[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3 10/15] xen/arm: Data abort exception (R/W) mem_events.
Hello Tamas,
On 01/09/14 10:22, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
This patch enables to store, set, check and deliver LPAE R/W mem_events.
I would expand a bit more the commit message to explain the logic of mem
event in ARM.
I know you already explain it in patch #8 ("p2m type definitions and
changes") but I think it's more relevant to explain where the "real"
code is.
diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
index a6dea5b..e8f5671 100644
--- a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
+++ b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <asm/event.h>
#include <asm/hardirq.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
+#include <xen/radix-tree.h>
#include <xen/mem_event.h>
#include <public/mem_event.h>
#include <xen/mem_access.h>
@@ -148,6 +149,74 @@ static lpae_t *p2m_map_first(struct p2m_domain *p2m,
paddr_t addr)
return __map_domain_page(page);
}
+static void p2m_set_permission(lpae_t *e, p2m_type_t t, p2m_access_t a)
+{
+ /* First apply type permissions */
+ switch (t)
switch ( t )
[..]
+ /* Then restrict with access permissions */
+ switch(a)
switch ( a )
[..]
/*
* Lookup the MFN corresponding to a domain's PFN.
*
@@ -228,7 +297,7 @@ int p2m_pod_decrease_reservation(struct domain *d,
}
static lpae_t mfn_to_p2m_entry(unsigned long mfn, unsigned int mattr,
- p2m_type_t t)
+ p2m_type_t t, p2m_access_t a)
It looks strange to modify nearly all prototypes except this one in #6.
[..]
@@ -346,7 +385,7 @@ static int p2m_create_table(struct domain *d, lpae_t *entry,
for ( i=0 ; i < LPAE_ENTRIES; i++ )
{
pte = mfn_to_p2m_entry(base_pfn + (i<<(level_shift-LPAE_SHIFT)),
- MATTR_MEM, t);
+ MATTR_MEM, t, p2m->default_access);
I'm not familiar with xen memaccess. Do we need to track access to
intermediate page table (i.e Level 1 & 2)?
/*
* First and second level super pages set p2m.table = 0, but
@@ -366,7 +405,7 @@ static int p2m_create_table(struct domain *d, lpae_t *entry,
unmap_domain_page(p);
- pte = mfn_to_p2m_entry(page_to_mfn(page), MATTR_MEM, p2m_invalid);
+ pte = mfn_to_p2m_entry(page_to_mfn(page), MATTR_MEM, p2m_invalid,
p2m->default_access);
Same question here.
[..]
+int p2m_mem_access_check(paddr_t gpa, vaddr_t gla, struct npfec npfec)
This function only return 0/1, I would use bool_t here.
To reply on your answer on the last version, this function is not used
in common code and x86 also use bool_t as return type.
+{
+ struct vcpu *v = current;
+ struct p2m_domain *p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(v->domain);
+ mem_event_request_t *req = NULL;
+ xenmem_access_t xma;
+ bool_t violation;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = p2m_get_mem_access(v->domain, paddr_to_pfn(gpa), &xma);
+ if ( rc )
+ {
+ /* No setting was found, reinject */
+ return 1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* First, handle rx2rw and n2rwx conversion automatically. */
+ if ( npfec.write_access && xma == XENMEM_access_rx2rw )
+ {
+ rc = p2m_set_mem_access(v->domain, paddr_to_pfn(gpa), 1,
+ 0, ~0, XENMEM_access_rw);
+ ASSERT(rc == 0);
It's not a good idea the ASSERT here. The function call
radix_tree_insert in p2m_set_mem_access may fail because there is a
memory allocation via xmalloc inside.
I suspect x86 adds the ASSERT because the mapping always exists and
there is no memory allocation in set_entry. I will let x86 folks confirm
or not my purpose.
+ return 0;
+ }
+ else if ( xma == XENMEM_access_n2rwx )
+ {
+ rc = p2m_set_mem_access(v->domain, paddr_to_pfn(gpa), 1,
+ 0, ~0, XENMEM_access_rwx);
+ ASSERT(rc == 0);
Same remark here.
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Otherwise, check if there is a memory event listener, and send the
message along */
+ if ( !mem_event_check_ring( &v->domain->mem_event->access ) )
+ {
+ /* No listener */
+ if ( p2m->access_required )
+ {
+ gdprintk(XENLOG_INFO, "Memory access permissions failure, "
+ "no mem_event listener VCPU %d, dom %d\n",
+ v->vcpu_id, v->domain->domain_id);
+ domain_crash(v->domain);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* n2rwx was already handled */
+ if ( xma != XENMEM_access_n2rwx)
+ {
+ /* A listener is not required, so clear the access
+ * restrictions. */
+ rc = p2m_set_mem_access(v->domain, paddr_to_pfn(gpa), 1,
+ 0, ~0, XENMEM_access_rwx);
+ ASSERT(rc == 0);
Same here.
+void p2m_mem_access_resume(struct domain *d)
+{
+ mem_event_response_t rsp;
+
+ /* Pull all responses off the ring */
+ while( mem_event_get_response(d, &d->mem_event->access, &rsp) )
+ {
+ struct vcpu *v;
+
+ if ( rsp.flags & MEM_EVENT_FLAG_DUMMY )
+ continue;
+
+ /* Validate the vcpu_id in the response. */
+ if ( (rsp.vcpu_id >= d->max_vcpus) || !d->vcpu[rsp.vcpu_id] )
+ continue;
+
+ v = d->vcpu[rsp.vcpu_id];
+
+ /* Unpause domain */
+ if ( rsp.flags & MEM_EVENT_FLAG_VCPU_PAUSED )
+ mem_event_vcpu_unpause(v);
+ }
+}
This function looks very similar, if not a copy, of the x86 one. Can't
we share the code?
+/* Set access type for a region of pfns.
+ * If start_pfn == -1ul, sets the default access type */
+long p2m_set_mem_access(struct domain *d, unsigned long pfn, uint32_t nr,
+ uint32_t start, uint32_t mask, xenmem_access_t access)
+{
+ struct p2m_domain *p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
+ p2m_access_t a;
+ long rc = 0;
+
+ static const p2m_access_t memaccess[] = {
+#define ACCESS(ac) [XENMEM_access_##ac] = p2m_access_##ac
+ ACCESS(n),
+ ACCESS(r),
+ ACCESS(w),
+ ACCESS(rw),
+ ACCESS(x),
+ ACCESS(rx),
+ ACCESS(wx),
+ ACCESS(rwx),
+#undef ACCESS
+ };
+
+ switch ( access )
+ {
+ case 0 ... ARRAY_SIZE(memaccess) - 1:
+ a = memaccess[access];
+ break;
+ case XENMEM_access_default:
+ a = p2m->default_access;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* If request to set default access */
+ if ( pfn == ~0ul )
+ {
+ p2m->default_access = a;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ spin_lock(&p2m->lock);
+ for ( pfn += start; nr > start; ++pfn )
Why don't you reuse apply_p2m_changes? everything to get/update a pte is
there and it contains few optimization.
Also this would avoid to duplicate the shatter code in p2m_set_entry.
+ {
+
+ bool_t pte_update = p2m_set_entry(d, pfn_to_paddr(pfn), a);
+
+ if ( !pte_update )
+ break;
Shouldn't you continue here? The other pages in the batch may require
updates.
[..]
+int p2m_get_mem_access(struct domain *d, unsigned long gpfn,
+ xenmem_access_t *access)
+{
I think this function is not complete. You only set the variable access
when the page frame number has been found in the radix tree. But the
page may use the default access which could result to a trap in Xen.
On x86, We agree that the default access value is stored in the entry.
So if the default access value changes, Xen will retrieved the value
previously stored in the pte.
With your current solution, reproduce this behavior on ARM will be
difficult, unless you add every page in the radix tree.
But I don't have better idea for now.
+ struct p2m_domain *p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
+ void *i;
+ int index;
+
+ static const xenmem_access_t memaccess[] = {
+#define ACCESS(ac) [XENMEM_access_##ac] = XENMEM_access_##ac
+ ACCESS(n),
+ ACCESS(r),
+ ACCESS(w),
+ ACCESS(rw),
+ ACCESS(x),
+ ACCESS(rx),
+ ACCESS(wx),
+ ACCESS(rwx),
+#undef ACCESS
+ };
+
+ /* If request to get default access */
+ if ( gpfn == ~0ull )
+ {
+ *access = memaccess[p2m->default_access];
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ spin_lock(&p2m->lock);
+
+ i = radix_tree_lookup(&p2m->mem_access_settings, gpfn);
+
+ spin_unlock(&p2m->lock);
+
+ if (!i)
if ( !i )
+ return -ESRCH;
+
+ index = radix_tree_ptr_to_int(i);
+
+ if ( (unsigned) index >= ARRAY_SIZE(memaccess) )
+ return -ERANGE;
You are casting to unsigned all usage of index within this function. Why
not directly define index as an "unsigned int"?
+
+ *access = memaccess[ (unsigned) index];
memaccess[(unsigned)index];
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-arm/processor.h b/xen/include/asm-arm/processor.h
index 0cc5b6d..b844f1d 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-arm/processor.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/processor.h
@@ -262,6 +262,36 @@ enum dabt_size {
DABT_DOUBLE_WORD = 3,
};
+/* Data abort data fetch status codes */
+enum dabt_dfsc {
+ DABT_DFSC_ADDR_SIZE_0 = 0b000000,
+ DABT_DFSC_ADDR_SIZE_1 = 0b000001,
+ DABT_DFSC_ADDR_SIZE_2 = 0b000010,
+ DABT_DFSC_ADDR_SIZE_3 = 0b000011,
+ DABT_DFSC_TRANSLATION_0 = 0b000100,
+ DABT_DFSC_TRANSLATION_1 = 0b000101,
+ DABT_DFSC_TRANSLATION_2 = 0b000110,
+ DABT_DFSC_TRANSLATION_3 = 0b000111,
+ DABT_DFSC_ACCESS_1 = 0b001001,
+ DABT_DFSC_ACCESS_2 = 0b001010,
+ DABT_DFSC_ACCESS_3 = 0b001011,
+ DABT_DFSC_PERMISSION_1 = 0b001101,
+ DABT_DFSC_PERMISSION_2 = 0b001110,
+ DABT_DFSC_PERMISSION_3 = 0b001111,
+ DABT_DFSC_SYNC_EXT = 0b010000,
+ DABT_DFSC_SYNC_PARITY = 0b011000,
+ DABT_DFSC_SYNC_EXT_TTW_0 = 0b010100,
+ DABT_DFSC_SYNC_EXT_TTW_1 = 0b010101,
+ DABT_DFSC_SYNC_EXT_TTW_2 = 0b010110,
+ DABT_DFSC_SYNC_EXT_TTW_3 = 0b010111,
+ DABT_DFSC_SYNC_PARITY_TTW_0 = 0b011100,
+ DABT_DFSC_SYNC_PARITY_TTW_1 = 0b011101,
+ DABT_DFSC_SYNC_PARITY_TTW_2 = 0b011110,
+ DABT_DFSC_SYNC_PARITY_TTW_3 = 0b011111,
+ DABT_DFSC_ALIGNMENT = 0b100001,
+ DABT_DFSC_TLB_CONFLICT = 0b110000,
+};
+
I'm not sure if it's necessary to define every possible value.
Regards,
--
Julien Grall
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
|
