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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v7 10/10] xen/common: do not implicitly permit access to mapped I/O memory

On 26/05/14 12:51, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 26.05.14 at 13:42, <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

On 26/05/14 12:37, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 26.05.14 at 13:24, <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On 26/05/14 12:14, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 26.05.14 at 12:53, <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On 26/05/14 11:14, Jan Beulich wrote:

Or maybe I wasn't wrong - the patch context doesn't really make
clear whether it's the granting or mapping operation that gets
adjusted here (since an earlier patch moved the mapping one into
this function).

             ret = -EPERM;
-        if ( !iomem_access_permitted(current->domain, mfn, mfn_end) )
+        if ( !iomem_access_permitted(d, mfn, mfn_end) )

             ret = xsm_iomem_mapping(XSM_HOOK, d, mfn, mfn_end, add);

There is an xsm_iomem_mapping just after, so the change has been done in

In which case I indeed stick to my original comment - it's perhaps
best to check _both_.

Why? We may want to map the region in the guest P2M without giving the
permission to the guest (I'm thinking about ARM passthrough case).

How can you put a mapping of memory into a guest's P2M for which
that guest has no access permission? To me this reads like you're
intending to create a security issue here.

iomem_access_permitted is used to check if we allow the current guest to
map a region in another guest P2M.

Once the mapping is done, at least on ARM, we don't use anymore the
permission check. This is because there is no trap involved afterwards.

I don't see how absence or presence of traps is involved here. The
problem I see is that by putting in such a P2M entrry you allow a
guest access to memory that it wasn't granted access to.

In the case of an HVM guest (or ARM guest), the permission seems to be used only during DOMCTL_memory_mapping hypercall. So I understand the permission as "I'm allowed to map/unmap this MMIO range from a guest P2M".

If we request the guest to have the permission on this range, we also allow the guest to map in its P2M (assuming XSM is not there) theses MMIOs.

I don't think, at least on ARM, we want to let the guest doing what it wants with the mapping MMIO region.

With your requirements, we have to call 2 hypercalls rather than one for
memory mapping, even if we don't want to allow the guest modifying iomem

While I can see you not allowing modification, even r/o access may
(and likely will) be problematic for MMIO.

AFAIU, iomem_access_permitted is only here to allow modification of this
range via hypercall.

Sorry, I should have read again what I wrote. I tried to be clearer above.

Julien Grall

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