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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH RFC V4 1/5] xen: Emulate with no writes


  • To: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • From: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Tue, 05 Aug 2014 18:27:49 +0300
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On 08/05/2014 06:16 PM, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
> On 08/04/2014 05:09 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> On 04.08.14 at 13:30, <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> +static int hvmemul_rep_ins_discard(
>>> +    uint16_t src_port,
>>> +    enum x86_segment dst_seg,
>>> +    unsigned long dst_offset,
>>> +    unsigned int bytes_per_rep,
>>> +    unsigned long *reps,
>>> +    struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
>>> +{
>>> +    return X86EMUL_OKAY;
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static int hvmemul_rep_movs_discard(
>>> +   enum x86_segment src_seg,
>>> +   unsigned long src_offset,
>>> +   enum x86_segment dst_seg,
>>> +   unsigned long dst_offset,
>>> +   unsigned int bytes_per_rep,
>>> +   unsigned long *reps,
>>> +   struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
>>> +{
>>> +    return X86EMUL_OKAY;
>>> +}
>>
>> ... these don't seem to be: I don't think you can just drop the other
>> half of the operation (i.e. the port or MMIO read).
> 
> I've been looking at hvmemul_do_io() (in arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c, line
> 52), which is what the above functions are reduced to. At line 88 I've
> come across the following code:
> 
>  /*
>   * Weird-sized accesses have undefined behaviour: we discard writes
>   * and read all-ones.
>   */
>  if ( unlikely((size > sizeof(long)) || (size & (size - 1))) )
>  {
>      gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "bad mmio size %d\n", size);
>      ASSERT(p_data != NULL); /* cannot happen with a REP prefix */
>      if ( dir == IOREQ_READ )
>          memset(p_data, ~0, size);
>      if ( ram_page )
>          put_page(ram_page);
>      return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
>  }
> 
> which does drop the last half of the function (though it does so by
> returning X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE). Hvmemul_rep_ins() looks like this:
> 
>  static int hvmemul_rep_ins(
>      uint16_t src_port,
>      enum x86_segment dst_seg,
>      unsigned long dst_offset,
>      unsigned int bytes_per_rep,
>      unsigned long *reps,
>      struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
>  {
>      struct hvm_emulate_ctxt *hvmemul_ctxt =
>          container_of(ctxt, struct hvm_emulate_ctxt, ctxt);
>      unsigned long addr;
>      uint32_t pfec = PFEC_page_present | PFEC_write_access;
>      paddr_t gpa;
>      p2m_type_t p2mt;
>      int rc;
> 
>      rc = hvmemul_virtual_to_linear(
>          dst_seg, dst_offset, bytes_per_rep, reps, hvm_access_write,
>          hvmemul_ctxt, &addr);
>      if ( rc != X86EMUL_OKAY )
>          return rc;
> 
>      if ( hvmemul_ctxt->seg_reg[x86_seg_ss].attr.fields.dpl == 3 )
>          pfec |= PFEC_user_mode;
> 
>      rc = hvmemul_linear_to_phys(
>          addr, &gpa, bytes_per_rep, reps, pfec, hvmemul_ctxt);
>      if ( rc != X86EMUL_OKAY )
>          return rc;
> 
>      (void) get_gfn_query_unlocked(current->domain, gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT,
> &p2mt);
>      if ( p2mt == p2m_mmio_direct || p2mt == p2m_mmio_dm )
>          return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
> 
>      return hvmemul_do_pio(src_port, reps, bytes_per_rep, gpa, IOREQ_READ,
>                            !!(ctxt->regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_DF), NULL);
>  }
> 
> So if I understand this code correctly, hvmemul_rep_ins() performs a few
> checks, and then calls hvmemul_do_pio(), which ends up calling
> hvmemul_do_io(), which seems to discard the write rather unceremoniously
> for weird-sized accesses. This would seem to roughly correspond to just
> returning X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE from hvmemul_rep_ins() for that special
> case (with no MMIO code executed).

To clarify, I'm aware that the special case should not happen for the
"rep" functions (hence the ASSERT()), I'm just trying to understand if
there are cases where it is allowed to drop the other half of the
operation, and if maybe in our case the handlers could just return
X86EMUL_OKAY as originally. If not, I'll continue exploring
hvmemul_do_io() for a way to do this safely.


Thanks,
Razvan Cojocaru

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