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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [PATCH 4/6] xen: Allow hardare domain != dom0
This adds a hypervisor command line option "hardware_dom=" which takes a
domain ID. When the domain with this ID is created, it will be used as
the hardware domain.
This is intended to be used when dom0 is a dedicated stub domain for
domain building, allowing the hardware domain to be de-privileged and
act only as a driver domain.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
---
xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c | 4 +++-
xen/arch/x86/setup.c | 3 +++
xen/common/domctl.c | 8 ++++++++
xen/common/rangeset.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
xen/include/xen/rangeset.h | 3 +++
xen/include/xen/sched.h | 3 ++-
6 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
index 84ce392..e9de496 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
@@ -1149,7 +1149,9 @@ int __init construct_dom0(
printk(" Xen warning: dom0 kernel broken ELF: %s\n",
elf_check_broken(&elf));
- iommu_dom0_init(dom0);
+ if( is_hardware_domain(dom0) )
+ iommu_dom0_init(dom0);
+
return 0;
out:
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
index 3a4f69c..3480854 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
@@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ unsigned long __initdata highmem_start;
size_param("highmem-start", highmem_start);
#endif
+unsigned int __read_mostly hardware_dom;
+integer_param("hardware_dom", hardware_dom);
+
cpumask_t __read_mostly cpu_present_map;
unsigned long __read_mostly xen_phys_start;
diff --git a/xen/common/domctl.c b/xen/common/domctl.c
index eebeee7..11e6b94 100644
--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
+++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
@@ -472,6 +472,14 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_domctl_t)
u_domctl)
break;
}
+ if (d->domain_id == hardware_dom) {
+ printk("Initialising hardware domain %d\n", hardware_dom);
+ rangeset_swap(d->irq_caps, dom0->irq_caps);
+
+ dom0 = d;
+ iommu_dom0_init(dom0);
+ }
+
ret = 0;
memcpy(d->handle, op->u.createdomain.handle,
diff --git a/xen/common/rangeset.c b/xen/common/rangeset.c
index f09c0c4..cd44634 100644
--- a/xen/common/rangeset.c
+++ b/xen/common/rangeset.c
@@ -438,3 +438,29 @@ void rangeset_domain_printk(
spin_unlock(&d->rangesets_lock);
}
+
+void rangeset_swap(struct rangeset *a, struct rangeset *b)
+{
+ struct list_head tmp;
+ spin_lock(&a->lock);
+ spin_lock(&b->lock);
+ memcpy(&tmp, &a->range_list, sizeof(tmp));
+ memcpy(&a->range_list, &b->range_list, sizeof(tmp));
+ memcpy(&b->range_list, &tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+ if (a->range_list.next == &b->range_list) {
+ a->range_list.next = &a->range_list;
+ a->range_list.prev = &a->range_list;
+ } else {
+ a->range_list.next->prev = &a->range_list;
+ a->range_list.prev->next = &a->range_list;
+ }
+ if (b->range_list.next == &a->range_list) {
+ b->range_list.next = &b->range_list;
+ b->range_list.prev = &b->range_list;
+ } else {
+ b->range_list.next->prev = &b->range_list;
+ b->range_list.prev->next = &b->range_list;
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&a->lock);
+ spin_unlock(&b->lock);
+}
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/rangeset.h b/xen/include/xen/rangeset.h
index 1e16a6b..805ebde 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/rangeset.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/rangeset.h
@@ -73,4 +73,7 @@ void rangeset_printk(
void rangeset_domain_printk(
struct domain *d);
+/* swap contents */
+void rangeset_swap(struct rangeset *a, struct rangeset *b);
+
#endif /* __XEN_RANGESET_H__ */
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/sched.h b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
index 3be26ec..6c4237b 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
@@ -778,7 +778,8 @@ void watchdog_domain_destroy(struct domain *d);
* (that is, this would not be suitable for a driver domain)
* - There is never a reason to deny dom0 access to this
*/
-#define is_hardware_domain(_d) ((_d)->domain_id == 0)
+extern unsigned int hardware_dom;
+#define is_hardware_domain(d) ((d)->domain_id == hardware_dom)
/* This check is for functionality specific to a control domain */
#define is_control_domain(_d) ((_d)->is_privileged)
--
1.8.5.3
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