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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 4/7] xen: rename dom0 to hardware_domain
On 27.03.14 12:52, Daniel De Graaf wrote:
> This should not change any functionality other than renaming the global
> variable. In a few cases (primarily the domain building code), a local
> variable or argument named dom0 was created and used instead of the
> global hardware_domain to clarify that the domain being used in this
> case is actually domain 0.
>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx>
> Cc: Liu Jinsong <jinsong.liu@xxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Christoph Egger <chegger@xxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@xxxxxxx>
> Cc: Xiantao Zhang <xiantao.zhang@xxxxxxxxx>
These changes are pretty mechanical.
I suppose you have code (or at least a plan) on top of
this patch? Is this a cleanup patch splitted out of it?
Christoph
> ---
> xen/arch/arm/domain_build.c | 2 +-
> xen/arch/arm/setup.c | 5 ++--
> xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c | 2 +-
> xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/vmce.h | 5 ++--
> xen/arch/x86/crash.c | 2 +-
> xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c | 37
> +++++++++++++++--------------
> xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c | 8 +++----
> xen/arch/x86/irq.c | 8 +++----
> xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 2 +-
> xen/arch/x86/nmi.c | 2 +-
> xen/arch/x86/setup.c | 5 ++--
> xen/arch/x86/traps.c | 2 +-
> xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.c | 6 ++---
> xen/common/domain.c | 2 +-
> xen/common/event_channel.c | 2 +-
> xen/common/kexec.c | 2 +-
> xen/common/keyhandler.c | 4 ++--
> xen/common/xenoprof.c | 2 +-
> xen/drivers/char/ns16550.c | 4 +++-
> xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c | 2 +-
> xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c | 10 ++++----
> xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c | 4 ++--
> xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c | 4 ++--
> xen/include/asm-arm/domain.h | 2 +-
> xen/include/xen/domain.h | 2 +-
> xen/include/xen/sched.h | 4 ++--
> 26 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/domain_build.c b/xen/arch/arm/domain_build.c
> index c9dda0e..3226792 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/arm/domain_build.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/arm/domain_build.c
> @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ custom_param("dom0_mem", parse_dom0_mem);
> */
> #define DOM0_FDT_EXTRA_SIZE (128 + sizeof(struct fdt_reserve_entry))
>
> -struct vcpu *__init alloc_dom0_vcpu0(void)
> +struct vcpu *__init alloc_dom0_vcpu0(struct domain *dom0)
> {
> if ( opt_dom0_max_vcpus == 0 )
> opt_dom0_max_vcpus = num_online_cpus();
> diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/setup.c b/xen/arch/arm/setup.c
> index 215ec24..2d562c6 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/arm/setup.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/arm/setup.c
> @@ -664,6 +664,7 @@ void __init start_xen(unsigned long boot_phys_offset,
> size_t fdt_size;
> int cpus, i;
> const char *cmdline;
> + struct domain *dom0;
>
> setup_cache();
>
> @@ -760,8 +761,8 @@ void __init start_xen(unsigned long boot_phys_offset,
> do_initcalls();
>
> /* Create initial domain 0. */
> - dom0 = domain_create(0, 0, 0);
> - if ( IS_ERR(dom0) || (alloc_dom0_vcpu0() == NULL) )
> + hardware_domain = dom0 = domain_create(0, 0, 0);
> + if ( IS_ERR(dom0) || (alloc_dom0_vcpu0(dom0) == NULL) )
> panic("Error creating domain 0");
>
> dom0->is_privileged = 1;
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c b/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c
> index d2119e2..b05fb39 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c
> @@ -972,7 +972,7 @@ static void set_cx(
> cx->entry_method = ACPI_CSTATE_EM_HALT;
> break;
> case ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_IO:
> - if ( ioports_deny_access(dom0, cx->address, cx->address) )
> + if ( ioports_deny_access(hardware_domain, cx->address, cx->address) )
> printk(XENLOG_WARNING "Could not deny access to port %04x\n",
> cx->address);
> cx->entry_method = ACPI_CSTATE_EM_SYSIO;
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/vmce.h b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/vmce.h
> index 6b2c95a..163ce3c 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/vmce.h
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/vmce.h
> @@ -5,8 +5,9 @@
>
> int vmce_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
>
> -#define dom0_vmce_enabled() (dom0 && dom0->max_vcpus && dom0->vcpu[0] \
> - && guest_enabled_event(dom0->vcpu[0], VIRQ_MCA))
> +#define dom0_vmce_enabled() (hardware_domain && hardware_domain->max_vcpus \
> + && hardware_domain->vcpu[0] \
> + && guest_enabled_event(hardware_domain->vcpu[0], VIRQ_MCA))
>
> int unmmap_broken_page(struct domain *d, mfn_t mfn, unsigned long gfn);
>
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/crash.c b/xen/arch/x86/crash.c
> index ec586bd..aed3b3e 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/crash.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/crash.c
> @@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ void machine_crash_shutdown(void)
> info = kexec_crash_save_info();
> info->xen_phys_start = xen_phys_start;
> info->dom0_pfn_to_mfn_frame_list_list =
> - arch_get_pfn_to_mfn_frame_list_list(dom0);
> + arch_get_pfn_to_mfn_frame_list_list(hardware_domain);
> }
>
> /*
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
> index 84ce392..b2411b0 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
> @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ static void __init parse_dom0_max_vcpus(const char *s)
> }
> custom_param("dom0_max_vcpus", parse_dom0_max_vcpus);
>
> -struct vcpu *__init alloc_dom0_vcpu0(void)
> +struct vcpu *__init alloc_dom0_vcpu0(struct domain *dom0)
> {
> unsigned max_vcpus;
>
> @@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ static void __init process_dom0_ioports_disable(void)
> printk("Disabling dom0 access to ioport range %04lx-%04lx\n",
> io_from, io_to);
>
> - if ( ioports_deny_access(dom0, io_from, io_to) != 0 )
> + if ( ioports_deny_access(hardware_domain, io_from, io_to) != 0 )
> BUG();
> }
> }
> @@ -1082,27 +1082,28 @@ int __init construct_dom0(
>
> rc = 0;
>
> - /* DOM0 is permitted full I/O capabilities. */
> - rc |= ioports_permit_access(dom0, 0, 0xFFFF);
> - rc |= iomem_permit_access(dom0, 0UL, ~0UL);
> - rc |= irqs_permit_access(dom0, 1, nr_irqs_gsi - 1);
> + /* The hardware domain is initially permitted full I/O capabilities. */
> + rc |= ioports_permit_access(hardware_domain, 0, 0xFFFF);
> + rc |= iomem_permit_access(hardware_domain, 0UL, ~0UL);
> + rc |= irqs_permit_access(hardware_domain, 1, nr_irqs_gsi - 1);
>
> /*
> * Modify I/O port access permissions.
> */
> /* Master Interrupt Controller (PIC). */
> - rc |= ioports_deny_access(dom0, 0x20, 0x21);
> + rc |= ioports_deny_access(hardware_domain, 0x20, 0x21);
> /* Slave Interrupt Controller (PIC). */
> - rc |= ioports_deny_access(dom0, 0xA0, 0xA1);
> + rc |= ioports_deny_access(hardware_domain, 0xA0, 0xA1);
> /* Interval Timer (PIT). */
> - rc |= ioports_deny_access(dom0, 0x40, 0x43);
> + rc |= ioports_deny_access(hardware_domain, 0x40, 0x43);
> /* PIT Channel 2 / PC Speaker Control. */
> - rc |= ioports_deny_access(dom0, 0x61, 0x61);
> + rc |= ioports_deny_access(hardware_domain, 0x61, 0x61);
> /* ACPI PM Timer. */
> if ( pmtmr_ioport )
> - rc |= ioports_deny_access(dom0, pmtmr_ioport, pmtmr_ioport + 3);
> + rc |= ioports_deny_access(hardware_domain, pmtmr_ioport,
> + pmtmr_ioport + 3);
> /* PCI configuration space (NB. 0xcf8 has special treatment). */
> - rc |= ioports_deny_access(dom0, 0xcfc, 0xcff);
> + rc |= ioports_deny_access(hardware_domain, 0xcfc, 0xcff);
> /* Command-line I/O ranges. */
> process_dom0_ioports_disable();
>
> @@ -1113,22 +1114,22 @@ int __init construct_dom0(
> if ( mp_lapic_addr != 0 )
> {
> mfn = paddr_to_pfn(mp_lapic_addr);
> - rc |= iomem_deny_access(dom0, mfn, mfn);
> + rc |= iomem_deny_access(hardware_domain, mfn, mfn);
> }
> /* I/O APICs. */
> for ( i = 0; i < nr_ioapics; i++ )
> {
> mfn = paddr_to_pfn(mp_ioapics[i].mpc_apicaddr);
> if ( !rangeset_contains_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn) )
> - rc |= iomem_deny_access(dom0, mfn, mfn);
> + rc |= iomem_deny_access(hardware_domain, mfn, mfn);
> }
> /* MSI range. */
> - rc |= iomem_deny_access(dom0, paddr_to_pfn(MSI_ADDR_BASE_LO),
> + rc |= iomem_deny_access(hardware_domain, paddr_to_pfn(MSI_ADDR_BASE_LO),
> paddr_to_pfn(MSI_ADDR_BASE_LO +
> MSI_ADDR_DEST_ID_MASK));
> /* HyperTransport range. */
> if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD )
> - rc |= iomem_deny_access(dom0, paddr_to_pfn(0xfdULL << 32),
> + rc |= iomem_deny_access(hardware_domain, paddr_to_pfn(0xfdULL << 32),
> paddr_to_pfn((1ULL << 40) - 1));
>
> /* Remove access to E820_UNUSABLE I/O regions above 1MB. */
> @@ -1140,7 +1141,7 @@ int __init construct_dom0(
> if ( (e820.map[i].type == E820_UNUSABLE) &&
> (e820.map[i].size != 0) &&
> (sfn <= efn) )
> - rc |= iomem_deny_access(dom0, sfn, efn);
> + rc |= iomem_deny_access(hardware_domain, sfn, efn);
> }
>
> BUG_ON(rc != 0);
> @@ -1149,7 +1150,7 @@ int __init construct_dom0(
> printk(" Xen warning: dom0 kernel broken ELF: %s\n",
> elf_check_broken(&elf));
>
> - iommu_dom0_init(dom0);
> + iommu_dom0_init(hardware_domain);
> return 0;
>
> out:
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c b/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c
> index bddc588..4e6fe2b 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c
> @@ -2363,7 +2363,7 @@ int ioapic_guest_write(unsigned long physbase, unsigned
> int reg, u32 val)
> * that dom0 pirq == irq.
> */
> pirq = (irq >= 256) ? irq : rte.vector;
> - if ( (pirq < 0) || (pirq >= dom0->nr_pirqs) )
> + if ( (pirq < 0) || (pirq >= hardware_domain->nr_pirqs) )
> return -EINVAL;
>
> if ( desc->action )
> @@ -2399,10 +2399,10 @@ int ioapic_guest_write(unsigned long physbase,
> unsigned int reg, u32 val)
>
> printk(XENLOG_INFO "allocated vector %02x for irq %d\n", ret, irq);
> }
> - spin_lock(&dom0->event_lock);
> - ret = map_domain_pirq(dom0, pirq, irq,
> + spin_lock(&hardware_domain->event_lock);
> + ret = map_domain_pirq(hardware_domain, pirq, irq,
> MAP_PIRQ_TYPE_GSI, NULL);
> - spin_unlock(&dom0->event_lock);
> + spin_unlock(&hardware_domain->event_lock);
> if ( ret < 0 )
> return ret;
>
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/irq.c b/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
> index 88444be..ca68f92 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
> @@ -185,9 +185,9 @@ int create_irq(int node)
> desc->arch.used = IRQ_UNUSED;
> irq = ret;
> }
> - else if ( dom0 )
> + else if ( hardware_domain )
> {
> - ret = irq_permit_access(dom0, irq);
> + ret = irq_permit_access(hardware_domain, irq);
> if ( ret )
> printk(XENLOG_G_ERR
> "Could not grant Dom0 access to IRQ%d (error %d)\n",
> @@ -205,9 +205,9 @@ void destroy_irq(unsigned int irq)
>
> BUG_ON(!MSI_IRQ(irq));
>
> - if ( dom0 )
> + if ( hardware_domain )
> {
> - int err = irq_deny_access(dom0, irq);
> + int err = irq_deny_access(hardware_domain, irq);
>
> if ( err )
> printk(XENLOG_G_ERR
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
> index ad48acc..b9a54a5 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
> @@ -5222,7 +5222,7 @@ void *alloc_xen_pagetable(void)
> {
> void *ptr = alloc_xenheap_page();
>
> - BUG_ON(!dom0 && !ptr);
> + BUG_ON(!hardware_domain && !ptr);
> return ptr;
> }
>
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/nmi.c b/xen/arch/x86/nmi.c
> index c67a9c3..526020b 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/nmi.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/nmi.c
> @@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ static void do_nmi_stats(unsigned char key)
> for_each_online_cpu ( i )
> printk("%3d\t%3d\n", i, nmi_count(i));
>
> - if ( ((d = dom0) == NULL) || (d->vcpu == NULL) ||
> + if ( ((d = hardware_domain) == NULL) || (d->vcpu == NULL) ||
> ((v = d->vcpu[0]) == NULL) )
> return;
>
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
> index 13a148c..75cf212 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
> @@ -547,6 +547,7 @@ void __init noreturn __start_xen(unsigned long mbi_p)
> unsigned long nr_pages, raw_max_page, modules_headroom, *module_map;
> int i, j, e820_warn = 0, bytes = 0;
> bool_t acpi_boot_table_init_done = 0;
> + struct domain *dom0;
> struct ns16550_defaults ns16550 = {
> .data_bits = 8,
> .parity = 'n',
> @@ -1338,8 +1339,8 @@ void __init noreturn __start_xen(unsigned long mbi_p)
> panic("Could not protect TXT memory regions");
>
> /* Create initial domain 0. */
> - dom0 = domain_create(0, DOMCRF_s3_integrity, 0);
> - if ( IS_ERR(dom0) || (alloc_dom0_vcpu0() == NULL) )
> + hardware_domain = dom0 = domain_create(0, DOMCRF_s3_integrity, 0);
> + if ( IS_ERR(dom0) || (alloc_dom0_vcpu0(dom0) == NULL) )
> panic("Error creating domain 0");
>
> dom0->is_privileged = 1;
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
> index 21c8b63..e5c1269 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
> @@ -3152,7 +3152,7 @@ void async_exception_cleanup(struct vcpu *curr)
>
> static void nmi_dom0_report(unsigned int reason_idx)
> {
> - struct domain *d = dom0;
> + struct domain *d = hardware_domain;
>
> if ( (d == NULL) || (d->vcpu == NULL) || (d->vcpu[0] == NULL) )
> return;
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.c
> index f6ea012..71ae519 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.c
> @@ -1447,15 +1447,15 @@ int memory_add(unsigned long spfn, unsigned long
> epfn, unsigned int pxm)
> if ( ret )
> goto destroy_m2p;
>
> - if ( !need_iommu(dom0) )
> + if ( !need_iommu(hardware_domain) )
> {
> for ( i = spfn; i < epfn; i++ )
> - if ( iommu_map_page(dom0, i, i, IOMMUF_readable|IOMMUF_writable)
> )
> + if ( iommu_map_page(hardware_domain, i, i,
> IOMMUF_readable|IOMMUF_writable) )
> break;
> if ( i != epfn )
> {
> while (i-- > old_max)
> - iommu_unmap_page(dom0, i);
> + iommu_unmap_page(hardware_domain, i);
> goto destroy_m2p;
> }
> }
> diff --git a/xen/common/domain.c b/xen/common/domain.c
> index b5868a5..f8ef439 100644
> --- a/xen/common/domain.c
> +++ b/xen/common/domain.c
> @@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ DEFINE_RCU_READ_LOCK(domlist_read_lock);
> static struct domain *domain_hash[DOMAIN_HASH_SIZE];
> struct domain *domain_list;
>
> -struct domain *dom0;
> +struct domain *hardware_domain __read_mostly;
>
> struct vcpu *idle_vcpu[NR_CPUS] __read_mostly;
>
> diff --git a/xen/common/event_channel.c b/xen/common/event_channel.c
> index db952af..51fd63d 100644
> --- a/xen/common/event_channel.c
> +++ b/xen/common/event_channel.c
> @@ -743,7 +743,7 @@ void send_global_virq(uint32_t virq)
> ASSERT(virq < NR_VIRQS);
> ASSERT(virq_is_global(virq));
>
> - send_guest_global_virq(global_virq_handlers[virq] ?: dom0, virq);
> + send_guest_global_virq(global_virq_handlers[virq] ?: hardware_domain,
> virq);
> }
>
> int set_global_virq_handler(struct domain *d, uint32_t virq)
> diff --git a/xen/common/kexec.c b/xen/common/kexec.c
> index 23d964e..2239ee8 100644
> --- a/xen/common/kexec.c
> +++ b/xen/common/kexec.c
> @@ -872,7 +872,7 @@ static int kexec_load_slot(struct kexec_image *kimage)
> static uint16_t kexec_load_v1_arch(void)
> {
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86
> - return is_pv_32on64_domain(dom0) ? EM_386 : EM_X86_64;
> + return is_pv_32on64_domain(hardware_domain) ? EM_386 : EM_X86_64;
> #else
> return EM_NONE;
> #endif
> diff --git a/xen/common/keyhandler.c b/xen/common/keyhandler.c
> index 5a974b1..627ef99 100644
> --- a/xen/common/keyhandler.c
> +++ b/xen/common/keyhandler.c
> @@ -172,12 +172,12 @@ static void dump_dom0_registers(unsigned char key)
> {
> struct vcpu *v;
>
> - if ( dom0 == NULL )
> + if ( hardware_domain == NULL )
> return;
>
> printk("'%c' pressed -> dumping Dom0's registers\n", key);
>
> - for_each_vcpu ( dom0, v )
> + for_each_vcpu ( hardware_domain, v )
> {
> if ( alt_key_handling && softirq_pending(smp_processor_id()) )
> {
> diff --git a/xen/common/xenoprof.c b/xen/common/xenoprof.c
> index 3c30c3e..3de20b8 100644
> --- a/xen/common/xenoprof.c
> +++ b/xen/common/xenoprof.c
> @@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ static int alloc_xenoprof_struct(
> bufsize = sizeof(struct xenoprof_buf);
> i = sizeof(struct event_log);
> #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
> - d->xenoprof->is_compat = is_pv_32on64_domain(is_passive ? dom0 : d);
> + d->xenoprof->is_compat = is_pv_32on64_domain(is_passive ?
> hardware_domain : d);
> if ( XENOPROF_COMPAT(d->xenoprof) )
> {
> bufsize = sizeof(struct compat_oprof_buf);
> diff --git a/xen/drivers/char/ns16550.c b/xen/drivers/char/ns16550.c
> index 429d786..d437bbf 100644
> --- a/xen/drivers/char/ns16550.c
> +++ b/xen/drivers/char/ns16550.c
> @@ -703,10 +703,12 @@ static void __init ns16550_endboot(struct serial_port
> *port)
> {
> #ifdef HAS_IOPORTS
> struct ns16550 *uart = port->uart;
> + int rv;
>
> if ( uart->remapped_io_base )
> return;
> - if ( ioports_deny_access(dom0, uart->io_base, uart->io_base + 7) != 0 )
> + rv = ioports_deny_access(hardware_domain, uart->io_base, uart->io_base +
> 7);
> + if ( rv != 0 )
> BUG();
> #endif
> }
> diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c
> b/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c
> index ff5f06e..031480f 100644
> --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c
> +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c
> @@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ static int amd_iommu_assign_device(struct domain *d, u8
> devfn,
> ivrs_mappings[req_id].read_permission);
> }
>
> - return reassign_device(dom0, d, devfn, pdev);
> + return reassign_device(hardware_domain, d, devfn, pdev);
> }
>
> static void deallocate_next_page_table(struct page_info *pg, int level)
> diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
> index 3e5635c..25d9af9 100644
> --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
> +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
> @@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ static void iommu_teardown(struct domain *d)
> }
>
> /*
> - * If the device isn't owned by dom0, it means it already
> + * If the device isn't owned by the hardware domain, it means it already
> * has been assigned to other domain, or it doesn't exist.
> */
> static int device_assigned(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn)
> @@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ static int device_assigned(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn)
> struct pci_dev *pdev;
>
> spin_lock(&pcidevs_lock);
> - pdev = pci_get_pdev_by_domain(dom0, seg, bus, devfn);
> + pdev = pci_get_pdev_by_domain(hardware_domain, seg, bus, devfn);
> spin_unlock(&pcidevs_lock);
>
> return pdev ? 0 : -EBUSY;
> @@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ static int assign_device(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8
> bus, u8 devfn)
> d->need_iommu = 1;
> }
>
> - pdev = pci_get_pdev_by_domain(dom0, seg, bus, devfn);
> + pdev = pci_get_pdev_by_domain(hardware_domain, seg, bus, devfn);
> if ( !pdev )
> {
> rc = pci_get_pdev(seg, bus, devfn) ? -EBUSY : -ENODEV;
> @@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ int deassign_device(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8
> devfn)
> devfn += pdev->phantom_stride;
> if ( PCI_SLOT(devfn) != PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn) )
> break;
> - ret = hd->platform_ops->reassign_device(d, dom0, devfn, pdev);
> + ret = hd->platform_ops->reassign_device(d, hardware_domain, devfn,
> pdev);
> if ( !ret )
> continue;
>
> @@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ int deassign_device(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8
> devfn)
> }
>
> devfn = pdev->devfn;
> - ret = hd->platform_ops->reassign_device(d, dom0, devfn, pdev);
> + ret = hd->platform_ops->reassign_device(d, hardware_domain, devfn, pdev);
> if ( ret )
> {
> dprintk(XENLOG_G_ERR,
> diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
> index dfa195a..fbc777c 100644
> --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
> +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
> @@ -569,7 +569,7 @@ int pci_add_device(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn, const
> struct pci_dev_info *info)
> ret = 0;
> if ( !pdev->domain )
> {
> - pdev->domain = dom0;
> + pdev->domain = hardware_domain;
> ret = iommu_add_device(pdev);
> if ( ret )
> {
> @@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ int pci_add_device(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn, const
> struct pci_dev_info *info)
> goto out;
> }
>
> - list_add(&pdev->domain_list, &dom0->arch.pdev_list);
> + list_add(&pdev->domain_list, &hardware_domain->arch.pdev_list);
> }
> else
> iommu_enable_device(pdev);
> diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
> b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
> index d22d518..263448d 100644
> --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
> +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
> @@ -1667,7 +1667,7 @@ static int reassign_device_ownership(
> * can attempt to send arbitrary LAPIC/MSI messages. We are unprotected
> * by the root complex unless interrupt remapping is enabled.
> */
> - if ( (target != dom0) && !iommu_intremap )
> + if ( (target != hardware_domain) && !iommu_intremap )
> untrusted_msi = 1;
>
> ret = domain_context_unmap(source, devfn, pdev);
> @@ -2270,7 +2270,7 @@ static int intel_iommu_assign_device(
> if ( list_empty(&acpi_drhd_units) )
> return -ENODEV;
>
> - ret = reassign_device_ownership(dom0, d, devfn, pdev);
> + ret = reassign_device_ownership(hardware_domain, d, devfn, pdev);
> if ( ret )
> goto done;
>
> diff --git a/xen/include/asm-arm/domain.h b/xen/include/asm-arm/domain.h
> index 28c359a..ec66a4e 100644
> --- a/xen/include/asm-arm/domain.h
> +++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/domain.h
> @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ enum domain_type {
> #endif
>
> extern int dom0_11_mapping;
> -#define is_domain_direct_mapped(d) ((d) == dom0 && dom0_11_mapping)
> +#define is_domain_direct_mapped(d) ((d) == hardware_domain &&
> dom0_11_mapping)
>
> struct vtimer {
> struct vcpu *v;
> diff --git a/xen/include/xen/domain.h b/xen/include/xen/domain.h
> index a057069..bb1c398 100644
> --- a/xen/include/xen/domain.h
> +++ b/xen/include/xen/domain.h
> @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ typedef union {
>
> struct vcpu *alloc_vcpu(
> struct domain *d, unsigned int vcpu_id, unsigned int cpu_id);
> -struct vcpu *alloc_dom0_vcpu0(void);
> +struct vcpu *alloc_dom0_vcpu0(struct domain *dom0);
> int vcpu_reset(struct vcpu *);
>
> struct xen_domctl_getdomaininfo;
> diff --git a/xen/include/xen/sched.h b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
> index 1f45f71..91adc8c 100644
> --- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h
> +++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
> @@ -43,8 +43,8 @@ DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(vcpu_runstate_info_compat_t);
>
> #define SCHED_STAT_CRANK(_X) (perfc_incr(_X))
>
> -/* A global pointer to the initial domain (DOM0). */
> -extern struct domain *dom0;
> +/* A global pointer to the hardware domain (usually DOM0). */
> +extern struct domain *hardware_domain;
>
> #ifndef CONFIG_COMPAT
> #define BITS_PER_EVTCHN_WORD(d) BITS_PER_XEN_ULONG
>
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