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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH V2 net-next 0/5] xen-net{back, front}: Multiple transmit and receive queues
On 14/02/14 15:25, Wei Liu wrote:
On Fri, Feb 14, 2014 at 02:53:48PM +0000, Andrew Bennieston wrote:
On 14/02/14 14:06, Wei Liu wrote:
On Fri, Feb 14, 2014 at 11:50:19AM +0000, Andrew J. Bennieston wrote:
This patch series implements multiple transmit and receive queues (i.e.
multiple shared rings) for the xen virtual network interfaces.
The series is split up as follows:
- Patches 1 and 3 factor out the queue-specific data for netback and
netfront respectively, and modify the rest of the code to use these
as appropriate.
- Patches 2 and 4 introduce new XenStore keys to negotiate and use
multiple shared rings and event channels, and code to connect these
as appropriate.
- Patch 5 documents the XenStore keys required for the new feature
in include/xen/interface/io/netif.h
All other transmit and receive processing remains unchanged, i.e. there
is a kthread per queue and a NAPI context per queue.
The performance of these patches has been analysed in detail, with
results available at:
http://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen-netback_and_xen-netfront_multi-queue_performance_testing
To summarise:
* Using multiple queues allows a VM to transmit at line rate on a 10
Gbit/s NIC, compared with a maximum aggregate throughput of 6 Gbit/s
with a single queue.
* For intra-host VM--VM traffic, eight queues provide 171% of the
throughput of a single queue; almost 12 Gbit/s instead of 6 Gbit/s.
* There is a corresponding increase in total CPU usage, i.e. this is a
scaling out over available resources, not an efficiency improvement.
* Results depend on the availability of sufficient CPUs, as well as the
distribution of interrupts and the distribution of TCP streams across
the queues.
Queue selection is currently achieved via an L4 hash on the packet (i.e.
TCP src/dst port, IP src/dst address) and is not negotiated between the
frontend and backend, since only one option exists. Future patches to
support other frontends (particularly Windows) will need to add some
capability to negotiate not only the hash algorithm selection, but also
allow the frontend to specify some parameters to this.
This has an impact on the protocol. If the key to select hash algorithm
is missing then we're assuming L4 is in use.
This either needs to be documented (which is missing in your patch to
netif.h) or you need to write that key explicitly in XenStore.
a)
I also have a question what would happen if one end advertises one hash
algorithm then use a different one. This can happen when the
driver is rogue or buggy. Will it cause the "good guy" to stall? We
certainly don't want to stall backend, at the very least.
b)
I'm not sure I understand. There is no negotiable selection of hash
algorithm here. This paragraph refers to a possible future in which
we may have to support multiple such. These issues will absolutely
have to be addressed then, but it is completely irrelevant for now.
There's actaully two questions.
I suspect your above reply was for a). My starting point of a) is, if
I'm to write a driver, either backend or frontend, for any random OS,
will I be able to have some basic idea what the correct behavior is by
looking at netif.h only? The current answer for multiqueue hash
algorithm selection is "no" given that 1) the document is not clear L4
is the default algorithm if no key is specified, 2) the key to select
algorithm is not mandatory the the current protocol.
I was not very clear in previous reply, especially the "write that key
explicitly in XenStore", sorry. The thing you need to do would be:
1) document L4 will be selected if algorithm selection is missing, or
2) document algorithm key is mandatory and implement negotiation.
For question b). Say, if I'm writing a malicious frontend driver, I
advertise I want L4 but actually I always select a particular queue, or
deliberately select random queue, will that cause problem to the
backend? If we are to use a more complex algorithm, will a rogue
frontend cause problem to backend?
Wei.
Let me attempt to clear this up. Bear with me...
Queue selection is a decision by a transmitting system about which queue
it uses for a particular packet. A well-behaved receiving system will
pick up packets on any queue and throw them up into its network stack as
normal. In this manner, the details of queue selection don't matter from
the point of view of a receiving guest (either frontend or backend).
That is; if a "malicious" frontend sends all of its packets on a single
queue, then it is only damaging itself - by reducing its effective
throughput to that of a single queue. This will not cause a problem to
the backend. The same goes for the "select a random queue" scenario,
although here you probably shouldn't expect decent TCP performance.
Certainly there will be no badness in terms of affecting the backend or
other systems, beyond that which a guest could achieve with a broken TCP
stack anyway.
In light of this, algorithm selection is (mostly) a function of the
transmitting side. The receiving side should be prepared to receive
packets on any of the legitimately established queues. It just happens
that the Linux netback and Linux netfront both use skb_get_hash() to
determine this value.
In the future, some frontends (i.e. Windows) may need to do complex
things like pushing hash state to the backend. This will be taken care
of with extensions to the protocol at the point these are implemented.
Andrew.
Andrew.
I don't see relevant code in this series to handle "rogue other end". I
presume for a simple hash algorithm like L4 is not very important (say,
even a packet ends up in the wrong queue we can still safely process
it), or core driver can deal with this all by itself (dropping)?
Wei.
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