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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2] x86/NMI: Allow processing unknown NMIs when watchdog is enabled
>>> On 27.08.14 at 18:45, <ross.lagerwall@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> ________________________________________
> From: Jan Beulich [JBeulich@xxxxxxxx]
> Sent: Wednesday, August 27, 2014 4:35 PM
> To: Ross Lagerwall
> Cc: Xen-devel; Keir (Xen.org)
> Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] x86/NMI: Allow processing unknown NMIs when watchdog
> is enabled
>
>>>>> On 27.08.14 at 17:11, <ross.lagerwall@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> @@ -473,14 +496,26 @@ void nmi_watchdog_tick(const struct cpu_user_regs
> *regs)
>>> }
>>> else if ( nmi_perfctr_msr == MSR_P6_PERFCTR0 )
>>> {
>>> + rdmsrl(MSR_P6_PERFCTR0, msr_content);
>>> + if ( msr_content & (1ULL << P6_EVENT_WIDTH) )
>>> + watchdog_tick = 0;
>>> +
>>> /*
>>> * Only P6 based Pentium M need to re-unmask the apic vector
>>> but
>>> * it doesn't hurt other P6 variants.
>>> */
>>> apic_write(APIC_LVTPC, APIC_DM_NMI);
>>> }
>>> + else if ( nmi_perfctr_msr == MSR_K7_PERFCTR0 )
>>> + {
>>> + rdmsrl(MSR_K7_PERFCTR0, msr_content);
>>> + if ( msr_content & (1ULL << K7_EVENT_WIDTH) )
>>> + watchdog_tick = 0;
>>> + }
>>
>>Looking at the top counter bits is rather weak a check, but I guess
>>there's nothing better (and considering a few more of the top
>>bits would only shrink the window of mis-detection, not eliminate
>>it)...
>>
>
> Well the counter counts down from some large negative number to zero. It is
> sign-extended beyond *_EVENT_WIDTH, so I don't think checking (one of) the
> sign
> bits to confirm whether it has overflowed is that bad.
Oh, indeed, I forgot that this gets programmed with a large initial
value (as, being a performance counter, counts upwards). Indeed,
that renders the above pretty reliable.
Jan
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