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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] xen/arm: Correctly handle non-page aligned pointer in raw_copy_*
On Fri, 2014-02-14 at 17:10 +0000, Julien Grall wrote:
> The current implementation of raw_copy_* helpers may lead to data corruption
> and sometimes Xen crash when the guest virtual address is not aligned to
> PAGE_SIZE.
Isn't a non-aligned address the vast majority of the cases (hypercall
arguments on the guest stack)? How have we managed to get away with this
for so long?
> When the total length is higher than a page, the length to read is badly
> compute with
> min(len, (unsigned)(PAGE_SIZE - offset))
>
> As the offset is only computed one time per function,
We set offset = 0 at the end of the first iteration.
Which I think is correct: On the second iteration things should now be
aligned to a page boundary.
Have you observed offset != 0 for the second and subsequent iterations?
> if the start address was
> not aligned to PAGE_SIZE, we can end up in same iteration:
> - to read accross page boundary => xen crash
> - read the previous page => data corruption
>
> This issue can be resolved by computing the offset on every iteration.
>
> Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx>
>
> ---
> This patch is a bug fix for Xen 4.4. Without this patch the data may be
> corrupted between Xen and the guest when the guest virtual address is
> not aligned to PAGE_SIZE. Sometimes it can also crash Xen.
>
> These functions are used in numerous place in Xen. If it introduce another
> bug we can see quickly with small amount of data.
> ---
> xen/arch/arm/guestcopy.c | 8 +++-----
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/guestcopy.c b/xen/arch/arm/guestcopy.c
> index af0af6b..b3b54e9 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/arm/guestcopy.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/arm/guestcopy.c
> @@ -9,12 +9,11 @@ static unsigned long raw_copy_to_guest_helper(void *to,
> const void *from,
> unsigned len, int flush_dcache)
> {
> /* XXX needs to handle faults */
> - unsigned offset = (vaddr_t)to & ~PAGE_MASK;
> -
> while ( len )
> {
> paddr_t g;
> void *p;
> + unsigned offset = (vaddr_t)to & ~PAGE_MASK;
> unsigned size = min(len, (unsigned)PAGE_SIZE - offset);
>
> if ( gvirt_to_maddr((vaddr_t) to, &g) )
> @@ -50,12 +49,12 @@ unsigned long raw_copy_to_guest_flush_dcache(void *to,
> const void *from,
> unsigned long raw_clear_guest(void *to, unsigned len)
> {
> /* XXX needs to handle faults */
> - unsigned offset = (vaddr_t)to & ~PAGE_MASK;
>
> while ( len )
> {
> paddr_t g;
> void *p;
> + unsigned offset = (vaddr_t)to & ~PAGE_MASK;
> unsigned size = min(len, (unsigned)PAGE_SIZE - offset);
>
> if ( gvirt_to_maddr((vaddr_t) to, &g) )
> @@ -76,12 +75,11 @@ unsigned long raw_clear_guest(void *to, unsigned len)
>
> unsigned long raw_copy_from_guest(void *to, const void __user *from,
> unsigned len)
> {
> - unsigned offset = (vaddr_t)from & ~PAGE_MASK;
> -
> while ( len )
> {
> paddr_t g;
> void *p;
> + unsigned offset = (vaddr_t)from & ~PAGE_MASK;
> unsigned size = min(len, (unsigned)(PAGE_SIZE - offset));
>
> if ( gvirt_to_maddr((vaddr_t) from & PAGE_MASK, &g) )
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