Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] evtchn: clean last_vcpu_id on EVTCHNOP_reset to avoid crash

[David Vrabel <david.vrabel@xxxxxxxxxx>]

On 08/08/14 16:17, Vitaly Kuznetsov wrote:
> David Vrabel <david.vrabel@xxxxxxxxxx> writes:
> 
>> On 08/08/14 15:22, Vitaly Kuznetsov wrote:
>>> When EVTCHNOP_reset is being performed last_vcpu_id attribute is not being
>>> cleaned by __evtchn_close(). In case last_vcpu_id != 0 for a particular
>>> event channel and this event channel is going to be used for event delivery
>>> (for another vcpu) before EVTCHNOP_init_control for vcpu == last_vcpu_id
>>> was done the following crash is observed:
>>>
>>>  ...
>>>  (XEN) Xen call trace:
>>>  (XEN)    [<ffff82d080127785>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x5/0x70
>>>  (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801097db>] evtchn_fifo_set_pending+0xdb/0x370
>>>  (XEN)    [<ffff82d080107146>] evtchn_send+0xd6/0x160
>>>  (XEN)    [<ffff82d080107df9>] do_event_channel_op+0x6a9/0x16c0
>>>  (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801ce800>] vmx_intr_assist+0x30/0x480
>>>  (XEN)    [<ffff82d080219e99>] syscall_enter+0xa9/0xae
>>>
>>> This happens because lock_old_queue() does not check VCPU's control
>>> block existence and after EVTCHNOP_reset they are all cleaned.
>>>
>>> I suggest we fix the issue twice: reset last_vcpu_id to 0 in 
>>> __evtchn_close()
>>> and add appropriate check to lock_old_queue() as lost event is much better
>>> than hypervisor crash.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>> ---
>>>  xen/common/event_channel.c | 3 +++
>>>  xen/common/event_fifo.c    | 9 +++++++++
>>>  2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/xen/common/event_channel.c b/xen/common/event_channel.c
>>> index a7becae..67b9d53 100644
>>> --- a/xen/common/event_channel.c
>>> +++ b/xen/common/event_channel.c
>>> @@ -578,6 +578,9 @@ static long __evtchn_close(struct domain *d1, int port1)
>>>      chn1->state          = ECS_FREE;
>>>      chn1->notify_vcpu_id = 0;
>>>  
>>> +    /* Reset last_vcpu_id to vcpu0 as control block can be freed */
>>> +    chn1->last_vcpu_id = 0;
>>
>> This is broken if the event channel is closed and rebound while the
>> event is linked.
>>
>> You can only safely clear chn->last_vcpu_id during evtchn_fifo_destroy().
>>
>> You also need to clear last_priority.
>>
> 
> Thanks, alternatively I can do that in evtchn_reset() after
> evtchn_fifo_destroy() as it is the only path leading to the issue. I
> wanted to avoid that to exclude additional loop for all event channels.
> 
>>> +
>>>      xsm_evtchn_close_post(chn1);
>>>  
>>>   out:
>>> diff --git a/xen/common/event_fifo.c b/xen/common/event_fifo.c
>>> index 51b4ff6..e4bef80 100644
>>> --- a/xen/common/event_fifo.c
>>> +++ b/xen/common/event_fifo.c
>>> @@ -61,6 +61,15 @@ static struct evtchn_fifo_queue *lock_old_queue(const 
>>> struct domain *d,
>>>      for ( try = 0; try < 3; try++ )
>>>      {
>>>          v = d->vcpu[evtchn->last_vcpu_id];
>>> +
>>> +        if ( !v->evtchn_fifo )
>>> +        {
>>> +            gdprintk(XENLOG_ERR,
>>> +                     "domain %d vcpu %d has no control block!\n",
>>> +                     d->domain_id, v->vcpu_id);
>>> +            return NULL;
>>> +        }
>>
>> I think this check needs to be in evtchn_fifo_init() to prevent the
>> event from being bound to VCPU that does not have a control block.
>>
> 
> I *think* it is not the issue here - the event is being bound to VCPU
> with this block initialized. But last_vcpu_id for this particular event
> channel points to some other VCPU which has not initialized its control
> block yet (so d->vcpu[evtchn->last_vcpu_id]->evtchn_fifo is NULL). There
> is no path to get in such situation (after we clear last_vcpu_id), I
> just wanted to put reasonable message here in case something will change
> in future.

Then evtchn_fifo_init() needs to check both the new VCPU and
last_vcpu_id have control blocks.

I much prefer failing the bind up front than detecting the problem later.

David

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