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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 01/10] xen: vnuma topology and subop hypercalls
On ven, 2014-07-18 at 01:50 -0400, Elena Ufimtseva wrote:
> diff --git a/xen/common/domain.c b/xen/common/domain.c
> index cd64aea..895584a 100644
> @@ -297,6 +297,144 @@ int vcpuaffinity_params_invalid(const
> xen_domctl_vcpuaffinity_t *vcpuaff)
> guest_handle_is_null(vcpuaff->cpumap_soft.bitmap));
> }
>
> +/*
> + * Allocates memory for vNUMA, **vnuma should be NULL.
> + * Caller has to make sure that domain has max_pages
> + * and number of vcpus set for domain.
> + * Verifies that single allocation does not exceed
> + * PAGE_SIZE.
> + */
> +static int vnuma_alloc(struct vnuma_info **vnuma,
> + unsigned int nr_vnodes,
> + unsigned int nr_vcpus,
> + unsigned int dist_size)
> +{
> + struct vnuma_info *v;
> +
> + if ( vnuma && *vnuma )
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + v = *vnuma;
>
Do you need this? What for?
> + /*
> + * check if any of xmallocs exeeds PAGE_SIZE.
> + * If yes, consider it as an error for now.
>
Do you mind elaborating a bit more on the 'for now'? Why 'for now'?
What's the plan for the future, etc. ...
> + */
> + if ( nr_vnodes > PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(nr_vnodes) ||
> + nr_vcpus > PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(nr_vcpus) ||
> + nr_vnodes > PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(struct vmemrange) ||
> + dist_size > PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(dist_size) )
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + v = xzalloc(struct vnuma_info);
> + if ( !v )
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + v->vdistance = xmalloc_array(unsigned int, dist_size);
> + v->vmemrange = xmalloc_array(vmemrange_t, nr_vnodes);
> + v->vcpu_to_vnode = xmalloc_array(unsigned int, nr_vcpus);
> + v->vnode_to_pnode = xmalloc_array(unsigned int, nr_vnodes);
> +
> + if ( v->vdistance == NULL || v->vmemrange == NULL ||
> + v->vcpu_to_vnode == NULL || v->vnode_to_pnode == NULL )
> + {
> + vnuma_destroy(v);
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + }
> +
> + *vnuma = v;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Allocate memory and construct one vNUMA node,
> + * set default parameters, assign all memory and
> + * vcpus to this node, set distance to 10.
> + */
> +static long vnuma_fallback(const struct domain *d,
> + struct vnuma_info **vnuma)
> +{
> +
I think I agree with Wei, about this fallback not being necessary.
> +/*
> + * construct vNUMA topology form u_vnuma struct and return
> + * it in dst.
> + */
> +long vnuma_init(const struct xen_domctl_vnuma *u_vnuma,
> + const struct domain *d,
> + struct vnuma_info **dst)
> +{
> + unsigned int dist_size, nr_vnodes = 0;
> + long ret;
> + struct vnuma_info *v = NULL;
> +
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> +
Why not initialize 'ret' while defining it?
> + /* If vNUMA topology already set, just exit. */
> + if ( !u_vnuma || *dst )
> + return ret;
> +
> + nr_vnodes = u_vnuma->nr_vnodes;
> +
> + if ( nr_vnodes == 0 )
> + return ret;
> +
> + if ( nr_vnodes > (UINT_MAX / nr_vnodes) )
> + return ret;
> +
Mmmm, do we perhaps want to #define a maximum number of supported vitual
node, put it somewhere in an header, and use it for the check? I mean
something like what we have for the host (in that case, it's called
MAX_NUMNODES).
I mean, if UINT_MAX is 2^64, would it make sense to allow a 2^32 nodes
guest?
> + dist_size = nr_vnodes * nr_vnodes;
> +
> + ret = vnuma_alloc(&v, nr_vnodes, d->max_vcpus, dist_size);
> + if ( ret )
> + return ret;
> +
> + /* On failure, set only one vNUMA node and its success. */
> + ret = 0;
> +
> + if ( copy_from_guest(v->vdistance, u_vnuma->vdistance, dist_size) )
> + goto vnuma_onenode;
> + if ( copy_from_guest(v->vmemrange, u_vnuma->vmemrange, nr_vnodes) )
> + goto vnuma_onenode;
> + if ( copy_from_guest(v->vcpu_to_vnode, u_vnuma->vcpu_to_vnode,
> + d->max_vcpus) )
> + goto vnuma_onenode;
> + if ( copy_from_guest(v->vnode_to_pnode, u_vnuma->vnode_to_pnode,
> + nr_vnodes) )
> + goto vnuma_onenode;
> +
> + v->nr_vnodes = nr_vnodes;
> + *dst = v;
> +
> + return ret;
> +
> +vnuma_onenode:
> + vnuma_destroy(v);
> + return vnuma_fallback(d, dst);
>
As said, just report the error and bail in this case.
> +}
> +
> long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_domctl_t) u_domctl)
> {
> long ret = 0;
> @@ -967,6 +1105,35 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_domctl_t)
> u_domctl)
> }
> break;
>
> + case XEN_DOMCTL_setvnumainfo:
> + {
> + struct vnuma_info *v = NULL;
> +
> + ret = -EFAULT;
> + if ( guest_handle_is_null(op->u.vnuma.vdistance) ||
> + guest_handle_is_null(op->u.vnuma.vmemrange) ||
> + guest_handle_is_null(op->u.vnuma.vcpu_to_vnode) ||
> + guest_handle_is_null(op->u.vnuma.vnode_to_pnode) )
> + return ret;
> +
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> +
> + ret = vnuma_init(&op->u.vnuma, d, &v);
>
Rather pointless 'ret=-EINVAL', I would say. :-)
> + if ( ret < 0 || v == NULL )
> + break;
> +
> + /* overwrite vnuma for domain */
> + if ( !d->vnuma )
> + vnuma_destroy(d->vnuma);
> +
> + domain_lock(d);
> + d->vnuma = v;
> + domain_unlock(d);
> +
> + ret = 0;
> + }
> + break;
> +
> default:
> ret = arch_do_domctl(op, d, u_domctl);
> break;
Regards,
Dario
--
<<This happens because I choose it to happen!>> (Raistlin Majere)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Dario Faggioli, Ph.D, http://about.me/dario.faggioli
Senior Software Engineer, Citrix Systems R&D Ltd., Cambridge (UK)
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