Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v1 3/6] x86: Enable Supervisor Mode Execution Prevention (SMAP) for Xen

[Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>]

On 16/04/14 03:20, Wu, Feng wrote:
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Andrew Cooper [mailto:andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx]
>> Sent: Tuesday, April 15, 2014 6:33 PM
>> To: Wu, Feng
>> Cc: JBeulich@xxxxxxxx; Ian.Campbell@xxxxxxxxxx; xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx;
>> Dong, Eddie; Nakajima, Jun
>> Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v1 3/6] x86: Enable Supervisor Mode Execution
>> Prevention (SMAP) for Xen
>>
>> On 15/04/14 14:01, Feng Wu wrote:
>>> Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP) is a new security
>>> feature disclosed by Intel, please refer to the following
>>> document:
>>>
>>> http://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/319433-014.pdf
>>>
>>> If CR4.SMAP = 1, supervisor-mode data accesses are not allowed
>>> to linear addresses that are accessible in user mode. If CPL < 3,
>>> SMAP protections are disabled if EFLAGS.AC = 1. If CPL = 3, SMAP
>>> applies to all supervisor-mode data accesses (these are implicit
>>> supervisor accesses) regardless of the value of EFLAGS.AC.
>>>
>>> This patch enables SMAP in Xen to prevent Xen hypervisor from
>>> accessing pv guest data, whose translation paging-structure
>>> entries' U/S flags are all set.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Feng Wu <feng.wu@xxxxxxxxx>
>>> ---
>>>  xen/arch/x86/setup.c             |  9 +++++++++
>>>  xen/arch/x86/traps.c             | 34
>> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
>>>  xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h |  1 +
>>>  xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h     |  6 ++++--
>>>  4 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
>>> index e9c2c51..09c974d 100644
>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
>>> @@ -61,6 +61,10 @@ integer_param("maxcpus", max_cpus);
>>>  static bool_t __initdata disable_smep;
>>>  invbool_param("smep", disable_smep);
>>>
>>> +/* smap: Enable/disable Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (default on). */
>>> +static bool_t __initdata disable_smap;
>>> +invbool_param("smap", disable_smap);
>>> +
>> Please use a positive boolean rather than negative.  Convention is also
>> to prefix the variable with opt_
>>
>> static bool_t __initdata opt_smap = 1;
>> boolean_param("smap", opt_smap);
>>
> Since SMAP is a similar feature compared to SMEP, here I just follow the
> existing code of SMEP.
>
>> Also, please patch docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
>>
>>>  /* **** Linux config option: propagated to domain0. */
>>>  /* "acpi=off":    Sisables both ACPI table parsing and interpreter. */
>>>  /* "acpi=force":  Override the disable blacklist.                   */
>>> @@ -1279,6 +1283,11 @@ void __init noreturn __start_xen(unsigned long
>> mbi_p)
>>>      if ( cpu_has_smep )
>>>          set_in_cr4(X86_CR4_SMEP);
>>>
>>> +    if ( disable_smap )
>>> +        setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SMAP);
>>> +    if ( cpu_has_smap )
>>> +        set_in_cr4(X86_CR4_SMAP);
>>> +
>>>      if ( cpu_has_fsgsbase )
>>>          set_in_cr4(X86_CR4_FSGSBASE);
>>>
>>> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
>>> index ed4ae2d..9307f10 100644
>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
>>> @@ -1182,11 +1182,12 @@ static int handle_gdt_ldt_mapping_fault(
>>>  enum pf_type {
>>>      real_fault,
>>>      smep_fault,
>>> +    smap_fault,
>>>      spurious_fault
>>>  };
>>>
>>>  static enum pf_type __page_fault_type(
>>> -    unsigned long addr, unsigned int error_code)
>>> +    unsigned long addr, struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
>>>  {
>>>      unsigned long mfn, cr3 = read_cr3();
>>>      l4_pgentry_t l4e, *l4t;
>>> @@ -1194,6 +1195,7 @@ static enum pf_type __page_fault_type(
>>>      l2_pgentry_t l2e, *l2t;
>>>      l1_pgentry_t l1e, *l1t;
>>>      unsigned int required_flags, disallowed_flags, page_user;
>>> +    unsigned int error_code = regs->error_code;
>>>
>>>      /*
>>>       * We do not take spurious page faults in IRQ handlers as we do not
>>> @@ -1270,11 +1272,26 @@ leaf:
>>>           ((error_code & (PFEC_insn_fetch|PFEC_user_mode)) ==
>> PFEC_insn_fetch) )
>>>          return smep_fault;
>>>
>>> +    /*
>>> +     * Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP):
>>> +     * Disallow supervisor access user-accessible mappings
>>> +     * A fault is considered as an SMAP violation if the following
>>> +     * conditions are ture:
>> 'true'
>>
>>> +     *   - X86_CR4_SMAP is set in CR4
>>> +     *   - An user page is accessed
>>> +     *   - CPL=3 or X86_EFLAGS_AC is clear
>> CPL < 3 surely?
>>
>> ~Andrew
> The comments here is correct. SMAP takes effect when:
>       - CPL == 3
>       or
>       - CPL <3 && AC bit is clear
>
>

Which is even further from your written comment, although given the
bullet points in the manual I can see why you expressed it this way.

On a broader note, how do implicit supervisor accesses interact with
SMAP when the usermode code is using alignment checking?  Do we end up
with spurious SMAP violations for accesses to the GDT, LDT, IDT and TSS?

~Andrew

_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel