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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [PATCH v9 14/14] xen/common: do not implicitly permit access to mapped I/O memory
Currently, the XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping hypercall implicitly grants
to a domain access permission to the I/O memory areas mapped in its
guest address space. This conflicts with the presence of a specific
hypercall (XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission) used to grant such a permission
to a domain.
This commit separates the functions of the two hypercalls by having only
the latter be able to permit I/O memory access to a domain, and the
former just performing the mapping after a permissions check on both the
granting and the grantee domains.
Signed-off-by: Arianna Avanzini <avanzini.arianna@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Paolo Valente <paolo.valente@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Cc: Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Eric Trudeau <etrudeau@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Viktor Kleinik <viktor.kleinik@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
v8:
- Drop iomem_permission-related changes.
- Conservatively check both the granting and the grantee domains'
permissions in the memory_mapping DOMCTL.
- Remove tentative phrases from commit description.
v7:
- Let iomem_permission check if the calling domain is allowed to access
memory ranges to be mapped to a domain. Remove such a check from the
memory_mapping hypercall.
---
xen/common/domctl.c | 36 ++++++++++--------------------------
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/common/domctl.c b/xen/common/domctl.c
index abc8d60..2e8d57e 100644
--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
+++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
@@ -925,7 +925,8 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_domctl_t)
u_domctl)
break;
ret = -EPERM;
- if ( !iomem_access_permitted(current->domain, mfn, mfn_end) )
+ if ( !iomem_access_permitted(current->domain, mfn, mfn_end) ||
+ !iomem_access_permitted(d, mfn, mfn_end) )
break;
ret = xsm_iomem_mapping(XSM_HOOK, d, mfn, mfn_end, add);
@@ -938,40 +939,23 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_domctl_t)
u_domctl)
"memory_map:add: dom%d gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx\n",
d->domain_id, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns);
- ret = iomem_permit_access(d, mfn, mfn_end);
- if ( !ret )
- {
- ret = map_mmio_regions(d, gfn, nr_mfns, mfn);
- if ( ret )
- {
- printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING
- "memory_map:fail: dom%d gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx
ret:%ld\n",
- d->domain_id, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns, ret);
- if ( iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn_end) &&
- is_hardware_domain(current->domain) )
- printk(XENLOG_ERR
- "memory_map: failed to deny dom%d access to
[%lx,%lx]\n",
- d->domain_id, mfn, mfn_end);
- }
- }
+ ret = map_mmio_regions(d, gfn, nr_mfns, mfn);
+ if ( ret )
+ printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING
+ "memory_map:fail: dom%d gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx
ret:%ld\n",
+ d->domain_id, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns, ret);
}
else
{
- int rc = 0;
-
printk(XENLOG_G_INFO
"memory_map:remove: dom%d gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx\n",
d->domain_id, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns);
- rc = unmap_mmio_regions(d, gfn, nr_mfns, mfn);
- ret = iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn_end);
- if ( !ret )
- ret = rc;
+ ret = unmap_mmio_regions(d, gfn, nr_mfns, mfn);
if ( ret && is_hardware_domain(current->domain) )
printk(XENLOG_ERR
- "memory_map: error %ld %s dom%d access to [%lx,%lx]\n",
- ret, rc ? "removing" : "denying", d->domain_id,
- mfn, mfn_end);
+ "memory_map: error %ld removing dom%d access to
[%lx,%lx]\n",
+ ret, d->domain_id, mfn, mfn_end);
}
/* Do this unconditionally to cover errors on above failure paths. */
memory_type_changed(d);
--
1.9.3
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