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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v7 6/7] x86/hvm: Add SMAP support to HVM guest



On 08/05/14 10:21, Feng Wu wrote:
> Intel new CPU supports SMAP (Supervisor Mode Access Prevention).
> SMAP prevents supervisor-mode accesses to any linear address with
> a valid translation for which the U/S flag (bit 2) is 1 in every
> paging-structure entry controlling the translation for the linear
> address.
>
> Signed-off-by: Feng Wu <feng.wu@xxxxxxxxx>
> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
> Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx>

Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>

> ---
>  xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c        |  3 +++
>  xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c  | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
>  xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h | 22 +++++++++++++++++++---
>  3 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> index da220bf..fa050e5 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> @@ -3048,6 +3048,9 @@ void hvm_cpuid(unsigned int input, unsigned int *eax, 
> unsigned int *ebx,
>          if ( (count == 0) && !cpu_has_smep )
>              *ebx &= ~cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SMEP);
>  
> +        if ( (count == 0) && !cpu_has_smap )
> +            *ebx &= ~cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SMAP);
> +
>          /* Don't expose MPX to hvm when VMX support is not available */
>          if ( (count == 0) &&
>               (!(vmx_vmexit_control & VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS) ||
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c
> index 70460b6..bb38fda 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c
> @@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m,
>      guest_l4e_t *l4p;
>  #endif
>      uint32_t gflags, mflags, iflags, rc = 0;
> -    int smep;
> +    bool_t smep = 0, smap = 0;
>      bool_t pse1G = 0, pse2M = 0;
>      p2m_query_t qt = P2M_ALLOC | P2M_UNSHARE;
>  
> @@ -159,13 +159,33 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain 
> *p2m,
>      mflags = mandatory_flags(v, pfec);
>      iflags = (_PAGE_NX_BIT | _PAGE_INVALID_BITS);
>  
> -    /* SMEP: kernel-mode instruction fetches from user-mode mappings
> -     * should fault.  Unlike NX or invalid bits, we're looking for _all_
> -     * entries in the walk to have _PAGE_USER set, so we need to do the
> -     * whole walk as if it were a user-mode one and then invert the answer. 
> */
> -    smep = (is_hvm_vcpu(v) && hvm_smep_enabled(v) 
> -            && (pfec & PFEC_insn_fetch) && !(pfec & PFEC_user_mode) );
> -    if ( smep )
> +    if ( is_hvm_vcpu(v) && !(pfec & PFEC_user_mode) )
> +    {
> +        struct segment_register seg;
> +        const struct cpu_user_regs *regs = guest_cpu_user_regs();
> +
> +        hvm_get_segment_register(v, x86_seg_ss, &seg);
> +
> +        /* SMEP: kernel-mode instruction fetches from user-mode mappings
> +         * should fault.  Unlike NX or invalid bits, we're looking for _all_
> +         * entries in the walk to have _PAGE_USER set, so we need to do the
> +         * whole walk as if it were a user-mode one and then invert the 
> answer. */
> +        smep =  hvm_smep_enabled(v) && (pfec & PFEC_insn_fetch);
> +
> +        /*
> +         * SMAP: kernel-mode data accesses from user-mode mappings should 
> fault
> +         * A fault is considered as a SMAP violation if the following
> +         * conditions come true:
> +         *   - X86_CR4_SMAP is set in CR4
> +         *   - A user page is accessed
> +         *   - CPL = 3 or X86_EFLAGS_AC is clear
> +         *   - Page fault in kernel mode
> +         */
> +        smap = hvm_smap_enabled(v) &&
> +               ((seg.attr.fields.dpl == 3) || !(regs->eflags & 
> X86_EFLAGS_AC));
> +    }
> +
> +    if ( smep || smap )
>          mflags |= _PAGE_USER;
>  
>  #if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS >= 3 /* PAE or 64... */
> @@ -338,8 +358,8 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m,
>  #if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS >= 4 /* 64-bit only... */
>  set_ad:
>  #endif
> -    /* Now re-invert the user-mode requirement for SMEP. */
> -    if ( smep ) 
> +    /* Now re-invert the user-mode requirement for SMEP and SMAP */
> +    if ( smep || smap )
>          rc ^= _PAGE_USER;
>  
>      /* Go back and set accessed and dirty bits only if the walk was a
> diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
> index b1c340e..2717726 100644
> --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
> +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
> @@ -264,6 +264,8 @@ int hvm_girq_dest_2_vcpu_id(struct domain *d, uint8_t 
> dest, uint8_t dest_mode);
>      (hvm_paging_enabled(v) && ((v)->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[4] & X86_CR4_PAE))
>  #define hvm_smep_enabled(v) \
>      (hvm_paging_enabled(v) && ((v)->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[4] & 
> X86_CR4_SMEP))
> +#define hvm_smap_enabled(v) \
> +    (hvm_paging_enabled(v) && ((v)->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[4] & 
> X86_CR4_SMAP))
>  #define hvm_nx_enabled(v) \
>      (!!((v)->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_efer & EFER_NX))
>  
> @@ -363,17 +365,30 @@ static inline int hvm_event_pending(struct vcpu *v)
>  
>  static inline bool_t hvm_vcpu_has_smep(void)
>  {
> -    unsigned int eax, ebx;
> +    unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx = 0;
>  
>      hvm_cpuid(0, &eax, NULL, NULL, NULL);
>  
> -    if (eax < 7)
> +    if ( eax < 7 )
>          return 0;
>  
> -    hvm_cpuid(7, NULL, &ebx, NULL, NULL);
> +    hvm_cpuid(7, NULL, &ebx, &ecx, NULL);
>      return !!(ebx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SMEP));
>  }
>  
> +static inline bool_t hvm_vcpu_has_smap(void)
> +{
> +    unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx = 0;
> +
> +    hvm_cpuid(0, &eax, NULL, NULL, NULL);
> +
> +    if ( eax < 7 )
> +        return 0;
> +
> +    hvm_cpuid(7, NULL, &ebx, &ecx, NULL);
> +    return !!(ebx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SMAP));
> +}
> +
>  /* These reserved bits in lower 32 remain 0 after any load of CR0 */
>  #define HVM_CR0_GUEST_RESERVED_BITS             \
>      (~((unsigned long)                          \
> @@ -394,6 +409,7 @@ static inline bool_t hvm_vcpu_has_smep(void)
>          X86_CR4_MCE | X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PCE |       \
>          X86_CR4_OSFXSR | X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT |           \
>          (hvm_vcpu_has_smep() ? X86_CR4_SMEP : 0) |      \
> +        (hvm_vcpu_has_smap() ? X86_CR4_SMAP : 0) |      \
>          (cpu_has_fsgsbase ? X86_CR4_FSGSBASE : 0) |     \
>          ((nestedhvm_enabled((_v)->domain) && cpu_has_vmx)\
>                        ? X86_CR4_VMXE : 0)  |             \


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