vcpuid >= d->max_vcpus || (v = d->vcpu[tr.vcpuid]) == NULL )
> - goto param_fail8;
> -
> - if ( v->arch.hvm_vcpu.inject_trap.vector != -1 )
> - rc = -EBUSY;
> - else
> +
> + spin_lock(&d->arch.hvm_domain.inject_trap_lock);
> +
> + if ( tr.vcpuid == (uint32_t)~0 ) /* Any VCPU. */
> {
> - v->arch.hvm_vcpu.inject_trap.vector = tr.vector;
> - v->arch.hvm_vcpu.inject_trap.type = tr.type;
> - v->arch.hvm_vcpu.inject_trap.error_code = tr.error_code;
> - v->arch.hvm_vcpu.inject_trap.insn_len = tr.insn_len;
> - v->arch.hvm_vcpu.inject_trap.cr2 = tr.cr2;
> - rc = 0;
> + unsigned int i;
> +
> + for ( i = 0; i < d->max_vcpus; i++ )
> + if ( (v = d->vcpu[i]) != NULL &&
> + v->arch.hvm_vcpu.inject_trap.vector != -1 )
> + {
> + rc = -EBUSY;
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + if ( d->arch.hvm_domain.inject_trap.vector != -1 )
> + rc = -EBUSY;
> +
> + if ( rc != -EBUSY )
> + {
> + d->arch.hvm_domain.inject_trap.vector = tr.vector;
> + d->arch.hvm_domain.inject_trap.type = tr.type;
> + d->arch.hvm_domain.inject_trap.error_code = tr.error_code;
> + d->arch.hvm_domain.inject_trap.insn_len = tr.insn_len;
> + d->arch.hvm_domain.inject_trap.cr2 = tr.cr2;
> + d->arch.hvm_domain.inject_trap.cr3 = tr.cr3;
> + rc = 0;
> + }
> }
> + else /* Specific VCPU. */
> + {
> + if ( tr.vcpuid >= d->max_vcpus || (v = d->vcpu[tr.vcpuid]) ==
> NULL )
> + goto param_fail8;
You can't do this anymore with a spin lock held.
> +
> + if ( v->arch.hvm_vcpu.inject_trap.cr3 != ~0 )
> + rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
> + if ( v->arch.hvm_vcpu.inject_trap.vector != -1 ||
This ought to be "else if".
> --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/domain.h
> +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/domain.h
> @@ -146,6 +146,10 @@ struct hvm_domain {
> struct vmx_domain vmx;
> struct svm_domain svm;
> };
> +
> + /* Pending hw/sw interrupt (.vector = -1 means nothing pending). */
> + struct hvm_trap inject_trap;
> + spinlock_t inject_trap_lock;
Are you sure you want a spin lock here, not an rw one?
Jan
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