[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH RFC V9 4/5] xen, libxc: Request page fault injection via libxc
On 10/09/14 09:55, Razvan Cojocaru wrote: > On 09/10/2014 11:48 AM, Andrew Cooper wrote: >> On 10/09/2014 09:09, Razvan Cojocaru wrote: >>> On 09/09/2014 09:38 PM, Tamas K Lengyel wrote: >>>> > But ultimately, as Tim said, you're basically just *hoping* that it >>>> > won't take too long to happen to be at the hypervisor when the proper >>>> > condition happens. If the process in question isn't getting many >>>> > interrupts, or is spending the vast majority of its time in the >>>> > kernel, you may end up waiting an unbounded amount of time to be able >>>> > to "catch" it in user mode. It seems like it would be better to find >>>> > a reliable way to trap on the return into user mode, in which case >>>> you >>>> > wouldn't need to have a special "wait for this complicated event to >>>> > happen" call at all, would you? >>>> >>>> Indeed, but it is assumed that the trap injection request is being made >>>> by the caller in the proper context (when it knows that the condition >>>> will be true sooner rather than later). >>>> >>>> >>>> How is it known that the condition will be true soon? Some more >>>> information on what you consider 'proper context' would be valuable. >>> It's actually pretty simple for us: the application always requests an >>> injection when the guest is already in the address space of the >>> interesting application, and in user mode. >> Does this mean that you always request a pagefault as a direct result of >> a mem_event, when the vcpu is in blocked the correct context? > Yes, exactly. > >> If so, how about extending the mem_event response mechanism with >> trap/fault information? > For this particular case, that is indeed a very good suggestion - > however, things may change. From what I understand, it is likely that in > the future we (or somebody else doing memory introspection) will need to > request a page fault injection in other cases. The risks described above > will of course exist in that case, but they are acceptable. Right. I can see your concern, but designing an interface like this for some hopeful future can be problematic, especially given only a vague idea of how it would be used in practice. With the Xen hypercall API/ABI, it is always possible to add something in the future, and a concrete example of how it is suppose to work does greatly help with justifying its design and implementation. In this case, I feel that extending mem_event responses is a very natural thing to do. It very closely ties the pagefault to the action which resulted in the decision for a pagefault, rather than an apparently asynchronous pagefault request via another mechanism which userspace has to use when it knows that the vcpu is blocked on a mem_event. Furthermore, having a general "please inject a fault which looks like this" mechanism allows the mem_event userspace agent algorithm to choose to inject other faults for different circumstances. ~Andrew _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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