[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 01/21] xen/common: do not implicitly permit access to mapped I/O memory
Hi all, Please forgot this patch. I've added it by mistake in my series. Regards, On 07/31/2014 04:00 PM, Julien Grall wrote: > From: Arianna Avanzini <avanzini.arianna@xxxxxxxxx> > > Currently, the XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping hypercall implicitly grants > to a domain access permission to the I/O memory areas mapped in its > guest address space. This conflicts with the presence of a specific > hypercall (XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission) used to grant such a permission > to a domain. > This commit separates the functions of the two hypercalls by having only > the latter be able to permit I/O memory access to a domain, and the > former just performing the mapping after a permissions check on both the > granting and the grantee domains. > > Signed-off-by: Arianna Avanzini <avanzini.arianna@xxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@xxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Paolo Valente <paolo.valente@xxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx> > Cc: Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxx> > Cc: Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx> > Cc: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Eric Trudeau <etrudeau@xxxxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Viktor Kleinik <viktor.kleinik@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > --- > xen/common/domctl.c | 36 ++++++++++-------------------------- > 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/xen/common/domctl.c b/xen/common/domctl.c > index 80b7800..04ecd53 100644 > --- a/xen/common/domctl.c > +++ b/xen/common/domctl.c > @@ -917,7 +917,8 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_domctl_t) > u_domctl) > break; > > ret = -EPERM; > - if ( !iomem_access_permitted(current->domain, mfn, mfn_end) ) > + if ( !iomem_access_permitted(current->domain, mfn, mfn_end) || > + !iomem_access_permitted(d, mfn, mfn_end) ) > break; > > ret = xsm_iomem_mapping(XSM_HOOK, d, mfn, mfn_end, add); > @@ -930,40 +931,23 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_domctl_t) > u_domctl) > "memory_map:add: dom%d gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx\n", > d->domain_id, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns); > > - ret = iomem_permit_access(d, mfn, mfn_end); > - if ( !ret ) > - { > - ret = map_mmio_regions(d, gfn, nr_mfns, mfn); > - if ( ret ) > - { > - printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING > - "memory_map:fail: dom%d gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx > ret:%ld\n", > - d->domain_id, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns, ret); > - if ( iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn_end) && > - is_hardware_domain(current->domain) ) > - printk(XENLOG_ERR > - "memory_map: failed to deny dom%d access to > [%lx,%lx]\n", > - d->domain_id, mfn, mfn_end); > - } > - } > + ret = map_mmio_regions(d, gfn, nr_mfns, mfn); > + if ( ret ) > + printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING > + "memory_map:fail: dom%d gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx > ret:%ld\n", > + d->domain_id, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns, ret); > } > else > { > - int rc = 0; > - > printk(XENLOG_G_INFO > "memory_map:remove: dom%d gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx\n", > d->domain_id, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns); > > - rc = unmap_mmio_regions(d, gfn, nr_mfns, mfn); > - ret = iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn_end); > - if ( !ret ) > - ret = rc; > + ret = unmap_mmio_regions(d, gfn, nr_mfns, mfn); > if ( ret && is_hardware_domain(current->domain) ) > printk(XENLOG_ERR > - "memory_map: error %ld %s dom%d access to > [%lx,%lx]\n", > - ret, rc ? "removing" : "denying", d->domain_id, > - mfn, mfn_end); > + "memory_map: error %ld removing dom%d access to > [%lx,%lx]\n", > + ret, d->domain_id, mfn, mfn_end); > } > /* Do this unconditionally to cover errors on above failure paths. */ > memory_type_changed(d); > -- Julien Grall _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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