[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 1/2] x86/hvm: Always do SMAP check when updating runstate_guest(v)
In the current implementation, we honor the guest's CPL and AC to determain whether do the SMAP check or not for runstate_guest(v). However, this doesn't work. The VMCS feild is invalid when we try to get geust's SS by hvm_get_segment_register(), since the right VMCS has not beed loaded for the current VCPU. In this patch, we always do the SMAP check when updating runstate_guest(v) for the guest when SMAP is enabled by it. Reported-by: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Feng Wu <feng.wu@xxxxxxxxx> --- xen/arch/x86/domain.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h | 17 ++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c index e896210..ad42e4c 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c @@ -180,6 +180,14 @@ void dump_pageframe_info(struct domain *d) spin_unlock(&d->page_alloc_lock); } +smap_check_policy_t smap_policy_change(struct vcpu *v, + smap_check_policy_t new_policy) +{ + smap_check_policy_t old_policy = v->arch.smap_check_policy; + v->arch.smap_check_policy = new_policy; + return old_policy; +} + /* * The hole may be at or above the 44-bit boundary, so we need to determine * the total bit count until reaching 32 significant (not squashed out) bits @@ -1349,22 +1357,33 @@ static void paravirt_ctxt_switch_to(struct vcpu *v) } /* Update per-VCPU guest runstate shared memory area (if registered). */ -bool_t update_runstate_area(const struct vcpu *v) +bool_t update_runstate_area(struct vcpu *v) { + bool_t rc; + smap_check_policy_t smap_policy; + if ( guest_handle_is_null(runstate_guest(v)) ) return 1; + smap_policy = smap_policy_change(v, SMAP_CHECK_ENABLED); + if ( has_32bit_shinfo(v->domain) ) { struct compat_vcpu_runstate_info info; XLAT_vcpu_runstate_info(&info, &v->runstate); __copy_to_guest(v->runstate_guest.compat, &info, 1); - return 1; + smap_policy_change(v, smap_policy); + rc = 1; + } + else + { + rc = __copy_to_guest(runstate_guest(v), &v->runstate, 1) != + sizeof(v->runstate); + smap_policy_change(v, smap_policy); } - return __copy_to_guest(runstate_guest(v), &v->runstate, 1) != - sizeof(v->runstate); + return rc; } static void _update_runstate_area(struct vcpu *v) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c index bb38fda..1b26175 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c @@ -164,25 +164,38 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m, struct segment_register seg; const struct cpu_user_regs *regs = guest_cpu_user_regs(); - hvm_get_segment_register(v, x86_seg_ss, &seg); - /* SMEP: kernel-mode instruction fetches from user-mode mappings * should fault. Unlike NX or invalid bits, we're looking for _all_ * entries in the walk to have _PAGE_USER set, so we need to do the * whole walk as if it were a user-mode one and then invert the answer. */ smep = hvm_smep_enabled(v) && (pfec & PFEC_insn_fetch); - /* - * SMAP: kernel-mode data accesses from user-mode mappings should fault - * A fault is considered as a SMAP violation if the following - * conditions come true: - * - X86_CR4_SMAP is set in CR4 - * - A user page is accessed - * - CPL = 3 or X86_EFLAGS_AC is clear - * - Page fault in kernel mode - */ - smap = hvm_smap_enabled(v) && - ((seg.attr.fields.dpl == 3) || !(regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_AC)); + switch ( v->arch.smap_check_policy ) + { + case SMAP_CHECK_HONOR_CPL_AC: + hvm_get_segment_register(v, x86_seg_ss, &seg); + + /* + * SMAP: kernel-mode data accesses from user-mode mappings + * should fault. + * A fault is considered as a SMAP violation if the following + * conditions come true: + * - X86_CR4_SMAP is set in CR4 + * - A user page is accessed + * - CPL = 3 or X86_EFLAGS_AC is clear + * - Page fault in kernel mode + */ + smap = hvm_smap_enabled(v) && + ((seg.attr.fields.dpl == 3) || + !(regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_AC)); + break; + case SMAP_CHECK_ENABLED: + smap = hvm_smap_enabled(v); + break; + default: + ASSERT(v->arch.smap_check_policy == SMAP_CHECK_DISABLED); + break; + } } if ( smep || smap ) diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h index abf55fb..112d0b1 100644 --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h @@ -382,6 +382,12 @@ struct pv_vcpu struct vcpu_time_info pending_system_time; }; +typedef enum __packed { + SMAP_CHECK_HONOR_CPL_AC, /* honor the guest's CPL and AC */ + SMAP_CHECK_ENABLED, /* enable the check */ + SMAP_CHECK_DISABLED, /* disable the check */ +} smap_check_policy_t; + struct arch_vcpu { /* @@ -438,6 +444,12 @@ struct arch_vcpu * and thus should be saved/restored. */ bool_t nonlazy_xstate_used; + /* + * The SMAP check policy when updating runstate_guest(v) and the + * secondary system time. + */ + smap_check_policy_t smap_check_policy; + struct vmce vmce; struct paging_vcpu paging; @@ -448,11 +460,14 @@ struct arch_vcpu XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(vcpu_time_info_t) time_info_guest; } __cacheline_aligned; +smap_check_policy_t smap_policy_change(struct vcpu *v, + smap_check_policy_t new_policy); + /* Shorthands to improve code legibility. */ #define hvm_vmx hvm_vcpu.u.vmx #define hvm_svm hvm_vcpu.u.svm -bool_t update_runstate_area(const struct vcpu *); +bool_t update_runstate_area(struct vcpu *); bool_t update_secondary_system_time(const struct vcpu *, struct vcpu_time_info *); -- 1.8.3.1 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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