VT-d: extend error report masking workaround to newer chipsets Add two more PCI IDs to the set that has been taken care of with a different workaround long before XSA-59, and (for constency with the newer workarounds) log a message here too. Also move the function wide comment to the cases it applies to; this should really have been done by d061d200 ("VT-d: suppress UR signaling for server chipsets"). This is CVE-2013-3495 / XSA-59. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c @@ -379,12 +379,6 @@ void me_wifi_quirk(struct domain *domain } } -/* - * Mask reporting Intel VT-d faults to IOH core logic: - * - Some platform escalates VT-d faults to platform errors - * - This can cause system failure upon non-fatal VT-d faults - * - Potential security issue if malicious guest trigger VT-d faults - */ void pci_vtd_quirk(const struct pci_dev *pdev) { int seg = pdev->seg; @@ -402,10 +396,20 @@ void pci_vtd_quirk(const struct pci_dev switch ( pci_conf_read16(seg, bus, dev, func, PCI_DEVICE_ID) ) { + /* + * Mask reporting Intel VT-d faults to IOH core logic: + * - Some platform escalates VT-d faults to platform errors. + * - This can cause system failure upon non-fatal VT-d faults. + * - Potential security issue if malicious guest trigger VT-d faults. + */ + case 0x0e28: /* Xeon-E5v2 (IvyBridge) */ case 0x342e: /* Tylersburg chipset (Nehalem / Westmere systems) */ + case 0x3728: /* Xeon C5500/C3500 (JasperForest) */ case 0x3c28: /* Sandybridge */ val = pci_conf_read32(seg, bus, dev, func, 0x1AC); pci_conf_write32(seg, bus, dev, func, 0x1AC, val | (1 << 31)); + printk(XENLOG_INFO "Masked VT-d error signaling on %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n", + seg, bus, dev, func); break; /* Tylersburg (EP)/Boxboro (MP) chipsets (NHM-EP/EX, WSM-EP/EX) */