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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 3/3] [GSOC14] FIX:- Race condition between initializing shared ring and mempaging.

On Wed, 2014-07-23 at 11:32 +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 23/07/14 11:14, Ian Campbell wrote:
> > On Mon, 2014-07-21 at 15:40 +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> >
> >>> Note that the XSA commmit, 6ae2df93c27, does exactly that. Enable
> >>> paging/access/sharing, and only after that decrease reservation (and
> >>> after that unpause). So the window is open ... methinks?
> >> No - it does a domain pause around this set of critical operations, so
> >> the guest is guaranteed not to be running, and therefore cannot
> >> interfere.
> > Shouldn't there be a memset in here somewhere? To clear out any bogus
> > material in the ring? (maybe the caller of this code always clears the
> > ring itself, I didn't check that)
> >
> > Ian.
> >
> Erm.  There probably should be.  Xen sets up the ring frontend
> correctly, but nothing I can spot cleans up any stale backend state
> which was preexisting in the page.
> It seems possible for a guest can map the affected pages and leave some
> crafted backend replies which will be picked up as soon as mem_events
> are enabled.  Combined with the lack of validation of responses in Xen,
> this is quite bad.


BTW, I wonder why we don't make the initial P2M mapping R/O. That would
still allow the tools to use the gpfn as a handle to pickup the page
later but would stop the guest messing with it in the meantime.


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