[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 3/3] [GSOC14] FIX:- Race condition between initializing shared ring and mempaging.
On Wed, 2014-07-23 at 11:32 +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote: > On 23/07/14 11:14, Ian Campbell wrote: > > On Mon, 2014-07-21 at 15:40 +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote: > > > >>> Note that the XSA commmit, 6ae2df93c27, does exactly that. Enable > >>> paging/access/sharing, and only after that decrease reservation (and > >>> after that unpause). So the window is open ... methinks? > >> No - it does a domain pause around this set of critical operations, so > >> the guest is guaranteed not to be running, and therefore cannot > >> interfere. > > Shouldn't there be a memset in here somewhere? To clear out any bogus > > material in the ring? (maybe the caller of this code always clears the > > ring itself, I didn't check that) > > > > Ian. > > > > Erm. There probably should be. Xen sets up the ring frontend > correctly, but nothing I can spot cleans up any stale backend state > which was preexisting in the page. > > It seems possible for a guest can map the affected pages and leave some > crafted backend replies which will be picked up as soon as mem_events > are enabled. Combined with the lack of validation of responses in Xen, > this is quite bad. Indeed! BTW, I wonder why we don't make the initial P2M mapping R/O. That would still allow the tools to use the gpfn as a handle to pickup the page later but would stop the guest messing with it in the meantime. Ian. _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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